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Abstract 
 
Intrusive memories are memories for negative autobiographical events that come to 
mind without being deliberately recalled (Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 
2004). Previous research has demonstrated that intrusive memories, and negative 
reactions to intrusive memories, are an important feature of depression (Starr & 
Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b) and contribute to the maintenance of 
depression longitudinally (Newby & Moulds, 2011c). It has also been established that 
intrusive memory experience is related to individual differences in cognitive control, 
specifically in proactive interference resolution (Verwoerd, Wessel, & de Jong, 2009; 
Verwoerd, Wessel, de Jong, Nieuwenhuis, & Huntjens, 2011). The present thesis 
aimed to extend upon these existing findings, using the Dual Mechanism of Control 
theory, which distinguishes between proactive and reactive modes of control (Braver, 
Gray, & Burgess, 2007). Furthermore, in view of some recent ambiguity of the 
defining feature of an intrusive memory, as compared to a negative involuntary 
memory more generally (Kvavilashvili, 2014; Moulds & Krans, 2015), another goal 
of the thesis was to incorporate a wider focus of involuntary memories, rather than 
focusing only on traditionally studied intrusive memories.  Participants from the 
student population and local community were tested. Overall, results provide some 
evidence for a negative involuntary memory related deficit in proactive control, on 
both a classic and an emotional version of the AX-Continuous Performance Task 
(AX-CPT). Conversely, there was no link between intrusive or involuntary memory 
experience and reactive control. A brief mindfulness and self-compassion based 
intervention, designed to reduce negative reactions to intrusive memories, was also 
tested. The intervention was successful in reducing intrusive-memory distress, and 
recommendations for the future development of the intervention are presented.  
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Chapter one. 
 
Introduction. 
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An intrusive memory is a memory for a negative past autobiographical event that 
comes to mind without being deliberately recalled (Hackmann et al., 2004). Intrusive 
memories have traditionally been studied in the context of Post-Traumatic Disorder 
(PTSD), where individuals experience unrecalled memories of a past traumatic event 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Intrusive memories are experienced either 
in autobiographical memory or flashback form, where the patient feels like they are 
back experiencing the original event (Ehlers, 2010). Subsequently, it has been 
demonstrated that individuals with depression also experience intrusive memories of 
past negative events (Brewin, 1998; Kuyken & Brewin, 1994). These memories have 
been shown to be distressing (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b), to 
be accompanied by ruminative processing styles (Williams & Moulds, 2008b, 2010) 
and to maintain symptoms of depression longitudinally (Newby & Moulds, 2011b).   
It is these non-traumatic examples of intrusive memories that are the focus of this 
thesis.   
 
There has been a plethora of research looking at factors that are important after 
intrusive memory retrieval in depression. This research has highlighted, for example, 
that negative appraisals are a common, but maladaptive, response to these memories 
(Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b) and that avoidance behaviours, 
including suppression and rumination, contribute to the long-term maintenance of 
intrusive memories (Moulds, Kandris, Williams, & Lang, 2008; Newby & Moulds, 
2011c; Williams & Moulds, 2007d). The primary focus of the thesis is to look at the 
initial manifestation of these memories. In particular, the studies presented here aim to 
determine whether individual differences in cognitive control can explain why some 
individuals are more susceptible to experiencing these unrecalled memories more 
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frequently than other individuals. Another objective of the thesis is to test, on a 
preliminary basis, the use of a mindfulness and self-compassion based intervention to 
reduce the distress associated with intrusive memories in a low mood sample. This 
introductory chapter will review the existing work that provides the rationale for the 
current programme of research, and then summarize the empirical studies that will be 
presented. 
What is an intrusive memory? 
 
As previously described, an intrusive memory is a memory for a negative 
autobiographical event that comes to mind without being deliberately recalled 
(Hackmann et al., 2004). Intrusive memories have been conceptualized as 
unsuccessful emotional processing (Rachman, 1980). Emotional processing is defined 
as ‘a process whereby emotional disturbances are absorbed, and decline to the extent 
that other experiences and behaviour can proceed without disruption’ (Rachman, 
1980). Therefore, the intrusiveness of cognitions (thoughts, feelings and memories) 
about the traumatic event in PTSD suggests it has not been fully processed and 
incorporated into typical memory systems. Similar to the view of Rachman (1980), 
Horowitz (2003) maintains that thoughts and memories about the event will be 
experienced both deliberately and automatically until the event is properly integrated.  
Rachman (1980) proposes that this process of integration is impeded by avoidance 
behaviours, for example whereby the patient suppresses the memory of the event in 
order to avoid negative emotions. Accordingly, avoidance of thoughts and feelings or 
external triggers concerning the memories are included in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) criteria for PTSD (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Research has looked at variables that contribute to the 
persistence of intrusive memories in PTSD longitudinally. An influential model is the 
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Ehlers and Steil (1995) model of intrusion maintenance. This model underlines the 
importance of the appraisals patients give to their intrusive memories. The model 
maintains that it is the individual’s interpretation of their memory, rather than the 
frequency of the memory per se, that determines the distress experienced. Examples 
of negative appraisals patients have been shown to endorse include ‘If I think about 
the trauma, I will seriously damage my health’ (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  According to 
the Ehlers and Steil (1995) model, the more negatively an individual appraises their 
memory, the more distress they experience following the memory. In the short term, 
this heightened distress prompts avoidance behaviours, for example thought 
suppression, which increase the frequency of the intrusions (Williams & Moulds, 
2008b). Additionally, in the long term, these avoidance behaviours prevent the 
memory being sufficiently processed (as per Rachman (1980) described above), and 
also prevent the incorporation of new information to change these appraisals. For 
example, the individual does not learn that although the memory is upsetting, it does 
not have to be devastating.    
 
However, intrusive memories are not only experienced by patients with PTSD. 
Individuals with depression also report experiencing intrusive memories of negative 
events. This was first established by Kuyken and Brewin (1994), who looked at a 
sample of females who had experienced childhood abuse. The sample was diagnosed 
as being clinically depressed, with no other psychiatric diagnoses. The authors found 
that, in this sample, Impact of Event Scale (IES), a measure of subjective distress, 
(Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) were comparable to the IES scores of a sample 
of patients diagnosed with PTSD. Additionally, participants with high IES scores 
were also significantly more depressed, measured by the Beck Depression Inventory 
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(BDI; Beck, Steer, and Brown (1996)) than participants with low IES scores. 
Although the sample was screened for PTSD, the sexual abuse experienced by these 
subjects qualifies as a traumatic event on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV 
(DSM-IV) criteria for PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This may 
suggest that results are not necessarily generalizable to a wider sample of depressed 
individuals. To address this potential confound, therefore, Brewin, Hunter, Carroll, 
and Tata (1996b) extended these findings to a wider range of negative past events, in 
a sample of female and male depressed participants. Their depressed sample reported 
intrusive memories about relationship/family problems, illness/death and 
work/financial problems. Since these initial investigations, multiple studies have 
found support for the presence of intrusive memories in clinically depressed (Newby 
& Moulds, 2011a) and dysphoric participants (Newby & Moulds, 2011b; Williams & 
Moulds, 2007c). Moulds and Krans (2015) conclude that there is considerable 
variability in terms of the content of intrusive memories reported by depressed 
samples, although many pertain to interpersonal events, including relationship 
problems and arguments.  Research has also looked longitudinally at the relationship 
between depression and intrusive memory experience. Brewin, Reynolds, and Tata 
(1999) found that IES scores predicted BDI-II scores at 6-months follow-up, after 
baseline depression scores were controlled for, in a clinically depressed sample. This 
suggests that intrusive memories play role in the course of depression.  
 
The content of an intrusive memory studied within the context of depression is 
different to the memories studied in PTSD. Specifically, in PTSD the event involves 
actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual violence (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). On the other hand, intrusive memories reported by depressed and 
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low-mood individuals are often memories of commonplace events that most people 
will have experienced at some point during their lifetime, for example arguments or 
embarrassing situations (Brewin et al., 1996b; Williams & Moulds, 2007c). However, 
despite this key difference in the memory content, similarities between intrusive 
memories in PTSD and depression have been demonstrated. For example, Reynolds 
and Brewin (1999) found that participants diagnosed with depression and PTSD 
reported comparable levels of memory vividness and memory distress, although the 
PTSD patients reported significantly more out of body dissociation when 
experiencing their memory than depressed individuals. An additional important 
similarity between the two disorders is the role of the appraisals assigned to the 
memories. Individuals with depression have been shown to appraise their memory in 
a negative way, e.g. ‘having this memory means I have a psychological problem’, 
‘having this memory means I am inferior to other people’ (Moulds et al., 2008).  
Accordingly, the model of intrusion maintenance in PTSD, described above, has been 
validated in depression-focused research. This research will now be summarized.  
 
Appraisals of intrusive memories:  
It has long been demonstrated that individuals with depression exhibit biases in the 
way they perceive and recall emotional information. These include selective attention 
to negative information (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994), showing either higher recall 
for negative information or difficulty recalling positive information (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005), overgeneralizing (e.g. summarizing across events rather than 
recalling a specific event, Williams et al. (2007)), catastrophizing (e.g. excessive 
focus on the worst possible outcomes, Beck (1979)) and the lack of a self-positivity 
bias (Dunn, Stefanovitch, Buchan, Lawrence, & Dalgleish, 2009; Watson, Dritschel, 
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Jentzsch, & Obonsawin, 2008)  Consequently, while actually experiencing an 
intrusive memory in the first place may not be limited to clinical populations, the 
consequences of these memories may be different. This idea is consistent with Newby 
and Moulds (2011a), who showed that intrusive memories are not unique to clinical 
populations. They found no difference in terms of the number of days on which 
currently depressed, recovered depressed and never-depressed individuals had 
experienced an intrusive memory the week prior to testing. The currently depressed 
group did report significantly more occurrences of the memory within the day than 
the recovered depressed group, who reported levels similar to the control group. 
However, they did find that there were some elements of the intrusive memories, not 
related to frequency, which differed between the groups. Specifically, the currently 
depressed individuals reported higher distress, higher memory vividness, and higher 
interference than the never depressed individuals. The currently depressed individuals 
also reported higher levels of interference than the recovered depressed individuals. 
Depressed individuals also reported higher helplessness and sadness than never 
depressed individuals, and higher helplessness than recovered depressed individuals.  
 
Starr and Moulds (2006) were the first to look at the impact of negative appraisals of 
intrusive memories in the context of depression. They used an undergraduate student 
sample. They showed that dysfunctional meanings of appraisals, measured by the 
Response to Intrusion Questionnaire (RIQ): Items include ‘something is wrong with 
me’, ‘I will not achieve future goals that are important’ (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999), 
and intrusion-related distress correlated with depressive symptomatology (measured 
with the BDI-II, Beck et al. (1996)), even after intrusion frequency and event severity 
were partialled out. Williams and Moulds (2008b) replicated these relationships in a 
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non-clinical student sample, finding a positive correlation between intrusion-related 
distress and BDI-II, and between BDI-II, and levels of intrusiveness and avoidance of 
memory, once again irrespective of memory frequency. These two studies highlight 
the importance of the reaction to the memory, rather than the initial occurrence of the 
memory, in samples beyond the original PTSD samples. Findings highlight the 
importance of the reaction to the memory, and suggest that healthy populations react 
in a different way to similar intrusive memories than clinical populations.  
 
In addition, a great deal of research has looked at the impact of ruminative responses 
to low mood and general symptoms of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993) and has more recently been looked at 
specifically as a detrimental reaction to intrusive memories (Williams & Moulds, 
2007b; Williams & Moulds, 2010). Rumination is defined at the passive thinking of 
the causes, meanings and consequence of depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991). Therefore while appraisals of intrusive memories specifically concern the 
memory, rumination refers more inclusively to the general reaction to negative 
thoughts and feeling down and depressed (e.g. ‘ think about all your shortcomings, 
failings, failures and mistakes’, ‘think about how passive and unmotivated you feel’, 
Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003)). A wealth of research has 
highlighted the role of rumination in both the onset and maintenance of depression 
(Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Experimental research has shown that 
inducing ruminative processing styles, by getting participants to read through a series 
of ruminative statements, leads to a decrease in mood and an increase in negative 
cognitive biases (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008) in dysphoric and 
depressed participants (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Conversely, engaging in a 
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distraction task has been shown to improve current mood ratings (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Wells & Papageorgiou, 2003).  
 
Further research has demonstrated that there are different components to rumination. 
One distinction refers to whether the ruminative self-focus has an analytical 
component (i.e. why do I feel like this?) or an experiential component (i.e. how do I 
feel?).  Only the analytical component of ruminative self-focus is problematic, 
whereas an experiential self-focus can have a beneficial impact on mood and 
cognition. For example, Watkins and Teasdale (2004) demonstrated that inducing 
depressed participants to an analytical focus, by reading through sentences preceded 
by the instruction to think ‘about the way you feel inside’, upholds the overgeneral 
memory bias, a hallmark of maladaptive processing in depression (see Williams et al. 
(2007) for a review). Conversely, they also showed that inducing an experiential 
focus, by reading through sentences preceded by the instruction to ‘focus on the way 
you feel inside’, reduced this overgeneral memory retrieval bias (Watkins & Teasdale, 
2004). Watkins and Moulds (2005) additionally demonstrated that an experiential 
induction improved problem solving in depressed participants, whereas an analytical 
induction had no impact on problem-solving abilities.  
 
Looking specifically at the relationship between rumination and intrusive memories, 
Williams (2008) demonstrated that rumination positively correlated with both the 
number of intrusive memories and intrusion-related distress in a student sample. 
However the directionality of causation remained unclear from this correlation; it 
could be that experiencing frequent intrusive memories causes people to ruminate 
more often, or it could be that rumination contributes to the maintenance of intrusive 
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memories by preventing more adaptive forms of emotional processing. For example, 
rumination can be conceptualised as a cognitive avoidance mechanism, as engaging in 
rumination prevents active problem-solving. Rumination also may reduce the 
intensity of emotions experienced (Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 2007). As 
argued by the Ehlers and Steil (1995) model of intrusion maintenance, therefore, a 
ruminative response to an intrusive memory may prevent the integration of the 
memory into normal memory systems. To investigate this possibility, Williams and 
Moulds (2007b) used the analytical versus experiential self-focus distinction 
described above to deconstruct the relationship between rumination and intrusive 
memories in a dysphoric student sample. They used the film methodology, where 
participants are exposed to a short film-clip to induce intrusive memories. Film clips 
are useful in the sense that participants are all exposed to the same event and the same 
time-point, which standardizes the objective severity of the event, duration of 
exposure, time since event et cetera. This provides control over the considerable 
variability in real-life intrusive memories. In this study, dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
participants watched a sad-movie clip and were subsequently exposed to either an 
analytical, experiential or distraction processing induction. However, contrary to their 
predictions, the researchers found that the induction condition had no impact on the 
frequency of intrusive memories experienced over a five-minute monitoring period. 
This was despite the fact that the film did successfully induce a negative mood, and 
that participants did experience intrusive memories about the film. The authors 
suggest that their null findings were the result of using a film-clip to induce 
memories, rather than looking at the impact of ruminative processing on real-life 
intrusive memories. This critique was addressed by Williams and Moulds (2010), who 
compared the effects of analytical versus distraction inductions on intrusive memories 
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that dysphoric participants actually experienced in real-life.  To assess the impact of 
processing induction, participants rated aspects of their intrusive memories (including 
valence, distress and sadness) before and after undergoing the rumination induction.  
Participants in the analytical condition rated their memories more negatively after the 
induction than participants in the distraction condition. They also reported a larger 
increase in intrusion-related sadness and a larger increase in intrusion-related distress 
pre-to post manipulation in the analytical compared to the distraction condition. These 
results provide evidence for the causal impact of ruminative processing on intrusive 
memory experience; analytical rumination exacerbates negative subjective 
evaluations of intrusive memories. However, the study did not include an experiential 
self-focus condition (it is unclear why not), therefore no conclusions about the 
differential the impact of experiential versus analytical processing on intrusive 
memory experience can be drawn.  
 
While this research has provided important insights into what happens after the 
intrusive memory comes to mind, other intrusive-memory related research has taken a 
step back to look at cognitive control and whether there is a link between individual 
differences in cognitive control and the number of intrusive memories experienced. 
Given that intrusive memories are memories an individual experiences without 
deliberately trying to recall it, it has been suggested that individuals with ‘weaker’ 
cognitive control may experience more of these memories than individuals with 
‘better’ cognitive control (Bomyea & Amir, 2011). Research in support of this 
suggestion will now be presented. 
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Intrusive memory and cognitive control:  
 
In our daily lives, we often have to complete effortful tasks in complex and 
challenging environments. Consequently, we must regulate perception, attention and 
behaviour in a goal-driven manner. The processes that enable us to do so are referred 
to collectively within experimental psychology as executive function or cognitive 
control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Braver et al., 2007; 
Miyake et al., 2000).  Efficient cognitive control encompasses a diverse set of 
processes. These include the updating and monitoring information concerning goal-
relevancy (Wessel, Overwijk, Verwoerd, & de Vrieze, 2008), the inhibition of goal-
irrelevant or distracting information (Banich, 2009; Wessel et al., 2008), adapting 
after a mistake (Laming, 1968; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977) and preparing for future 
challenges (Banich, 2009; Braver, 2012). Given that intrusive memories come to mind 
without having been deliberately recalled, or when they are not wanted (Hackmann et 
al., 2004), it has been suggested that individual differences in cognitive control may 
be related to intrusive memory experience. Wessel et al. (2008) propose a specific 
pathway through which cognitive control is important in regulating the experience of 
intrusions following the experience of traumatic or stressful event. They propose that 
immediately following the event, the memory is highly active and therefore easily 
triggered by reminders of the event, both internal (e.g. thoughts or bodily sensations) 
and external (e.g. seeing a particular person or a movie-scene). Efficient cognitive 
control during this period of high activation, therefore, would allow an individual to 
ignore these reminders and continue unimpaired with their goal-driven behaviour. The 
authors subsequently maintain that repeatedly ignoring these reminders may lower the 
activation of the memory, thereby resulting in an overall decrease in memory 
occurrence.  Conversely, an individual with less efficient cognitive control would be 
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less able to ignore any triggers and would therefore continue to experience intrusions 
on a regular basis. 
 
The initial work looking at potential underlying deficits in cognitive control was 
focussed on the development of PTSD, with the rationale that while a high proportion 
of individuals experience an event which would qualify as a traumatic event on the 
PTSD criteria (67% of college students, Bernat, Ronfeldt, Calhoun, and Arias (1998)), 
not all of these people will go on to experience PTSD. Despite this, immediately after 
the traumatic event, many individuals report experiencing intrusive memories and 
heightened symptoms of mental health difficulties (McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003) 
which typically decrease over time. This leads to an important question of whether 
there are any individual differences that make individuals predisposed to 
psychopathology following a negative event. The samples used to explore this 
question have predominantly consisted of university students (Verwoerd, de Jong, & 
Wessel, 2008; Verwoerd et al., 2009; Wessel et al., 2008). This is in line with the 
view that research using non-clinical samples is a good starting point for delineating 
underlying cognitive processes, which can then be translated into clinical populations 
(Brewin, 1998; Williams, 2008). Because non clinical-samples are used, it is not 
incredibly important whether the question of cognitive control and intrusive memory 
experience is conducted within the context of PTSD, or within the context of 
depression. The underlying question in both examples remains whether individual 
differences in cognitive control are important in reducing the manifestation of 
unrecalled memories for negative events. Another bridging feature is that both 
depression and PTSD-focussed research use the Impact of Event Scale (IES, Horowitz 
et al. (1979)) to index the subjective distress of the memory. Therefore, this existing 
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research is highly relevant to the question of cognitive control in the context of 
intrusive memories experienced in depression.  
 
The first research into individual differences in cognitive control was based on a 
working memory (WM) model of cognitive control. Working Memory Capacity 
(WMC) is defined as the amount of information that can be held simultaneously in 
working memory (Wilhelm, Hildebrandt, & Oberauer, 2013). WMC reflects the 
amount of information an individual can maintain or keep memory representations in 
focus (even in the presence of interference), the ability to relocate attention from one 
representation to another, as well as the ability to manipulate those representations as 
necessary (Brewin & Smart, 2005). These processes are understood to rely on a 
supervisory system called the central executive, which controls information from the 
short-term storage components; the phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Baddeley (2000) later added an episodic buffer to the 
model, which was theorized to be a ‘back-up’ storage system that interacts with all 
three of the other components. Because WM is a limited-capacity system, the ability 
to inhibit irrelevant material is important to ensure optimal functioning. Therefore, 
individuals who are less able to inhibit irrelevant information (e.g. ruminating about 
recent events) may be vulnerable towards experiencing recurrent intrusive memories. 
Clinical depression and dysphoria have been associated with general deficits in WM 
functioning (Channon & Robertson, 1993; Christopher & MacDonald, 2005). These 
findings are consistent with the difficulties in concentration reported by patients with 
depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Additionally, Joorman and 
Gotlib (2008) demonstrated that depressed participants showed a specific deficit in 
the ability to remove irrelevant negative material from WM, and that this ability was 
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also related to individual differences in rumination. They conclude that this may have 
implications for a depressed individual’s ability to self-regulate during a negative 
mood; they may find it difficult to update the content of WM from negative to 
positive material.  In particular relevance to the current thesis, there has been some 
previous research looking specifically at intrusive memory experience and individual 
differences in WM. The aim of this work was to determine whether thoughts and 
memories about stressful life events would take up already limited attentional 
resources, thereby reducing WMC in people high in life stress. Accordingly, Klein 
and Boals (2001) established that students with lower WMC (measured by the 
operation-word span task) reported higher IES scores in relation to a major life event.  
Brewin and Smart (2005) demonstrated that students higher in WMC reported fewer 
intrusive thoughts (about an event they reported having frequent thoughts about) 
during a short suppression task, when they were instructed not to think about that 
event.  However, in the same sample, WMC was not associated with the number of 
intrusive thoughts reported in everyday life, questioning the generalizability of the 
laboratory results. It must be noted that working memory is a very general concept. It 
is unclear from these findings exactly how some individuals are predisposed to 
experiencing intrusive memories, or exactly which mechanisms are involved.  One 
possible extension of the Joorman and Gotlib (2008) WM study described above may 
be that depressed individuals experiencing intrusive memories are less able to remove 
information about their negative intrusive memory from WM (even if it is no longer 
relevant), and therefore they experience the memory more often. This in turn will take 
up the limited-WMC and result in a cyclical process of continual memory experience. 
This possibility has not yet been tested, but it is an interesting extension of the 
existing research. However, one limitation of the WM model of cognitive control is 
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that it is a very general concept. It is unclear from these findings exactly how some 
individuals are predisposed to experiencing intrusive memories, or exactly which 
mechanisms are involved.  As a consequence of this criticism, additional research 
looking at the relationship between intrusive memories has specifically investigated 
the role of proactive interference. This focus is based on the model of cognitive 
control by Friedman and Miyake (2004). They postulate that cognitive control is 
dependent on three components; updating, inhibition and shifting. Furthermore, 
Miyake et al. (2000) argue that is important to differentiate between different types of 
inhibition, which are pre-potent response inhibition, resistance to distracting features 
in the environment, and resistance to proactive interference. Within these subtypes, 
researchers interested in intrusive memory vulnerability have chosen to focus 
specifically on proactive interference (e.g. Verwoerd et al., 2009; Wessel et al., 2008). 
This focus was chosen because proactive interference has been shown to involve the 
resolution of conflict from internal distractors, including thoughts and memories 
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004).  Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with a 
deficit in proactive interference will be less able to prevent an intrusive memory 
coming to mind in the presence of triggers. Resistance to proactive interference is 
defined as the ability to remove information from working memory that is no longer 
relevant, for example updating a mobile phone number when you buy a new one 
(Verwoerd et al., 2011). Verwoerd et al. (2011) looked prospectively at the 
relationship between cognitive control and intrusive memories using the trauma-film 
paradigm, described earlier in the chapter during the section on memory appraisals.  
In this design, participants complete the cognitive control task, watch a short film-clip 
depicting a traumatic or sad event, and then aspects of intrusion experience are 
measured over a certain time period (typically one week). As mentioned previously, 
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film clips are useful as they standardize various aspects of intrusive memory 
experience (e.g. severity of the event, length of exposure, time since event).  
 
Using the film paradigm, in student samples, Wessel et al. (2008) used the AB-AC-
AB list-learning task to measure proactive interference and looked at the number of 
film-related intrusive cognitions (thoughts and memories) that occurred during a 24 
hour period after viewing the clip (study 2). Participants retrospectively rated the 
number of intrusive memories they had experienced over the past 24 hours. In the 
AB-AC-AB task, participants are given a pair of strongly associated words (the AB 
list, e.g. butcher-meat) and are asked to learn the pairs so they are able to give the 
target word (meat) when presented with the cue (butcher). Participants are 
subsequently provided with a less-strongly related pair of words (the AC list, e.g. 
butcher-rope) and must now provide this target word (rope) when provided with the 
cue (still butcher). The number of AB target words given in error at this stage of the 
task is the measure of proactive interference. The researchers found that better 
resistance to proactive interference on list 2 was associated with a lower number of 
film-related cognitions (thoughts and memories) and lower avoidance over this 24-
hour period. This suggests resistance to proactive interference might be important in 
reducing intrusive cognitions. In a separate set of participants (study 1), Wessel et al. 
(2008) also looked at performance on the random number generation task (RNG). 
During this task, participants have to provide a sequence of numbers between 1 and 
10 as randomly they can. Because participants have to monitor their previous 
responses in order to keep the following numbers as random as possible, the task 
measures updating/monitoring and inhibition abilities. Specifically, the researchers 
indexed updating/monitoring abilities by looking at whether each number was used an 
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equal number of times during the task. Inhibition was measured by the ability to avoid 
providing pre-potent responses, including counting, stereotyped responses etc. As a 
measure of film-related intrusions, participants completed a colour-naming 
interference task, where they were presented with film-related words (both positive 
and negative) and had to name the colour of the word as quickly as possible. Results 
showed that better updating and monitoring on the RNG was related to less 
interference on the colour-naming task. The authors conclude that this finding 
supports the idea that cognitive control is important in reducing interference from 
recent stressful events, in this case a stressful film. However, a different pattern 
emerged on their diary measure of film-related intrusions, which participants kept for 
a 48-hour period after watching the film. On this measure, better updating and 
monitoring on the RNG was associated with a higher number of film-related intrusive 
memories. The authors suggest this may reflect the role of cognitive control in 
keeping the goal of recording memories in mind, i.e. that participants with better 
cognitive control are better at remembering to complete their diaries. Conversely, 
inhibition, as measured by the RNG was not related to intrusive memory experience. 
In study 2 reported by Wessel et al. (2008), which looked more specifically at 
proactive interference, participants also completed the RNG task. In this study, 
intrusion experience was measured retrospectively 24 hours after watching the film, 
rather than through diary recordings. They found no significant relationship between 
updating/monitoring abilities and reports of intrusive memories, as reported 
retrospectively. This discrepancy in results found between the diary and retrospective 
measure of memories is important to bear in mind. The authors suggest that the diary 
methodology is affected by participants’ capability to adhere to task instructions, and 
therefore is not necessarily a pure measure of memory frequency.  The colour-naming 
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interference task was also used in study 2, but this time participants completed the 
task 24 hours after watching the film, rather than immediately after watching the film.  
In this case, there was no significant relationship between updating/monitoring on the 
RNG and colour-naming performance; the only significant findings were related to 
the measure of proactive interference. The authors suggest the null finding concerning 
updating/monitoring in study 2, as compared to study 1, may reflect that the impact of 
cognitive control on intrusive memory experience may not specifically work by 
reducing the activation of the memory. Another potential explanation is that the 
colour-naming task is not a very sensitive way of measuring the activation of film-
memories. Overall, this study supports the idea that intrusive cognition is associated 
with some degree of deficits in cognitive control, specifically updating/monitoring 
(study 1) and proactive interference (study 2), and highlights potential issues 
concerning the different measures of intrusive memories (diary versus retrospective 
measures).  
 
Also in a student sample, Verwoerd et al. (2011) replicated the finding that individual 
differences in proactive interference were related to intrusive memory experience, 
again using the trauma-film paradigm. Proactive interference was measured using the 
California Verbal Learning Task (CVLT), to determine whether the role of proactive 
interference would be replicated with a different task to previous research. The CVLT 
comprises of two lists of words which participants are instructed to encode and then 
free recall. Some categories overlap between the two lists (e.g. list 1: 10 animals, 10 
vegetables, list 2: 10 different animals (an overlapping category), 10 flowers (a new 
category)). An interference index was calculated by looking at the impact of shared 
and non-shared categories in list 1 have n list 2 recall performance. The researchers 
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measured intrusive memories experienced over a week, which participants recorded in 
a diary. Consistent with Wessel et al. (2008), proactive interference predicted the 
number of film-related memories experienced during the week; individuals who 
showed weaker proactive interference recorded more memories in their diary.  
Importantly, this was not related to previous trauma or depressive symptomatology. 
Together, these studies support the role of inhibitory deficits, specifically proactive 
interference, in intrusion experience.  
 
Despite these initial indications that there is a link between cognitive control and 
intrusive memories, is important to look at real-life intrusive memories individuals 
actually experience outside of the laboratory-induced memories. This was highlighted 
by Williams and Moulds (2010) who looked at the impact of induced ruminative 
processing styles on intrusion maintenance, both in real-life and laboratory-induced 
intrusive memories. As discussed earlier in the chapter, there was no difference in 
ratings of intrusive memories between the analytical and experiential induction 
conditions on the film-related intrusions (Williams & Moulds, 2007b). The 
detrimental effects of analytical induction on intrusion experience were only found 
when looking at memories participants actually experienced (Williams & Moulds, 
2010). There were no differences in intrusive memory experience between the 
analytical and experiential induction conditions on film-induced intrusions. This 
suggests that cognitive control research should also focus on intrusive memories 
people actually experience in order to be as sensitive as possible. Consequently, it is 
these personally experienced intrusive memories that will be studied in the current 
thesis. Existing research has found differences in cognitive control looking at real-life 
intrusive memories, again in non-clinical samples. Verwoerd et al. (2009) for 
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example, asked participants to report on the most distressing event they have ever 
experienced while they measured proactive interference. Proactive interference was 
evaluated by the AB-AC-AB list-learning paradigm, described above. The IES was 
used to index intrusion experience, and participants completed this measure in relation 
to their memories about their distressing event. As before, results showed that a lower 
ability to resist proactive interference was associated with higher IES scores. In terms 
of the other types of inhibition posited by Miyake et al., (2000) it would be interesting 
to determine whether individuals who experience a high number of intrusive 
memories also have difficulty resisting interference from features in the environment, 
for example, external memory triggers such as people and places. It may be that this is 
another aspect of inhibition that is related to individual differences in intrusive-
memory experience. This has not previously been looked at. The Verwoerd et al., 
(2009) paper discussed above also looked at the relationship between intrusive 
memories, response inhibition (measured by the Stroop task) and RNG performance, 
specifically at the ability to avoid automatically triggered pre-potent responses, as 
measured by the Stoop and RNG tasks. Performance on these tasks was not related to 
intrusive memory experience, suggesting that prepotent response inhibition is not 
important in intrusive memory vulnerability.    
 
Together, the existing research on WMC and proactive interference supports the 
current research goal; there are identifiable deficits in cognitive control in people 
reporting high number of intrusive memories.  The studies presented in this thesis will 
use a different model of cognitive control; the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control 
(Braver et al., 2007). However, before that framework is introduced, there is another 
pertinent finding from the cognitive control literature that may have implications for 
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the current research goal. Hertel and Rude (1991) propose that the cognitive deficits 
observed in depression actually reflect difficulty with attentional control, rather than 
reflecting an overall, generalized, deficit. They consequently showed that depressed 
individuals were only impaired during an unconstrained (i.e. free learning) task; there 
was no differences between depressed and non-depressed individuals in a structured 
(i.e. focused learning) task. They argue that under unconstrained conditions, people 
with depression are negatively impacted by task-irrelevant processes, for example 
rumination. This idea is intriguing in respect to work by Berntsen (1998) who 
demonstrated that involuntary memories most often come to mind when attention is 
not focused on a particular task (e.g. when bored, tired or when daydreaming).  These 
are similar conditions to those which Hertel and Rude (1991) argue are the most likely 
to find depressive-related deficits in cognitive control. Together, these lines of 
research may suggest that people with depression are more prone to intrusive 
memories when they are not engaged in something specific (e.g. before falling asleep 
at night), than individuals without a vulnerability to depression. Coupled with a 
ruminative response style, experiencing an intrusive memory when not busy with a 
distracting activity may be particularly detrimental to these individuals. This 
possibility awaits further research.  
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that, in addition to looking at behavioural 
measures of cognitive control, research has also looked at the neuropsychological 
underpinnings of these deficits and how these relate to depression. 
Neuropsychological testing is an important technique used in the diagnosis of clinical 
disorders, and can provide a wealth of information about rehabilitation, treatment 
planning and the prognosis of these disorders (Goldberg & Bougakov, 2005). There 
are established biomarkers of depression, including reduced volume of rostal ACC 
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(rACC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Pizzagalli, 2001). The ACC 
is postulated to be important for error detection and cognitive and emotional 
processing (Bush, Luu & Posner, 2000). The DLPFC is important for a variety of 
executive functions, including WM processes (Barbey, Koenings & Grafman, 2013), 
planning (Heinze et al., 2014) and decision making behaviours (Kahnt, Heinzle, Park 
& Haynes, 2011). Impaired executive functions are one of the fundamental cognitive 
deficits in depression (Austin et al., 2001), and have been related to both the severity 
of depression (Paelecke-Habermann et al., 2005) and in predicting poorer response to 
pharmacological treatment in older patients (Sneed et al., 2007, Alexopoulous et al., 
2005). Therefore, it is crucial to understand how these brain areas are affected by 
factors such as depression. Accordingly, Frodl et al., (2008a) demonstrated that 
patients with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) showed a significantly larger 
increase in rACC and DLPFC volume as compared to never-depressed controls. In 
addition, smaller rACC volume has also been shown to predict a poorer response to 
treatment (Chen et al, 2007, Frodl et al., 2008b). Less work has focused on the role of 
the dACC, and this work has found less consistent results. However, there is some 
indication that dACC volume reduction is also important in depression. For example, 
Caetano et al., (2006) demonstrated that unmedicated participants with a past history 
of MDD showed reduced volume of the dACC. On the other hand, Frodl et al., (2008) 
found that currently depressed medicated participants showed no dACC 
abnormalities. This awaits clarification. Nonetheless, this work demonstrates that 
there are some clear neuropsychological deficits in depression that appear to concern 
areas important for cognitive control. Given the recent clinical focus on intrusive 
memories as a symptom of depression, it is necessary to determine whether these 
established neuropsychological markers of depression are important in intrusive 
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memory experience, or whether there are any independent markers of intrusive 
memory vulnerability. For example, as the focus on the relationship between 
cognitive control and intrusive memory experience grows, it would be interesting to 
add electrophysical (e.g. electroencephalographic (EEG)) data to the behavioural data 
to provide a more thorough investigation. EEG data is relatively inexpensive and easy 
to collect. This type of data would enable researchers to determine whether there are 
any changes in the brain’s electrical activity as a function of intrusive-memory 
experience. It would be exciting to determine, for example, whether people who 
experience a high number of intrusive memories respond differently to memory 
triggers (external or internal) than individuals who do not report as many memories. 
To my knowledge, there are no existing papers that use electrophysical techniques to 
investigate this research question. Only behavioural measures of cognitive control are 
used in the current thesis, but the potential utility of neuropsychological data is 
important going forward.  
 
The framework of cognitive control for the current program of research will now be 
presented. As mentioned above, this is based on the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive 
Control (DMC). The DMC was proposed by Braver et al. (2007) to account for the 
flexibility required for optimal cognitive control. The DMC consists of two modes of 
control; proactive and reactive control. Proactive control is defined as the active 
maintenance of information prior to a cognitively demanding event, in order to bias 
attention in a goal-driven manner (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007). Reactive 
control, on the other hand, is recruited after interference is detected, in a ‘late 
correction’ fashion (Braver et al., 2007). As proactive and reactive modes of control 
both have advantages and limitations, optimal cognition is theorized to rely on 
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flexible use of both modes. Proactive control is costly to maintain, as the appropriate 
contextual information has to be maintained over a period of time (Braver, 2012). 
This continual context maintenance also means that proactive control is less sensitive 
to potentially important incoming bottom-up information (Braver, 2012). Reactive 
control, conversely, relies more heavily on the trigger events that reactivate the goal, 
and requires constant reactivation of the goal. This will be less efficient in situations 
where context can be adequately predicted and maintained. In terms of the 
neuropsychological underpinnings of the DMC, proactive control is understood to be 
sustained by the active maintenance of task-relevant information in the lateral PFC 
and reactive control reflected through the more short-term activation of the lateral 
PFC, activated by conflict detection areas, such as the ACC (Braver, 2012, de Pisapia 
& Braver, 2006). Although a clear picture of the neuropsychological underpinnings is 
still in progress (Braver, 2012), the utility of the differentiating between proactive and 
reactive control behaviourally will now be discussed. This work will suggest it is 
important to establish whether differentiating between proactive and reactive control 
can provide any additional insight into a potential link between intrusive memory 
experience and cognitive control, beyond the work already conducted into WMC and 
proactive interference.  
 
The AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT) has previously been used to 
differentiate between proactive and reactive control. The task itself is simple; 
participants are presented with cue-probe letter pairs presented sequentially. Possible 
trial types are AX, AY, BX, BY and participants make their response based on the 
combination of letters presented. Specifically, a ‘target’ response to AX trials, and a 
‘non-target’ response to the three other trial types. The task is made more difficult by 
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the fact that 70% of the trials are AX trials, which biases participants towards making 
‘target’ responses to trials with the cue-letter A (incorrect in a AY trial) and trials with 
a target-letter X (incorrect in a BX trial). Given the disproportionate number of AX 
trials, which impacts the statistical comparisons that can be made, it is performance to 
‘non-target’ trials that is compared. As the correct response to a target-letter depends 
on which cue-letter was presented, participants must maintain the contextual 
information presented by the cue letter over the interval between the letter pairs. This 
reflects proactive control. However, proactive control is not always beneficial on the 
task. For example, in an AY trial, the cue-letter A would mislead participants into 
preparing a ‘non-target’ response. Therefore, individuals using a proactive strategy 
would be impaired in AY trials, but perform well on a BX trial, where they would 
have use the cue-letter B to prepare a ‘non-target’ response. A deficit in proactive 
control would also be demonstrated through impaired AX performance. Reactive 
processing is indexed through target-letter processing. Consequently, participants 
using a reactive processing style would be impaired by the letter X on a BX trial, but 
not be influenced by the A on an AY trial. Crucially, the DMC can account for shifts 
in cognitive control, both within tasks and between populations (Redick, 2014). For 
example, on the AX-CPT, older adults have consistently been shown to rely more on 
reactive control than younger adults (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Paxton, 
Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008). Additionally, the task has previously been used to 
demonstrate that individuals with schizophrenia are impaired on BX, but not AY 
trials, compared to healthy controls (Barch et al., 2001). This demonstrates a specific 
deficit in proactive control. Differences within the performance of young adults have 
also been demonstrated. This is important because a young adult sample will be tested 
in the current thesis. Specifically, Redick and Engle (2011) compared healthy young 
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participants with low WMC to healthy participants with high WMC. It is important to 
note that Redick and Engle (2011) did not compare AX performance separately to the 
other trial types, even though this violates the statistical assumption that each trial 
type is presented equally frequently. Nonetheless, they showed that low WMC 
participants made more errors on AX and BX trials, as compared to individuals with 
high WMC. This suggests a deficit in the use of the context information provided by 
the cue letter in the low WMC group. This suggests the importance of WMC in 
maintaining context. The low WMC group were also slower than the high WMC 
group on AX, BX and BY trials, but not on AY trials. This is consistent with the 
prediction that using proactive control will impair performance when the expectancy 
generated by the contextual information (i.e. letter A) is incorrect.  
 
In further support of the DMC framework, it has been demonstrated that, in addition 
to stable individual differences, reliance on proactive and reactive control can be 
modified as a function of task specific parameters. For example, Paxton, Barch, 
Storandt, and Braver (2006) directed older adults to a proactive strategy by explicitly 
highlighting the high proportion of AX trials and the importance of using the cue-
letter to prepare a ‘target’ response. After this training, older adult performance 
changed in accordance with a proactive strategy (i.e. more AY errors, fewer BX 
errors). Braver et al. (2009) extended this finding to show that young adults shifted to 
more reactive control when they were given monetary penalties for poor performance, 
and also replicated the previous finding that older adults shifted to a more proactive 
strategy when trained to attend to the cue. The DMC is able to account for this 
flexible use of cognitive control. Another study supporting the utility of a dual 
mechanisms account was conducted by Speer, Jacoby, and Braver (2003). They 
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manipulated the expected working memory load on a word memory task, and found 
differences between the conditions both behaviourally and in brain activation patterns. 
In the task, participants were given a list of words, and after a short delay (3000 ms) 
had to determine whether a certain probe word had been presented in the original list. 
In low expected load blocks, list length averaged four words or fewer and it was 
predicted that participants would engage in an active maintenance-focused strategy 
(i.e. proactive control). In high expected load blocks, lists averaged eight words or 
fewer, which was expected to be beyond working memory capacity, and therefore 
participants were expected to engage in encoding and retrieval-focused strategies after 
the probe was presented (i.e. reactive control).  Probe-decisions to trials containing six 
words within each block were then compared. Importantly, the number of words was 
exactly the same, and only the expectation differed. As predicted, performance did 
vary as a function of expected load. Specifically, when the expected load was low, 
brain activation patterns were consistent with proactive processing (i.e. increased 
activity over the delay). Conversely, when the expected load was high, patterns were 
consistent with reactive processing (i.e. decreased activity over the delay and 
increased activity following probe presentation). Behaviourally, participants were 
faster and more accurate on the matched six-word trials in the low-load expectancy 
condition, as compared to the high-load expectancy condition. This supports proactive 
processing in the low-load condition, as participants maintained the items over the 
delay period when the expected number of items was lower. These results are 
evidence that even subtle changes in cognitive tasks can result in a switch between 
proactive and reactive modes of control.   
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Returning to the question of cognitive deficits as a function of intrusive memory 
experience, no research looking at intrusive memories has used the DMC framework 
of cognitive control. Some work has looked at the impact of low mood on AX-CPT 
performance. Msetfi, Murphy, Kornbrot, and Simpson (2009) demonstrated that 
dysphoric student participants were selectively impaired on BX trials when the 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the letter-pairs was long. Conversely, on 
short SOA trials, dysphoric students’ performance was similar to non-dysphoric 
students. This suggests an inability to retain contextual information over a longer 
period of time in dysphoric individuals. These results are consistent with the 
suggestion by Braver (2012) that processes associated with low mood will interfere 
with proactive control. Importantly, Msetfi et al. (2009) also measured levels of trait 
rumination and found no effect of rumination on task performance. Other cognitive 
control research, more general than research based on the DMC, has associated 
rumination with reduced cognitive control, independently of the strong relationship 
between rumination and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). Whether specifically relating to intrusive memories (Williams & Moulds, 
2008b, 2010) or viewed as a general feature of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), 
ruminative processes place a large constraint on cognitive resources and as just stated, 
has been proposed to specifically impact proactive control processes (Braver, 2012), 
although this was not supported by Msetfi et al. (2009). Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2000) found an association between rumination and cognitive inflexibility, indexed 
through more perseverance errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, in a student 
sample. It has also been demonstrated that rumination is associated with an inability 
to discard irrelevant negative material from Working Memory (Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010). Joormann, Levens, and Gotlib (2011) further showed that rumination was 
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selectively associated with difficulty manipulating negative words, and not difficulty 
manipulating positive or neutral words, in currently depressed participants. This work 
suggests that high trait ruminators may have more difficulty disengaging from an 
intrusive memory than non-ruminators. This concurs with the importance of 
measuring trait rumination, and the way individuals react to negative cognitions, 
when looking at low mood and dysphoric samples. Interestingly, using the word-
Stroop task, Altamirano, Miyake, and Whitmer (2010) showed that the effects of 
rumination and depression on cognitive control to be dissociable in a student sample. 
On their modified task, only 25% of trials were incongruent, therefore, unless 
participants actively maintained the colour-naming goal, it would be easy to switch to 
word-reading behaviour. They found that, after controlling for BDI-II scores, 
accuracy on incongruent trials positively correlated with RRS scores; high trait 
ruminators performed better than low trait ruminators. Conversely, when controlling 
for RRS scores, accuracy on incongruent trials negatively correlated with BDI-II 
scores; low mood participants performed more poorly. This is especially interesting 
given the unvalenced nature of their Stroop task, as often valenced tasks are more 
sensitive at detecting differences. Their results highlight the importance of assessing 
both depressive symptomatology and trait rumination when assessing cognitive 
control, rather than assuming that because they correlate highly with each other, they 
will have a similar effect on cognitive processing. The Altamirano et al. (2010) study 
is a demonstration that rumination can, in some cases, facilitate performance on a 
cognitive control task, as high ruminators adhered more to task instructions.  
 
The aim of the current research is to use the comprehensive approach to cognitive 
control posited by the DMC to determine whether there are fundamental differences 
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in the trade-off between proactive and reactive control in individuals experiencing a 
high number of intrusive memories.  Consequently, in this thesis, chapters four and 
five will use the original AX-CPT (described above) to look at cognitive control as a 
function of intrusion experience.  Chapter six expands upon this using the emotional 
AX-CPT, where the same cue-probe letters are presented on happy or sad faces, 
which themselves are irrelevant to the task. Assessing performance on emotional tasks 
of cognitive control is an important addition to the existing research for two primary 
reasons. Firstly, intrusive memories themselves concern emotional and distressing 
events. Consequently, it may be that individuals who experience high numbers of 
intrusive memories are specifically impaired in the ability to inhibit emotional or 
valenced information. Using unvalenced tasks to assess cognitive control does not 
address this possibility.  Secondly, in most of the literature, intrusive memories are 
conceptualized as a symptom of PTSD or depression. In the context of depression, 
both clinical depression and dysphoria have been associated with impaired inhibition 
of irrelevant mood-congruent material (Joormann & Siemer, 2004), impaired 
manipulation of negative material in working memory (Joormann et al., 2011) and 
impaired removal of irrelevant negative material from working memory (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2008). Therefore it is important to also look at performance on emotional 
tasks in relation to intrusive memory experience. For this reason, chapter six will also 
use the emotional Stroop task as a second measure of cognitive control. The Stroop 
task is an extremely common task in experimental psychology (MacLeod, 1991) and 
is a measure of interference. In the classic version of the Stroop, participants are 
presented with a colour-naming word presented in either a compatible or an 
incompatible ink colour (e.g. the word RED written in either red or blue ink). Even 
though participants are not told to attend to the word itself, a consistent finding is that 
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responses are faster and less error prone on compatible trials as compared to 
incompatible trials (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935). In the emotional-face version 
(Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006) participants are presented with either 
a happy or a sad face, with the word HAPPY or SAD presented below. A variant of 
the Stroop task can be used to separate performance into proactive and reactive 
control processes. For example, proactive control can be indexed by comparing 
performance to blocks where participants are told to prioritize accuracy compared to 
when they are told to prioritize speed (Saunders & Jentzsch, 2014). An ability to 
respond faster or more accurately as a function of instruction reflects good proactive 
control, i.e. goal-directed behaviour (Braver et al., 2007). Reactive control can be 
indexed through congruency sequence effects (CSEs). This is the finding that the 
Stroop interference effect is typically reduced following an incompatible trial as 
compared to a compatible trial. This suggests that experiencing conflict increases 
attentional control and therefore reduces the influence of conflict on the next trial. 
Verwoerd et al. (2009) did look at classic Stroop task performance, as a measure of 
response inhibition, as well as proactive interference in the paper discussed earlier in 
the chapter. However, they predicted that Stroop performance would not be related to 
intrusion experience. They reasoned that Stroop performance reflects response 
inhibition, i.e. inhibiting automatically triggered responses, whereas they argued that 
proactive interference reflects inhibition at a cognitive level, i.e. the inhibition of 
previously important information. As they predicted, they found no relationship 
between Stroop task performance and intrusion experience. However, as concluded by 
Joormann and colleagues, it is important to establish if any differences emerge with 
the emotional Stroop task. No existing intrusive memory research has looked at 
cognitive control on emotional cognitive tasks.  
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How special are intrusive memories? Widening the focus to involuntary 
memories. 
The work summarized so far in this introductory chapter has focused only on intrusive 
(negative) memories. Whether the research was done in clinical or non-clinical 
samples, it was conducted with a view to better understand the role of these memories 
in clinical disorders; the memories have been conceptualized a symptom of PTSD and 
depression (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Newby & Moulds, 2011c). There are, however, 
three important limitations to this focus. Firstly, it has been established that intrusive 
memories are experienced by student samples (Wessel et al., 2008) and never 
depressed individuals (Newby & Moulds, 2011a). These results support the view that 
intrusive memories are not disorder-specific, but instead are a common feature of 
memory.  Secondly, not all involuntary memories are negative in valence. A separate 
literature, which has looked at involuntary memory more generally, has shown that 
involuntary memories of positive, negative and neutral event are common, although 
the specific number experienced does differ both over time and within individuals 
(Berntsen, 2011).  It is important to note that there are some discrepancies in the 
intrusive/involuntary memory terminology used in the literature, and often lack of 
clarity about which exact phenomena are being studied (Kvavilashvili, 2014). 
Whereas Kvavilashvili (2014) defines an intrusive memory as repetitive memories for 
past negative events, negative involuntary memories are not necessarily recurrent 
(‘involuntary memories are random, one-off memories, which pop into mind only 
once or twice’, p.101). However, research sometimes uses the terms negative 
involuntary memories and intrusive memories interchangeably (Brewin, 1998; 
Deeprose, Zhang, DeJong, Dalgleish, & Holmes, 2012). This may be a result of the 
research on intrusive memories in depression having its roots in PTSD research, 
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where according to DSM-IV criteria, the ‘recurrent and intrusive’ memory (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) specifically concerns the traumatic event. However 
this intrusive/involuntary ambiguity demonstrates that the repetitive component is not 
always translated beyond PTSD specific research. For example, Berntsen and 
colleagues’ research into involuntary memory does not always make a clear 
distinction between intrusive and negative involuntary memories. This is consistent 
with Moulds and Krans (2015) who define intrusive memories as ‘distressing 
memories that come to mind unbidden and unwanted’ (p. 162). They highlight the 
significance of subjective judgments of the memories in rendering the memory an 
intrusive memory, rather than necessarily containing any repetitive component. 
Consequently, they argue that what makes an intrusive memory intrusive is that it is 
recalled without deliberate attempts and that it is upsetting, unwanted and disruptive. 
While Moulds and Krans (2015) acknowledge the definitions put forward by 
Kvavilashvili (2014), they support the idea championed by Berntsen and colleagues 
that both terms represent the same type of memory. To be cautious, however, the 
work presented in chapters three and five will consider both ‘types’ of negative 
involuntary memory (i.e. repetitive and not-necessarily repetitive) separately. 
Specifically, during the Intrusive Memory Interview, participants are asked to 
retrospectively rate the number of ‘spontaneous’ memories they experienced over the 
previous week within the context of the same original event, for example an argument 
with a friend. This is the traditional way intrusive memories are studied in the existing 
literature (Newby & Moulds, 2011a, 2011c, 2011d; Williams, 2008). Participants also 
complete the IES in respect to this intrusive memory. It is important to note that the 
instructions given to participants during the Intrusive Memory Interview make no 
reference to any repetitive nature of the spontaneous memory. Therefore, it is unclear 
	  	   34	  
whether a participant reporting only one memory over the previous week is 
necessarily reporting a memory they experience on a regular basis. This is a 
demonstration of the ambiguity highlighted by Kvavilashvili (2014). In the current 
research, participants will also complete diary measures of intrusive memories, but 
the term will not be used with any explicit requirement that the memory is repetitive. 
Participants will only be told that they should record any memory of a past negative 
event/circumstance or situation (as per the Intrusive Memory Interview, Hackmann et 
al. (2004)). Therefore, this frequency measure is only addressing negative involuntary 
memories in a more general sense, rather than distinguishing between intrusive and 
involuntary memories. The work presented in the thesis aims to provide a baseline 
understanding of whether there are individual differences in the experience of 
intrusive memories, without, in this first exploration, defining how repetitive the 
memories necessarily are.   
 
Returning to the idea that not all involuntary memories are negative, it has been 
demonstrated that, in healthy samples, involuntary memories are predominantly 
positive (Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004). Berntsen (1998), for example, 
found that 49% of involuntary memories recorded in a diary study by a student 
sample were rated positive (rated as 1 or 2 on a 5-point scale), compared to 19% rated 
as negative (-1 or -2 on the scale). The remaining 32% of the memories were rated as 
neutral (0 on the scale). Drawing a similar conclusion, Berntsen and Rubin (2008) 
asked a non-clinical Danish sample to answer questions about the involuntary 
memory they had experienced the most frequently over the last year. Contrary to the 
idea that involuntary memories are experienced only in reaction to negative events, a 
large proportion of memories were reported to be have been either positive (45.4%) or 
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highly positive (12.7%), while comparatively fewer memories were rated as negative 
(15.2%) or highly negative (4.7%). In addition, 22% of memories were rated neutral 
in valence. Even in a sample of students meeting criteria for PTSD on the self-report 
Post-Traumatic Stress Diagnostic (PDS) questionnaire, Berntsen (2001) found that the 
frequency of negative and positive involuntary memories recorded was almost equal 
(39% versus 40% respectively). Indeed, 78% of the involuntary memories recorded 
by this sample did not even concern the traumatic event participants had experienced, 
once again questioning the view that involuntary remembering prioritizes extra-
ordinary memories. A limitation to the interpretation of this study is that they used a 
method designed to ensure, as far as possible, that the memories were genuinely 
involuntary, rather than resulting from task demands. In this method, participants are 
asked to record only the first 2 involuntary memories they experience on any day, 
until they have recorded a total of 50 memories. Consequently, a full picture of 
involuntary remembering is not addressed by this methodology, and no conclusions 
about the exact proportion of trauma-related memories as a total number of memories 
experienced can be made. It has also been demonstrated that low mood populations do 
experience positive involuntary memories. For example, Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, 
and Watkins (2012) established that individuals with depression also experience 
positive involuntary memories. In their depressed sample, 34% of involuntary 
memories recorded in a diary were negative, 50% were positive and 15% were neutral 
(Watson et al., 2012). These are clear indications that involuntary memories do not 
consist exclusively of negative events. In fact, Berntsen (1996) suggests that intrusive 
memories are not conceptually different to more general involuntary memories. 
Instead, she argues that intrusive memories form part of a normally functional 
memory system. While intrusive memories may develop into something problematic, 
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for example, if experienced habitually, or as a reaction to extremely stressful events 
(Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009), that is not to say the involuntary memory system is 
fundamentally maladaptive (Berntsen, 2011). Consequently, Berntsen (2011) argues 
that the high accessibility of memories that have been traditionally studied in clinical 
populations can be attributed to factors which apply to both voluntary and involuntary 
memory recall; known as the basic mechanisms view (Berntsen, 2011). This basic 
mechanisms view maintains that involuntary memories adhere to the same principles 
of encoding and maintenance as voluntary memory.  For example, research has 
demonstrated that involuntary memories have a greater emotional impact than 
voluntary memories (Berntsen, 2011; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Rubin, Boals, & 
Berntsen, 2008). However, this effect is attributed to fundamental differences in the 
way involuntary and voluntary memories are retrieved (Berntsen, 2011). Because an 
involuntary memory pops into mind suddenly, there is no opportunity to engage in 
pre-emptive emotion regulation (Gross, 2001), for example by reappraising or down 
regulating a negative memory before it comes to mind.  This finding may account 
somewhat for the association between reports of intrusive memories and heightened 
levels of distress, without meaning that intrusive memories are fundamentally 
different to memories for non-traumatic or non-distressing events.  
 
The third rationale for looking more generally at involuntary memory and cognitive 
control, rather than focusing only on negative memories, comes from work on the 
effects of positive voluntary memory recall in low mood individuals. The effects of 
depressed mood on voluntary remembering have been well documented; memories of 
negative events are more easily accessible (Clark & Teasdale, 1982, 1985; Lloyd & 
Lishman, 1975) and individuals with depression report fewer memories for specific 
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events than individuals with no depression (Williams et al., 2007; Williams & 
Dritschel, 1988). However, it has been demonstrated that individuals vulnerable to 
depression also react to positive material in a different way to healthy populations. 
Accordingly, Joormann and Siemer (2004) showed that dysphoric individuals 
reported no increase in mood following positive memory recall, whereas non-
dysphoric individuals did report an increase in mood.  Most interestingly, Joormann, 
Siemer, and Gotlib (2007) demonstrated that recalling a positive memory resulted in a 
decrease in current mood in currently depressed individuals, whereas the mood of 
never-depressed individuals improved. Therefore, positive involuntary memories, and 
reactions to positive involuntary memories, may also be important in clinical 
disorders, a view supported by Moulds and Krans (2015). In conjunction, these 
findings indicate that the clinically-focused literature does not investigate the full 
picture of memories that come to mind without being deliberately recalled; looking 
only at intrusive memories in the clinical context may be too blinkered a view. This 
has implications for the research looking at cognitive control. By focusing only on 
memories for negative life events, predictions are formed in terms of deficits that 
make people more vulnerable to these memories, implying that involuntary memories 
are always unwanted or always problematic. Chapter five challenges the narrow focus 
on intrusive memories by looking at whether there is a link between cognitive control 
and all kinds of involuntary memories reported by participants; the ability to regulate 
the occurrence of unrecalled memories may not depend on the valence of the memory. 
This is an important step in bridging the gap between the clinical literature and the 
more general involuntary memory literature, which argues that involuntary memories 
represent a basic mode of remembering (Berntsen, 2010). This goal is also consistent 
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with Brewin (2014), who highlights the importance of investigating how ordinary 
mechanisms of memory operate in unusual circumstances.  
Interventions targeting intrusive memories:  
 
The research summarized at the beginning of this introductory chapter implies that 
targeting negative reactions to intrusive memories would have a beneficial impact on 
well-being in depression. Despite this, treatment programmes specifically addressing 
intrusive memories in depressed samples are underdeveloped (Newby, Lang, Werner-
Seidler, Holmes, & Moulds, 2014). In contrast, the most effective treatments for 
PTSD involve repeated exposure to the trauma memory (Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, 
McManus, & Fennell, 2005). For example during imaginal exposure, patients are 
encouraged to revisit the event in first-person narrative on multiple occasions. 
Another example of treatment specifically addressing the intrusive memory in PTSD 
is the writing of a trauma narrative and/or cognitive restructuring of the event during 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2005). In 
the context of depression, Kandris and Moulds (2008) used a single case study to test 
the efficacy of imaginal exposure in a male experiencing a current episode of 
depression, which at the onset of the study had lasted four months. The treatment 
involved five 90-minute weekly sessions, during which the man was encouraged to 
relive the event, which consisted of an argument with his ex-partner, in the first-
person narrative. It also included some elements of psychoeducation. Treatment 
reduced the frequency and distress associated with the patient’s intrusive memories, 
and improved mood to the extent that the participants no longer met criteria for a 
current episode of depression after treatment completion. However, more relevant to 
the goal of the current thesis, Lang, Moulds, and Holmes (2009) demonstrated that 
appraisals of intrusive memories can be modified, and importantly, that modifying 
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appraisals has an effect on intrusion experience. They used Cognitive Bias 
Modification (CBM), during which participants are repeatedly exposed to positive or 
negative resolutions to ambiguous situations in order to train interpretations (Cristea, 
Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015). Lang et al. (2009) 
exposed an undergraduate sample to either 72 positive or negative appraisals (e.g. 
having an intrusive memory means nothing/something is wrong with me’) who then, 
after the CBM induction, watched a traumatic film-clip. Participants in the positive 
appraisal condition subsequently reported fewer intrusive memories of the film over 
the following week, reported lower levels of intrusiveness and avoidance (as 
measured by the IES) as compared to participants in the negative appraisal condition. 
Building on these findings, Woud, Holmes, Postma, Dalgleish, and Mackintosh 
(2012) showed similar results when student participants were inducted to positive 
appraisals after watching the film, rather than before the film, as done by Lang et al. 
(2009). These results demonstrate the benefits of specifically targeting appraisals. 
Newby et al. (2014) extended upon these results by testing the impact of positive 
appraisal CBM training (consisting of 72 positive statements, e.g. ‘intrusive memories 
mean I can cope’ and 8 neutral statements ‘e.g. ‘intrusive memories pop into my mind 
spontaneously’) on personally experienced negative intrusive memories in a 
dysphoric sample, some of whom met criteria for a current episode of depression. 
This intervention was compared to a single-session education-based intervention. In 
the latter condition, participants were given information about intrusive memories. 
For example, they were told that intrusive memories are experienced by many people. 
Participants also took part in exercises to challenge their negative appraisals (e.g. that 
thinking about the memory would interfere with any task they tried to complete) and 
in a short thought suppression experiment, in order to demonstrate the often 
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paradoxical effects of thought suppression (Wegner, 1994; Wegner, Schneider, 
Carter, & White, 1987). This work demonstrates that trying to suppress a particular 
thought can actually increase the number of times the thought is experienced. There 
was also a third no-intervention control group. Each group contained 20 participants. 
At one week follow-up, they found reductions in depression and anxiety, 
intrusiveness of the memory (measured by the intrusiveness subscale of the IES) and 
negative appraisals across all three groups. These reductions were greatest in the 
education group, followed by the CBM group. However, contrary to predictions, there 
was also an effect in the no-intervention control group. This maybe a result of the 
self-report questionnaires normalising the experience of intrusive memories and is 
important to bear in mind for any research investigating the impact of future 
interventions. The authors also found that reductions in negative appraisals positively 
correlated with reduction in intrusion-related distress (measured by the total IES 
score). Results of this study demonstrate the initial potential efficacy of interventions 
addressing the reaction to intrusive memories, but the selective nature of such 
interventions requires further study. It is also important to more extensively 
investigate the changes observed in the no-intervention control group. The third 
chapter of this thesis extends upon this finding by testing the efficacy of mindfulness 
and self-compassion based intervention to reduce the impact of negative appraisals. 
The intervention aims to target emotional reactivity and implicitly teach participants 
to react differently to their memories, without getting caught up in a negative cycle of 
appraisals. The concepts of mindfulness and self-compassion, and research in support 
of these interventions, will now be introduced.  
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Mindfulness, self-compassion and the benefits of a mixed intervention:  
 
Mindfulness is defined as ‘paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the 
present moment, and non-judgmentally’ (pg. 4, Kabat-Zinn (1994)). The origins of 
mindfulness stem from Eastern meditation practices (Baer, 2003), but within 
psychology, mindfulness is practiced without any religious nuances. During mindful 
practice, individuals are encouraged to tune into their current experience, without 
trying to judge or change thoughts or feelings that come to mind. Using the body as 
an anchor, individuals are encouraged to begin notice when their attention wanders, 
and how to bring their focus back to their internal experience, for example by 
focusing on the breath. Higher trait mindfulness, as measured by the Mindful 
Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS, Brown and Ryan (2003)) has been associated 
with lower levels of depression, as measured by the BDI-II, and anxiety, measured by 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, and 
Jacobs (1983)) in a student sample. Yeung (2013) replicated this finding, 
demonstrating that trait mindfulness, measured by the MAAS, was negatively 
correlated with symptoms of depression and anxiety, measured by the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS), in a student sample. 
 
Mindfulness has, in several variants, been incorporated into psychological 
interventions to improve well-being. Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) 
was originally designed to help people with chronic pain and a variety of issues that 
were difficult to care of in a hospital setting (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). The programme 
consists of 8-10 weekly group sessions and one full intensive mindfulness day. The 
course combines mindfulness meditations with some yoga exercises. Participants are 
encouraged to talk about their experiences of the exercises within the group. In a large 
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systematic review of 26 studies (involving over 1,900 participants, both clinical and 
non-clinical), Vibe, Bjørndal, Tipton, Hammerstrøm, and Kowalski (2012) conclude 
that MBSR has a moderate and consistent beneficial effect on mental health. 
Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) built upon the foundations of MBSR 
and was specifically designed for individuals experiencing recurrent episodes of 
depression, in remission at the beginning of the programme. MBCT is based on a 
model of depressive relapse and combines elements of mindful practice with elements 
of Cognitive Therapy (Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995). According to the 
depressive relapse model, experiences of low mood, which may be transient in 
healthy individuals, are more likely to spiral into long-term experiences of depression 
in people who have experienced previous depressive episodes. Therefore, mindful 
practice helps individuals become more aware of negative patterns of thoughts and, 
through repeated practice, learn how to disengage from these thoughts before they 
kick off a ruminative cycle and contribute to more extended experiences of low mood. 
Participants are also encouraged to decentre from these negative thoughts, recognising 
that they do not necessarily reflect reality (Teasdale et al., 1995) and that these 
negative thoughts are simply mental experiences that will come and go (Baer, 2003). 
Specific elements of CBT are also incorporated into MBCT; participants are taught 
about the effects of depression on cognition (for example, the role of negative 
interpretative biases on mood) and the relationship between emotions, behaviour and 
physiology (van der Velden et al., 2015). The format of MBCT is similar to MBSR; it 
involves 8 weeks of group sessions, a full one-day retreat and homework in between 
the sessions. Initial randomized control trials (RCTs) into MBCT indicated that the 
programme successfully reduced relapse in participants with 3 or more previous 
episodes of depression. However, in participants who had experienced only 1 or 2 
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previous episodes, there was either no reduction in relapse rate (Teasdale et al., 2000), 
or an increase in relapse rates (Ma & Teasdale, 2004), as compared to a treatment-as-
usual (TAU) condition. The selective efficacy in patients with 3 or more previous 
episodes of depression was further shown by Ma and Teasdale (2004) to be associated 
with key differences in characteristics between the two groups. Specifically, MBCT 
was most beneficial in reducing relapse in the participants whose depression was not 
triggered by a negative life event, but instead in cases where the relapse was triggered 
by internal processes, including rumination. Therefore, Ma and Teasdale (2004) 
conclude that MBCT is highly effective at reducing the impact of ruminative negative 
thinking on downward spirals in mood. This supports the investigation of 
mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) to reduce negative reactions to intrusive 
memories. However, these results are clear evidence that MBCT is not effective in all 
populations. Therefore, other variants of Mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) 
have been investigated, in more general samples, including non-clinical populations. 
These samples are similar to the sample tested in the study presented in chapter 3. For 
example, Heeren and Philippot (2011) adapted MBCT to be suitable for subclinical 
participants with a mix of stress, anxiety and depressive symptoms. Consequently, 
instead of just being told specifically about depression, participants were given more 
general information about mental well-being. Changes were compared to a waitlist 
control group. The mindfulness group showed a significant decrease in general 
symptomatology (measured by the global score index of the Symptom Checklist-90-
R) and a significant decrease in rumination, as compared to the waitlist control group. 
Additionally, changes in rumination mediated the effects of the intervention on 
general symptomatology, again supporting the idea that rumination is one component 
being changed in mindfulness training. However, these changes were only assessed 
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against a waitlist control, therefore it is unclear to what extent the benefits were 
treatment-specific, or whether they reflected non-specific factors, such as contact with 
researchers, social effects of participating in a study.  In further support of the benefits 
of mindfulness in more general samples, beyond the selective impact of MBCT, 
mindfulness interventions have been shown to be effective in enhancing 
psychological well-being in community volunteers (Williams, Kolar, Reger, & 
Pearson, 2001), university student samples (Danitz & Orsillo, 2014; Shapiro, 
Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998), and adolescents (Tan & Martin, 2015). These studies are 
indications that MBIs, more general than MBCT, can be effective in more extensive 
samples than the previous selective efficacy of MBCT in participants with 3 or more 
previous episodes of depression.   
 
Shorter mindfulness interventions have also been shown to be effective. This is an 
important finding as the considerable time commitment involved in a traditional 
mindfulness courses described above, typically 8 weeks, may deter people from 
beginning a traditional mindful course (Tappen, 2014). For example, Cavanagh et al. 
(2013) reported improvements in stress, anxiety and depression in a large student 
sample following an online mindfulness training course. Participants were given 
access to a 10-minute meditation and encouraged to listen once a day for a period of 
two weeks (they were sent reminder emails every 3 days). The effects were compared 
to a waitlist control group. Levels of stress, anxiety and depression significantly 
decreased in the mindfulness group, and remained unchanged in the control group.  
However, consistent with the idea that attrition is a large problem in mindfulness 
interventions (Crane & Williams, 2010), there was a large attrition rate in this study.  
Almost half of the mindfulness group dropped out of the study before completing the 
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final questionnaires, although there was no face-to-face contact required to 
participate. Consequently, results could be somewhat the result of a sample selection 
bias, where only certain participants completed the course. The intervention presented 
in this chapter is more extensive than this online study, as participants were exposed 
to more than one short mindfulness exercise, but still shorter than traditional longer 
programs. The study tested during this thesis also involved personal contact rather 
than being an online study, which may enhance the acceptability to participants and 
address the attrition issue. The intervention presented here lasts three weeks. In 
addition, participants were encouraged to follow guided exercises on a daily basis, 
should the benefits of the Cavanagh et al. (2013) study result from the regularity of 
the practice.  
 
Overall, the existing research supporting mindfulness-based interventions shows some 
promise, although it has been demonstrated that mindfulness interventions are not 
always effective, and the lack of control group is problematic. Additionally, less work 
has looked at exactly how mindfulness works (Baer, 2011; van der Velden et al., 
2015). Understanding the mechanisms underlying the favourable effects is important, 
both to best understand which populations would benefit from a proposed 
intervention, and to optimise the training protocol used for that particular sample 
(Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 2003). Accordingly Teasdale et al. (2003) caution 
against simply viewing mindfulness as a ‘cure-all’ intervention; it is important to 
predict exactly how mindful practice would help a particular population.  As 
described above, the premise of mindfulness is that practice reduces the potency of 
negative thoughts or experiences by helping individuals to learn to notice, and then 
disengage from them, before getting caught up in a negative ruminative cycle 
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(Teasdale et al., 2000). There is empirical support for this proposition. In a sample of 
individuals with lifetime mood disorder, mindfulness training reduces rumination, 
after controlling for changes in affective symptoms and dysfunctional beliefs (Ramel, 
Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004). Returning to the idea that rumination consists 
of different subtypes, Heeren and Philippot (2011) demonstrated that MBCT training 
increased what they termed ‘adaptive’ rumination (discussed earlier in the chapter as 
experiential self-focus; a focus on how I feel ) and decreased maladaptive rumination 
(described earlier as analytical self-focus; a focus on why I feel this way). Moreover, 
the authors demonstrated that changes in rumination mediated the reductions in 
general symptomatology, thereby suggesting that the changes in rumination are an 
integral part of the benefits of mindfulness.  This proposal has implications for the 
proposed intervention. It has consistently been demonstrated that it is not the initial 
experience of the intrusive memory that is problematic, but instead the reaction to the 
memory. This suggests that mindful practice would be beneficial to individuals prone 
to negative reactions to an intrusive memory (e.g. ‘having this memory means 
something is wrong with me’, Kandris and Moulds (2008)). In accordance with 
Teasdale et al. (2003), this reflects a specific application of mindfulness based on an 
understanding of one major contributing factor to distress; in this case, the impact of 
general depressive rumination widened to include reactions specifically to intrusive 
memories. This potential has not previously been investigated.  
 
Existing mindfulness interventions are being modified to also incorporate aspects of 
self-compassion. Like mindfulness, self-compassion also has roots in Buddhist 
traditions (Neff, 2003a). While it has been suggested that self-compassion is implicit 
in mindful practice, it will be argued that there are specific benefits of making self-
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compassion explicit. Neff (2003a) defines self-compassion as ‘generating the desire to 
alleviate one’s suffering and heal oneself with kindness’ (p.87). The premise of self-
compassion is to treat yourself the same way you would treat a friend or loved one 
who was going through a difficult time; with kindness, support and understanding 
(Neff & Dahm, in press). Neff (2003a) proposes that self-compassion is made up of 
three inter-related constructs: i) self-kindness, being kind and understanding instead 
of being critical and judgemental, ii) common humanity, viewing our individual 
experiences as a wider part of the general human experience, iii) mindfulness, 
maintaining a balanced awareness, reducing the need to avoid, suppress or over-
identify with our personal experiences.  
 
Correlational studies, conducted in non-clinical samples, have shown that higher 
levels of self-compassion are associated with lower levels of anxiety, depression 
(Leary, Tate, Adams, Allen, & Hancock, 2007; Neff, 2003b) and rumination (Neff, 
2003b; Neff & Vonk, 2009). Levels of self-compassion have also been shown to be 
associated with higher levels of positive affect, happiness and optimism (Neff, 2003b; 
Neff, Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007). In addition, first-year university students who rated 
themselves higher in self-compassion at the beginning of the semester reported less 
homesickness and lower levels of depression at the end of the semester (Terry, Leary, 
& Mehta, 2013). Furthermore, Neff et al. (2007) demonstrated that high levels of self-
compassion were associated with a lower increase in anxiety in an undergraduate 
sample asked to write about their greatest weakness in a mock job interview. This task 
was designed to induce high stress levels and suggests self-compassion is protective 
against distress in times where a positive view of the self is challenged. Leary et al. 
(2007) drew a similar conclusion when exploring the relationship between self-
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compassion and reactions to real-life and hypothetical life events. Hypothetical events 
were looked at in addition to real-life events to ensure that any differences were not 
simply attributable to the type of events people high versus low in self-compassion 
are reporting. For both types of events, high self-compassion was associated with 
lower negative emotions. Individuals high in self-compassion also ruminated less 
when presented with negative evaluations of themselves. In light of the demonstration 
that higher self-compassion has been associated with lower levels of anxiety and 
depression (Leary et al., 2007; Neff, 2003b; Neff et al., 2007), Raes (2010) looked at 
the mediating effects of rumination and worry on the relationship between self-
compassion, depression and anxiety in an undergraduate sample. Rumination and 
worry both represent negative repetitive types of thinking, in depression and anxiety 
disorders respectively. Therefore, Raes (2010) hypothesized that the positive 
implications of being self-compassionate may come about through a reduction in 
these detrimental negative thinking styles. As per Treynor et al. (2003), they further 
subdivided rumination into brooding (negative and passive reflection on the current 
situation) and reflection (a more neutral type of reflection) subtypes, using the 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). Their analysis confirmed that the brooding 
subscale of the RRS mediated the relationship between self-compassion scores and 
BDI-II scores. In addition, both worry and brooding scores significantly mediated the 
relationship between self-compassion and anxiety.  This is initial evidence of how 
being self-compassionate is beneficial; it may reduce the impact of repetitive negative 
thinking about oneself.  This has implications for the current proposed intervention.  
Certain individuals have been shown to endorse the belief that having an intrusive 
memory infers something negative about themselves, for example, that they are weak 
or inadequate (Moulds et al., 2008). This is an example of an uncompassionate 
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response and supports the prediction that individuals prone to self-deprecating 
reactions to intrusive memories would benefit from being more self-compassionate.  
 
Like mindfulness, it has been shown that self-compassion can be increased through 
interventions. For example, Compassionate Mind Training (CMT) was developed for 
people with high levels of shame and self-criticism with a mixture of chronic 
psychological problems (Gilbert & Irons, 2005). The premise of CMT is that there are 
two processing pathways, a self-judgmental one and a self-kind one. The intervention 
is designed to help individuals change the way they relate to themselves by activating 
the self-kind pathway through a variety of exercises. A key component of the 
intervention is the generation of compassionate imagery, during which participants 
are encouraged to create and explore their ideal compassionate image, and use this 
image to help adopt a more compassionate stance towards themselves. Another 
exercise is writing a compassionate letter to themselves, written as if it were from the 
chosen compassionate image. Gilbert and Procter (2006) conducted a small ‘pre-trial’ 
study on CMT (N = 6) in participants attending a CBT day centre for patients with 
long-term psychological difficulties. They found significant reductions in depression, 
anxiety, shame and increases in participants’ self-rated ability to be self-
compassionate following twelve two-hour sessions. This was the first evidence of the 
potential effectiveness of a compassion-based intervention. Smeets, Neff, Alberts, and 
Peters (2014) tested the effectiveness of a shorter three-week self-compassion 
intervention in non-clinical female college students. This reflects a similar sample to 
the one used in chapter three. The intervention in the Smeets et al. (2014) study 
consisted of two one and a half hour sessions designed to help the students cope with 
the demands of college life in a more self-compassionate manner, plus a follow-up 
	  	   50	  
week session. During the first session, participants were introduced to the concept of 
self-compassion and were encouraged to write down their most common self-critical 
thoughts. The homework consisted of three components. Participants were given an 
‘intervention bracelet’, which they were told to move from one arm to the other 
anytime they reacted un-compassionately to a negative event. They also kept a ‘self-
compassion’ journal, which encouraged self-compassionate responses to challenging 
situations and were asked to practice three loving-kindness statements daily. Loving-
kindness is the practice of unconditional kindness and loving acceptance towards all 
beings and the self, for example ‘may the person be free of suffering’ (Hofmann, 
Grossman, & Hinton, 2011). During the second session, participants devised three 
self-compassionate phrases to practice during the week, and were asked to write down 
five things they appreciate about themselves. As homework over the following week, 
participants were asked to write themselves a compassionate letter about a negative 
issue, written as if they were writing to a friend. The control group completed sessions 
in time management skills, matched for the number of sessions and homework 
assignments (e.g. keeping records of their time efficiency). The self-compassion 
group reported significantly greater increases in both self-compassion and 
mindfulness than the control group. The increases in mindfulness are particularly 
interesting given that participants did not complete any explicit meditative 
mindfulness exercises. This result further supports the interplay between mindfulness 
and self-compassion that was discussed above. Consequently, training in one practice 
may enhance the other, even if the other practice is not an explicit focus. The 
compassion group also reported decreases in rumination, and increases in ratings of 
self-efficacy and optimism. Results from this study demonstrate that a short self-
compassion intervention can be beneficial to a non-clinical student sample.   
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Another intervention, the Mindful Self-compassion (MSC) programme, combines 
mindfulness and self-compassion exercises (Neff & Germer, 2013). The programme 
was designed for use in both clinical and healthy populations and, like the traditional 
mindfulness programmes, consists of 8 weekly sessions. Although the intervention 
addresses both mindfulness and self-compassion, MSC was designed primarily to 
increase self-compassion, but also focuses on teaching basic skills in mindfulness. 
MSC consists of a mixture of formal and informal exercises. Formal exercises include 
an affectionate breathing exercise, where participants are encouraged to bring 
affection and warmth to their breathing. Informal practices include bringing self-
compassion to daily life, for example by putting hands gently on the heart during a 
stressful experience. Neff and Germer (2013) showed that community participants 
undergoing MSC reported larger gains in self-compassion, mindfulness and greater 
reductions in depression, anxiety, stress and avoidance than a waitlist control group. 
The intervention was also rated favourably by participants. This study demonstrates 
the potential of a mixed mindfulness and self-compassion intervention. This is 
important for two reasons. Firstly, self-compassion requires a certain level of 
mindfulness to begin with, in that participants do not get carried away or avoid 
negative thoughts or feelings (Neff, 2003a). Therefore mindful exercises may be a 
critical foundation for self-compassion exercises. In addition, although research has 
suggested that levels of self-compassion increase during mindful practice (Kuyken et 
al., 2010), there are no explicit exercises focusing on self-compassion. The 
intervention presented in the thesis will encompass mindfulness and self-compassion, 
as both were expected to, in slightly different ways, reduce the negative impact of 
appraisals of intrusive memories.  
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Overview of the current research goal:  	  
In summary, the empirical work presented in this thesis begins by testing an 
intervention based specifically on research highlighting the role of reactions to 
intrusive memories in maintaining intrusion-related distress and depressive 
symptomatology. It is predicted that a short mindfulness and self-compassion based 
intervention will help individuals react to their memories less intensely, and therefore 
reduce both measures of subjective distress and depressive symptomatology. The 
second and predominant focus of the thesis is to extend upon research highlighting a 
role for individual differences in intrusive memory experience, using the Dual 
Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMC) framework. Research will initially be 
conducted in a non-valenced task, where chapter four will focus on a potential link 
between cognitive control and intrusive, negative memories, and chapter five will 
look at involuntary memory in the general sense. The final study, presented in chapter 
six, will extend this to emotional tasks of cognitive control.  The research was 
conducted on student and community samples. The intervention study (chapter three) 
specifically recruited participants with current low mood, to ensure some degree of 
distress. However, no mood qualifier was used in the advertisements for the cognitive 
control studies.  The use of a non-clinical university sample to test mindfulness and 
self-compassion based interventions is consistent with previous research (Neff & 
Germer, 2013; Smeets et al., 2014). The use of a non-clinical sample to address the 
question of underlying deficits in cognitive control is also consistent with the research 
introduced throughout this chapter (Verwoerd et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 2011; 
Wessel et al., 2008). 
Importantly, these previous studies have found enough variation in both the intrusion 
experience and in cognitive control to find differences in cognitive control, 
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specifically proactive interference, within these samples. Furthermore, Brewin (1998) 
suggests that non-clinical populations are a good basis for examining intrusive 
memory experience. These samples can be used to establish the basic factors 
associated with memory experience, which can then later be applied to clinical 
samples.  Consequently, the following empirical studies look to establish whether 
there is a link between intrusive and involuntary memories and individual differences 
in cognitive control. In addition, a novel intervention, designed specifically to reduce 
the impact of negative reactions to intrusive memories to will be examined. This work 
will now be presented. 
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Chapter two. 
 
 
General Methodology. 
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In this chapter, the methodology used for the empirical work presented in the thesis 
will be introduced. The first section will outline the different ways of measuring 
intrusive and involuntary memories, and the second section will introduce the 
measures of depressive symptomatology, mindfulness and self-compassion.  
Research summarized in the introductory chapter suggests that research into intrusive 
memories should take more than a simple measure of memory frequency into account. 
Therefore, the studies presented will measure two elements of intrusive and 
involuntary memory experience; the frequency of the memory, and the consequences 
of the memory. These measures will now be introduced.   
1) Frequency, via retrospective and diary measures:  
 
The clinical literature predominantly uses the Intrusive Memory Interview 
(Hackmann et al., 2004) to measure personally experienced intrusive memories. In 
this methodology, participants make retrospective assessments of the number of 
memories they have experienced over the past 7 days (Newby & Moulds, 2011a; 
Williams & Moulds, 2007c; Williams & Moulds, 2008b). Conversely, the involuntary 
memory literature primarily uses diary measures to study memory characteristics 
(Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen, 2001; Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013). 
Furthermore, when memory frequency is not the focus of the study, participants are 
often only asked to record first two involuntary memories they experience in a given 
day, until they have recorded a total of fifty memories. This is done as an attempt to 
reduce potential demand effects, for example artificially inflating the number of 
involuntary memories participants experience (Berntsen, 1998; Watson et al., 2012). 
Other times, involuntary memory studies use a two-structured approach where 
participants complete a small set of questions immediately after the memory, and a 
larger set of questions at a later time that suits them. This is done to reduce time 
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demands of the diary methodology and try to ensure, as far as possible, that 
participants comply with the task instructions (Berntsen, 2011).   
 
There are advantages and limitations to the reliability of both retrospective and diary 
measures. For example, retrospective ratings may be distorted, especially in the 
presence of low mood (Beck, 1979) or stressful memories (Buchanan, 2007). 
Additionally, Rasmussen, Johannessen, and Berntsen (2014) suggest that as 
involuntary memories are often experienced briefly and pertain to everyday events, 
retrospective assessments may easily underestimate the frequency of these memories. 
However, as noted above, diary measures are also potentially inaccurate if 
participants do not comply with the instructions, for example because they had an 
involuntary memory at a time it was not convenient to record the details, or if they 
forgot to. Furthermore, Verwoerd et al. (2008) argue that the number of memories 
recorded in a diary may to some extent reflect an individual’s ability to keep the goal 
of recording memories in mind, resulting in a higher number of memories being 
recorded by individuals high in attentional control. On the other hand, they also 
suggest that asking participants to keep a diary may artificially increase the number of 
intrusive memories experienced, because it may increase the activation of the 
memory.  Their results support this second proposal; participants who kept a diary 
about their film-induced intrusive memories recorded three times as many as 
participants who retrospectively reported their memories. This finding has 
implications for the question of potential deficits in cognitive control. For example, 
Verwoerd et al. (2008) found that attentional control only predicted film-related 
intrusive memories in a group instructed to keep a diary of their intrusive memories. 
There was no relationship between participants who were asked to retrospectively 
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report on their intrusive memories. This suggests that keeping a diary did 
meaningfully impact frequency of the memories.  To address this trade-off, and to 
ensure frequency estimates are as accurate as possible, the diary method will be used 
in all three investigations into cognitive control and intrusive/involuntary memory 
experience, specifically to assess frequency of negative involuntary memories 
(chapter four and six) and involuntary memories (chapter five). In addition, the 
retrospective measures of intrusive memories will be used to assess the frequency of 
intrusive memories in chapters four and six. Chapter five, which investigates a 
potential link between cognitive control and involuntary memory (regardless of the 
valence of the memory) will only use the diary methodology, as to my knowledge 
there are no validated retrospective measures of involuntary memories. In this study, 
however, given the possibility that participants will not fully comply with instructions 
to record all of their involuntary memories, they will be asked at the end of the 
procedure to estimate the number of memories they experienced, but did not write in 
the diary, for any reason. The properties of the measures used to index these aspects 
of intrusive and involuntary memories are summarized below.  
 
Intrusive Memory Interview (IMI, Hackmann et al. (2004)):   
The IMI will be used to measure the frequency of intrusive memories in chapters 
three, four and six. It is verbally administered and addresses participants’ subjective 
experience of negative ‘spontaneous’ memories experienced over the past 7 days. 
Participants are given a definition of a spontaneous memory and are asked about the 
frequency of intrusions, along with content and sensory information concerning the 
memory. Participants rate various memory features on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 100 
(very much), including distress, sense of nowness, interference with daily activities. 
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Participants also rate the vantage perspective of the memory from -3 (completely first 
person) to +3 (completely third person). If participants experience intrusive memories 
about more than one event, subsequent questions are answered in relation to the most 
intrusive or most distressing of the memories.  
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Diary of intrusive/involuntary memories:  
Diary measures will be used to assess both intrusive and involuntary memories in 
chapters four, five and six. The booklet consists of a small number of questions for 
each intrusive/involuntary memory they experience over a 7-day period, based on 
work by Berntsen and colleagues (Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Watson et al., 2012). 
Participants were told this could include any intrusive or involuntary memory they 
experienced; it was not restricted to the memory talked about in the initial session. 
Participants are asked to provide a short description of the memory, rate their current 
mood on a 5-point scale (0 very bad to 5 very good) and indicate whether the memory 
affected their mood (my mood became better/worse/uninfluenced).  As an attempt to 
reduce demand effects as far as possible, participants are told not to worry if they do 
not experience any intrusive or involuntary memories over the week, and also that 
they should not feel obliged to record any details they did not want to. In addition, for 
the involuntary memory study (chapter five) participants will be asked to rate the 
valence of the memory on a scale from 0-5 (0 representing an extremely negative 
memory, 5 representing an extremely positive memory). See Appendix A for 
examples of an intrusive/involuntary memory diary page. 
 
Compliance questionnaire: 
This measure will be used in the involuntary memory study (chapter five). After 
handing in their diaries, participants are given a questionnaire which asked them to 
estimate the number of times they experienced a memory that they could not put into 
words, the number of times they experienced a memory when it was impractical to 
record details of the memory and the number of memories they did not report for any 
other reason. No other detail of the memory was asked, therefore this measure allows 
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participants to include memories they did not want to disclose any specific details 
about.  The total number of memories indicated on this questionnaire was added to the 
number of memories recorded in the diary to form a summative measure of 
involuntary memories. See Appendix B.  
2) Consequence measures: 
 
Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz et al. (1979)): 
The IES will be used to measure the consequences of intrusive memories in chapters 
three, four and six. The IES assesses the subjective impact of a specific life event and 
has two subscales, measuring intrusiveness and avoidance respectively. The intrusion 
subscale indexes the frequency and variety of intrusions associated with the specific 
event (e.g. ‘pictures about it popped into my mind’, ‘other things kept making me 
think about it’), and the avoidance subscale assesses attempts to suppress thoughts 
and memories associated with the event (‘I tried not to talk about it’, ‘I avoided letting 
myself get upset when I thought about it or was reminded of it’). Each item is rated on 
a four-point scale; not at all (scored as 0), rarely (scored as 1), sometimes (scored as 
3) or often (scored as 5). Scores are calculated for the intrusion and avoidance 
subscales separately, and then an overall total (maximum 70) is calculated. As done in 
previous research, if participants report having experienced more than one intrusive 
memory over the past week, the IES is filled out in regards to the memory the 
participant identifies as the “most intrusive or most distressing”. Higher scores reflect 
greater levels of intrusiveness and avoidance. Internal consistencies of the intrusion 
subscale has been reported as .78 and the avoidance subscale as .82 (Horowitz et al., 
1979). 
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Ruminative Response Scale (RRS, subscale of the Response Style Questionnaire 
Treynor et al. (2003)): 
The RRS will be used in chapters four, five and six as a consequence measure. It 
consists of 22 items which participants are instructed to respond to in respect to how 
much they think about or engage in the items when they feel down or depressed (e.g. 
‘think about how passive and unmotivated you feel’ and ‘think ‘why do I always react 
this way?’’). Each item is rated on a four-point scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 
(almost always) and scores are summed across all items. The RRS has a good internal 
consistency of .90 (Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). 
3) Additional measures used in the thesis:  
 
Beck Depression Inventory- Second edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996): 
The BDI-II will be used as a measure of depressive symptomatology in all four 
studies. It is one of the most common ways of measuring depressive symptomatology, 
in both clinical and research settings. Participants are asked to rate their experience of 
21 cognitive, affective and behavioural features of depression. Items include a loss of 
pleasure, changes in appetite and concentration difficulties and are measured on a 3 
point scale, ranging from no endorsement of the symptom (e.g. I get as much pleasure 
as I ever did from the things I enjoy’) to a high endorsement of the symptom (‘I can’t 
get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy’). Participants are instructed to 
respond in terms of how they have been feeling over the past two weeks. The 
maximum score is 63, and higher scores reflected a higher experience of depressive 
symptomatology. The internal consistency of the BDI-II in a student sample has been 
reported as .90 (Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004).  
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Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS: Brown and Ryan (2003)): 
The MAAS will be used in chapter three and is a 15-item scale assessing mindfulness 
in common everyday experiences. Participants are asked to respond in terms of what 
‘really reflects’ their experiences, as opposed to what they think their experiences 
should be.  Example statements include ‘I rush though activities without being really 
attentive to them’ and ‘I snack without being aware that I’m eating’. Each item is 
rated on a scale of 1-6 (1 representing almost always, 6 representing almost never) 
and a mean score is calculated. Higher overall scores represent a greater level of trait 
mindfulness. Internal consistency of the MAAS has been reported as .82 in a general 
student sample (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
 
Self-compassion Scale (SCS; Neff (2003b)): 
The SCS will also be used in chapter three. It is a 26-item self-report which assesses 
the extent to which individuals show themselves compassion in times of difficulty. 
The SCS has six subscales; self-kindness (e.g. ‘I try to be loving to myself when I am 
in emotional pain’), mindfulness (e.g. ‘When I fail at something important to me I try 
to keep things in perspective’), common humanity (e.g. ‘I try to see my failings as 
part of the human condition’), self-judgment (e.g. ‘I’m disapproving and judgmental 
about my own flaws and inadequacies’), over-identification (e.g. ‘when I’m feeling 
down I tend to obsess and fixate on everything that’s wrong’) and isolation (e.g. 
‘when I’m feeling down, I tend to feel like most people are probably happier than I 
am’). Items are scored on a scale of 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). Scores for 
negative items are reverse scored, and a mean score is calculated. The SCS has been 
demonstrated to have an internal consistency of .92 (Neff, 2003b).  
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Chapter three. 
An investigation into mindfulness 
and self-compassion training to 
reduce the impact of intrusive 
memories. 
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Introduction:  
 
This chapter will explore the efficacy of a mindfulness and self-compassion 
intervention to reduce the distress arising from the experience of intrusive memories 
in a low mood sample. As discussed in the introductory chapter, an abundance of 
research emphasizes that is not necessarily the intrusive memory per se that causes 
high levels of distress in individuals vulnerable to depression, but instead the way 
people vulnerable to low mood appraise their memories (Starr & Moulds, 2006; 
Williams & Moulds, 2008b). Reactions such as ‘something is wrong with me and ‘I 
cannot cope’ have been shown to increase levels of distress and maintain symptoms 
of depression over time (Williams & Moulds, 2008b). The current study therefore 
investigates the efficacy of a mixed mindfulness and self-compassion intervention to 
reduce this emotional reactivity. Empirical evidence to support mindfulness and self-
compassion based interventions to support this research goal will be reviewed, before 
the current study is described. 
 
The model of PTSD maintenance by Ehlers and Steil (1995) provides the rationale for 
the current study. The model emphasizes the importance of the appraisals ascribed to 
the memory, both in terms of the memory content (‘it was my fault’) and the 
consequences of experiencing an intrusive memory (‘there is something wrong with 
me’). According to the model, assigning a negative appraisal to a memory increases 
the distress experienced with the memory, which then in turn may encourage more 
avoidance behaviours (e.g. thought suppression). However, these avoidance 
behaviours contribute to the persistence the intrusive memories by preventing a 
change in the meaning of the event and preventing the memory from being 
successfully emotionally processed (Rachman, 1980). As such, the distress associated 
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with the memory has been shown to be more important than the frequency of the 
memory in determining mental well-being. The Ehlers and Steil (1995) model has 
since been extended to apply to the non-traumatic intrusive memories experienced by 
individuals with depression, both in correlational (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & 
Moulds, 2008b) and causal (Lang et al., 2009) data. For example, in a student sample, 
Williams and Moulds (2008a) found that intrusion-related distress (rated on a 100-
point scale) was significantly positively correlated with BDI-II scores, and BDI-II 
scores correlated with Impact of Event Scale (IES) scores (both the intrusiveness and 
avoidance subscales), irrespective of the frequency of the intrusive memory. 
Assigning a negative meaning to intrusions was also associated with higher intrusion-
related distress and BDI-II scores, as well as higher engagement in avoidance 
behaviours, specifically suppression and rumination. To my knowledge, the study 
presented in this chapter is the first to directly test the prediction that reducing the 
impact of appraisals would reduce depressive symptomatology, as predicted by 
Brewin (1998). Lang et al. (2009) did use Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) to look 
at the impact of appraisals on intrusion experience. They induced either positive or 
negative appraisals about intrusive memories (e.g. having an intrusive memories 
means nothing/something is wrong with me) in student participants and measured the 
number of intrusions over the next week (indexed through diary recordings) after 
watching a sad film. Participants in the negative appraisal condition recorded more 
intrusions in their diaries, and reported higher IES scores than participants in the 
positive appraisal condition. These results suggest a causal impact of appraisals on 
intrusion development, beyond correlational data. This supports the current objective 
of changing the way people react to their intrusive memories and suggests that 
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reducing the impact of appraisals would have a beneficial impact on both intrusive 
memory distress and mood.  
 
Rumination, the passive focus on the causes and consequences of symptoms of 
depression (e.g. ‘think about how sad I feel (Treynor et al., 2003)) has also been 
demonstrated to exacerbate negative reactions to intrusive memories (Williams & 
Moulds, 2010). Although rumination has been implicated in the onset and 
maintenance of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 
2008), it has since been demonstrated that it is not specifically the self-focus aspect of 
rumination that is detrimental to mood. Instead, it is the analytical processing style 
that accompanies ruminative processing that is problematic, for example focusing on 
why I feel this way (Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). However, an 
experiential self-focus, for example focusing on how I feel, can be advantageous to 
mood, and facilitate adaptive emotional processing (Teasdale, 1999). This distinction 
between analytical and experiential self-focus forms the basis of mindful practice, 
which will now be discussed. The rationale for using a mindfulness intervention to 
reduce the impact of negative appraisals will then be introduced. Mindfulness 
involves a non-judgemental focus of attention on thoughts and sensation being 
experienced in the present moment (Kabat-Zinn, 1994).  During mindful practice, 
participants are taught to just notice what comes to mind, without judging or trying to 
change their experience, for example through avoidance or suppression.  Exercises in 
the mindfulness programme include the body scan, where attention is progressively 
directed to different parts of the body, for example the knees and the toes, and the 
sitting meditation, where attention is directed to the breath. These provide a focal 
point to help participants start to notice when their attention wanders, and help 
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improve their ability to bring their attention back to the exercise once they are aware 
that their attention has wandered. Mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) exist in 
various forms, including Mindful-based Stress Reduction (MBSR), Mindfulness-
based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), which both last eight weeks, and shorter 
interventions. MBCT was specifically designed for individuals experiencing recurrent 
episodes of clinical depression and is founded on the idea that it is not the initial 
experience of low mood that provokes relapse into an episode of depression. Instead, 
it is the negative thinking patterns activated during a period of low mood that can 
propel the downward ruminative cycle into long-term low mood or depression (Segal, 
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002; Teasdale et al., 1995). Therefore, as discussed in the 
introduction, MBCT specifically targets these patterns of negative thinking. The 
programme teaches participants to become more aware of these ruminative patterns 
and disengage from them before they lead to longer episodes of low mood.  It has 
been demonstrated that MBCT is selectively effective in reducing depressive relapse 
in individuals with 3 or more previous episodes of depression, and is not effective in 
reducing relapse in individuals with one or two previous episodes (Ma & Teasdale, 
2004; Teasdale et al., 2000). Furthermore, Ma and Teasdale (2004) demonstrated that 
this selective effect on individuals who with three or more previous episodes reflected 
differences in the underlying cause for relapse; MBCT was most effective in reducing 
relapse when the relapse was not preceded by a major life event, when it presumably, 
therefore, was instead triggered by internal ruminative processes. This selective effect 
has been taken as evidence of the impact on MBCT in reducing ruminative processes. 
Other more general mindful-based interventions, have been found to be effective in 
wider populations than the selective effects of MBCT on individuals with three or 
more episodes of depression, including healthy individuals (Khoury, Sharma, Rush, & 
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Fournier, 2015), medical students (Rosenzweig, Reibel, Greeson, Brainard, & Hojat, 
2003) and inner-city populations (Smith, Metzker, Waite, & Gerrity, 2015). 
Interventions that last less time than the traditional eight-week programmes have also 
been shown to be effective. This is an important extension of existing interventions, 
given the substantial time commitments of the traditional programmes and the 
problem of attrition (Crane & Williams, 2010; Tappen, 2014). Cavanagh et al. (2013) 
reported improvements in stress, anxiety and depression in a large student sample 
following a two-week online mindfulness training course, consisting of short-recorded 
exercises. These studies are evidence that mindfulness interventions, in various forms, 
are beneficial beyond the selective impact of MBCT on participants with three or 
more episodes of depression. This in turn supports the extension of mindfulness 
training to reduce intrusive-memory distress in a low mood student sample. Research 
looking at how mindfulness works also supports the proposed intervention. Heeren 
and Philippot (2011) found that the benefits of mindfulness on symptoms of stress, 
depression and anxiety were mediated by changes in rumination in a general sample.  
This is evidence that rumination is one aspect that changes through training, and 
suggests that mindfulness training could reduce negative emotional reactivity that has 
been shown to occur after an intrusive memory (Moulds et al., 2008; Starr & Moulds, 
2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b). This potential leads to the question of whether any 
reduction would consequently be accompanied by a decrease in depressive 
symptomatology. Engaging in mindful practice encourages participants not to 
suppress their memory, as well as not to get caught up in negative thinking about the 
memory. Instead, they are encouraged to let the memory pass out of awareness again, 
without reacting to it in a ruminative way or engaging in any negative appraisals. As it 
has specifically been shown that ruminative processing exacerbates negative 
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responses to intrusive memories (Williams & Moulds, 2010), an intervention to 
reduce this detrimental  reaction is important.  
 
Self-compassion is a closely related concept to mindfulness that is also predicted to 
help counteract the self-condemnatory reactions accompanied by an intrusive memory 
(i.e. ‘there is something wrong with me’, Newby and Moulds (2010)). Neff (2003a) 
defines self-compassion as ‘generating the desire to alleviate one’s suffering and heal 
oneself with kindness’ (p.87). While we are often compassionate towards others, we 
typically do not extend this kindness to ourselves when faced with difficult personal 
circumstances (Neff, 2003a). In addition, self-attitudes in people with mood disorders 
are known to be negative and self-deprecating (Van Dam, Sheppard, Forsyth, & 
Earleywine, 2011). Furthermore, individuals have also been shown to react in a non 
self-compassionate way to intrusive memories, for example ‘because I can’t control 
this memory, I am a weak person’ (Moulds et al., 2008). Research has indicated that 
higher levels of trait self-compassion are associated with lower levels of anxiety and 
depression (Neff, 2003b) and higher levels of happiness and positive affect (Neff et 
al., 2007). It has also been shown that self-compassion can reduce reactions to 
potentially upsetting events, such as writing about personal weaknesses (Neff et al., 
2007), when receiving ambivalent feedback and imagining upsetting social events, 
which included losing an important game for their sports team or forgetting their lines 
during a stage performance (Leary et al., 2007). Higher self-compassion has also been 
associated with better adaption to university life in first year students (Terry et al., 
2013), specifically reflected by lower levels of depression and lower levels of 
homesickness.  
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As discussed in the introduction chapter, various self-compassion based interventions 
have been empirically tested, with some promising results. For example, 
Compassionate Mind Training (CMT) was developed for people with high levels of 
shame and self-criticism and is designed to help individuals to change the way in 
which they relate to themselves (Gilbert & Irons, 2005). One exercise in CMT is the 
generation of compassionate imagery. Participants are encouraged to create and 
explore feelings they associate with a compassionate being, real or imaginary, and to 
apply this compassionate focus to their specific difficulty. Another important part of 
the CMT programme is writing a compassionate letter to the self from the perspective 
of the chosen compassionate image, to facilitate adapting to a more compassionate 
self-to-self relating. These components of CMT will be incorporated into the current 
intervention. The aim is to encourage individuals to react more compassionately to the 
distress they may feel about their intrusive memory. Gilbert and Procter (2006) 
reported significant reductions in depression, anxiety and shame in a small study of 
CMT, consisting of twelve two-hour sessions, in patients (mean age = 45.2 years, SD 
= 5.54) attending a day centre for a variety of psychological issues. They did not 
include a control group. Neff and Germer (2013) designed a Mindful Self-
Compassion program for clinical and non-clinical populations. The intervention lasts 
eight weeks, and includes exercises in affectionate breathing, finding a compassionate 
voice and managing difficult emotions by learning to better read the body and react 
appropriately (for example, noticing tension).  Compared to a waitlist control group, 
MSC participants reported significant increases in self-compassion, mindfulness and 
life satisfaction, and decreases in depression, anxiety, stress and emotional avoidance 
(Neff & Germer, 2013). Smeets et al. (2014) tested a shorter self-compassion 
intervention in female college students. Participants took part in two sessions, where 
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they completed exercises to promote self-compassion. These exercises included being 
encouraged to be self-compassionate in response to negative events and to practice 
compassionate statements daily (e.g. ‘may you be kind to yourself’). Compared to a 
waitlist control group, participants in the compassion group reported increases in self-
reported mindfulness, self-compassion, self-efficacy and optimism, and also decreases 
in rumination. This study suggests that a self-compassionate intervention can enhance 
well-being in a non-clinical student sample, such as the one tested in the current 
chapter.  
 
Three main reasons support the investigation of a mixed mindfulness and self-
compassion intervention. Firstly, both mindfulness and self-compassion are predicted 
to reduce intrusive-memory distress; mindfulness by reducing emotional reactivity, 
for example ‘having this memory means I am losing my mind’ (Moulds et al., 2008) 
and self-compassion by encouraging participants not to be as self-deprecating about 
the memory, for example ‘this memory means I am weird or abnormal’ (Moulds et 
al., 2008). Secondly, Neff (2003a) suggests that in order to be self-compassionate, 
individuals need to be able to hold negative emotions in check (i.e. not avoid or get 
carried away with them), therefore mindful practice is an important foundation to self-
compassion exercises.  Thirdly, the enhancement of self-compassion that may arise 
through mindfulness training is only implicit; there are no exercises during 
mindfulness training that directly encourage a self-compassionate attitude.  However 
given the predicted benefits of self-compassion to reduce the impact of negative 
reactions to intrusive memories, making this an explicit component of the intervention 
is predicted to provide additional benefit to participants. No previous research has 
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directly tested the effect of either mindfulness or self-compassion training on intrusive 
memory experience.  
The present study:  
 
The present study will test the effectiveness of a brief three-week group intervention 
(consisting of two mindfulness sessions and one self-compassion session) in reducing 
intrusive memory related-distress, in individuals currently experiencing intrusive 
memories and low mood. Participants will be measured on the Impact of Event Scale 
(IES, including separate analysis of the intrusiveness and avoidance subscales), Beck 
Depression Inventory II (BDI-II), Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS) 
and the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS) both pre-intervention (time 1) and one week 
post-intervention (time 2).  Changes on these self-report questionnaires will be 
compared to a group taking part in three weeks of relaxation sessions. Using 
relaxation as a control group controls for placebo or demand effects (Baer, 2003) as 
well as non-specific treatment effects (e.g. group support, contact with researchers, 
completing questionnaires) of the intervention. Specifically, the relaxation exercises 
are conducted in group sessions which follow a similar format to the mindfulness/self-
compassion sessions, and participants are presented with a similar rationale at the 
beginning of the intervention.  However an important difference between the two 
interventions is that during relaxation exercises there is a specific intention to relax, 
which is opposed to mindful practice, which is approached with a non-striving 
attitude.  There is also no emphasis on the importance of a non-judgemental attitude 
in relaxation exercises, which is a core component of mindfulness. Relaxation-based 
interventions have previously been shown to reduce depressive symptomatology (Jain 
et al., 2007; Jorm, Morgan, & Hetrick, 2008). However in a comparison of a one-
	  	   73	  
month mindfulness to a one-month relaxation intervention, Jain et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that only the mindfulness group showed a reduction in rumination, 
while both groups showed a positive change in distress and positive state of mind, as 
compared to a waitlist control. This suggests that while both processes may result in a 
decrease in depressive symptomatology, the benefits of relaxation are more general 
than the predicted specific impact of mindfulness on ruminative processes, and that 
therefore the mindfulness/self-compassion will be more beneficial at reducing 
intrusion distress. 
 
Consistent with all four studies presented in the thesis, the correlations between the 
self-report measures will be examined to further enhance our understanding of 
intrusive memory experience and to form a clear picture of the sample being tested.  
No existing research has looked at the relationships between intrusive memory 
experience, mindfulness and self-compassion. For the baseline measures, the 
questionnaire will be collapsed across intervention group. The correlations between 
change scores in mindfulness and self-compassion and changes on the other self-
report measures (IES, BDI-II and RRS) will also be looked at to determine the way in 
which the intervention is successful. This analysis will be done separately for the two 
groups.  
Predictions:  
 
1) Baseline data:  
 
In light of existing research citing mindfulness and self-compassion as adaptive for 
psychological well-being, higher levels of mindfulness (measured by the MAAS, 
Brown and Ryan (2003)) and self-compassion (measured by the SCS, Neff (2003b)) 
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are predicted to negatively correlate with depressive symptomatology (as measured by 
the BDI-II, Beck et al. (1996)). No previous research has looked at mindfulness and 
self-compassion in relation to intrusive memory experience, therefore it is unclear 
whether IES scores will correlate with the MAAS and SCS scores.  
2) Group differences following training:  
 
Reductions in depressive symptomatology have been demonstrated after both 
mindfulness/self-compassion (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Jain et al., 2007; Neff & 
Germer, 2013) and relaxation training (Jain et al., 2007; Jorm et al., 2008), therefore a 
main effect of time on BDI-II is expected in both groups. However, as the changes in 
the mindfulness/self-compassion training is expected to come about specifically 
through a reduction in rumination (Heeren & Philippot, 2011; Smeets et al., 2014) and 
given the impact of ruminative appraisals on maintenance of low mood (Newby & 
Moulds, 2011c; Williams & Moulds, 2008b), it is predicted that participants in the 
mindfulness and self-compassion group will report greater reductions on the IES and 
on the BDI-II between time 1 and time 2 than participants in the relaxation group. It is 
also predicted that only the mindfulness/self-compassion group will show significant 
positive changes on the measures of mindfulness and self-compassion, as the 
relaxation training will not incorporate these concepts.   
 
3) The relationship between changes in mindfulness and self-compassion, and 
changes on the IES and BDI-II:  
 
In light of the close relationship between mindfulness and self-compassion (Birnie, 
Speca, & Carlson, 2010; Neff, 2003a; Smeets et al., 2014), a significant positive 
correlation between increases in mindfulness and increases in self-compassion is 
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expected. Additionally, as the benefits of mindfulness and self-compassion on 
intrusive memory experience are hypothesised to come from specific aspects of 
mindfulness and self-compassion, there is predicted to be a significant positive 
correlation between changes on the MAAS and SCS, and changes on the IES, in the 
mindfulness/self-compassion group only. No such correlation is expected in the 
relaxation group. There is also predicted to be a significant negative correlation 
between changes on the MAAS/SCS and BDI-II in the mindfulness/self-compassion 
group. Again, no such correlation is expected in the relaxation group, because these 
concepts are not addressed in relaxation training.  
 
Methods:  
Participants:  
 
The study was granted ethical approval from the University Teaching and Research 
Ethics Committee (UTREC). Participants were all students from the University of St 
Andrews, recruited via noticeboards in the department and through the University 
weekly memo system. Participants volunteered on the basis of having recently 
experienced intrusive memories with concurrent low mood.  In total, 21 participants 
responded to an advert to participate in a study about mindfulness, self-compassion 
and intrusive memories and 20 participants responded to an advert to participate in a 
study about relaxation and intrusive memories. Therefore, it is important to note that 
participants self-selected for the type of intervention they participated in, a limitation 
that will be addressed in the discussion. Three participants withdrew from the 
mindfulness and self-compassion condition and two withdrew from the relaxation 
condition. Data were only analysed for those participants who completed the study. 
As a result, the final sample consisted of 19 participants for the mindfulness and self-
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compassion condition (15 female, 4 male) and 18 participants for the relaxation 
condition (16 female, 2 male). Distribution of the questionnaire data was checked by 
ensuring all questionnaire data fell within 3 SDs of the mean.  No data were 
consequently excluded. Power analysis revealed that a total sample size of 36 would 
be required to detect a medium effect size at a 95% confidence interval using the .05 
criterion of statistical significance. Therefore the sample size was sufficient. 
Participants received either £10 or a book for their participation.  
Training:  
Mindfulness and self-compassion sessions:   
 
The mindfulness and self-compassion training took part in groups of 3-5 participants 
per group, and consisted of 3 weekly sessions. The first session began with a short 
overview of the benefits of mindfulness on mental well-being before introducing 
participants to the concept of mindfulness by talking about mindlessness and 
highlighting occasions where we rush through activities or get carried away worrying 
about the future etc. Participants were next taken through the raisin exercise. This 
exercise encourages participants to really pay attention to the process of eating a 
raisin, in order to emphasize how mindlessly we sometimes eat. After this and each 
subsequent exercise in the training procedure, participants were encouraged to take 
part in a group discussion about their experiences. During this first session, 
participants were also guided through a sitting meditation, where participants are 
encouraged to focus on their breath and bring their attention back to the breath should 
their mind wander. Over the coming week, participants were encouraged to bring 
mindfulness to an everyday activity (e.g. walking to class or washing the dishes) and 
were emailed an mp3 copy of the sitting meditation to practice at home once a day (or 
as often as they were comfortable doing so). The second session began with another 
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sitting meditation, and then introduced the 3-minute breathing space. This is a shorter 
mediation exercise, which participants are encouraged to turn to when they feel they 
are not being mindful, and helps to bring them back to a mindful focus. Participants 
were then given some red dot stickers to place in locations of their choice (e.g. on a 
bedroom mirror or a laptop) to serve as a reminder to be mindful throughout their 
daily lives. During the third week, participants took part in the self-compassion based 
exercises.  The format of the session was adapted from Compassionate Mind Training 
(CMT) designed by Gilbert and Procter (2006) and outlined in Gilbert (2009), as well 
as the MSC program designed by Neff and Germer (2013). The first exercise involved 
generating a personalized compassionate image that participants could work with 
during the session, with qualities including wisdom, strength, warmth and non-
judgmental acceptance. Participants were encouraged to think about images and 
feelings that arise when thinking of compassion they have for somebody else (e.g. a 
family member or a friend) to help them generate their compassionate images. The 
next task involved writing a letter from their compassionate self about the way they 
feel when they experience an intrusive memory. The final exercise involved creating 
five compassionate statements to the self to be practiced over the next week (e.g. ‘I 
would be sympathetic towards a friend in my situation. I’d like to feel this way about 
myself’).  Over the next week participants were instructed to spend approximately one 
minute visualizing their kind, accepting image and to read the statements with warmth 
while holding their compassionate image in mind. As another homework element, 
participants were encouraged to try and generate their compassionate image when 
faced with their intrusive memories.    
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Relaxation sessions:  
 
The relaxation sessions were also run in groups of 3-5 participants, and consisted of 
three weekly sessions. The first session began with a similar short overview about the 
benefits of relaxation on mental well-being. Participants were then guided through a 
deep breathing exercise and, as in the mindfulness/self-compassion condition, 
participants were encouraged to discuss their experiences in the group after each 
exercise they took part in. Also during the first session, participants were guided 
through a progressive muscle relaxation, an mp3 copy of which was emailed to them 
to practice at home once a day, or as often as they felt comfortable with. The second 
session began with another progressive muscle relaxation and then introduced a 
guided imagery exercise, followed by further group discussions. Participants were 
encouraged to practice the guided imagery over the next week, once or a day or as 
much as they felt comfortable with. In the third session participants again completed 
the progressive muscle relaxation introduced in session one and then took part in a 
second more extensive deep breathing exercise. Participants were encouraged to 
continue to practice relaxation exercises over the next week and also to try and 
practice the exercises when they experienced an intrusive memory.  
 
Procedure:  
 
Participants first came into the research lab for an individual interview session where 
they provided informed consent and were taken through the Intrusive Memory 
Interview to determine the presence of intrusive memories experienced over the past 
week (time 1). Participants then completed the battery of self-report questionnaires 
detailed above (IES, BDI-II, MAAS and SCS) in a randomized order. The three-week 
training in either mindfulness and self-compassion or relaxation followed. One week 
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after the final session, participants returned to the research lab for a final time (time 2) 
to recomplete the self-report questionnaires, to be debriefed and to be compensated 
for their time. 
 
Results: 	  
1) Baseline data:  
 
In conjunction with previous research (Brewin et al., 1996, Newby & Moulds, 2012), 
the intrusive memories that participants reported included relationship/family 
problems (e.g. when my girlfriend broke up with me, an argument with my friend at a 
University ball), work/school issues or personal failure (e.g. disagreement with a 
supervisor at work, an embarrassing job interview) and illness/death of another (e.g. 
being with Mum as she died in the hospital, receiving the news that a school teacher 
had died in a car accident) . The mean rating of intrusive memory distress in 
mindfulness/self-compassion group was 66.32 (SD = 19.85) out of 100, and the mean 
rating of distress in relaxation group was 65.23 (SD = 20.25) out of 100. An 
independent samples t-test revealed that this difference was not significant, t (35) = 
.16, p > .05. Distress ratings were similar between the two groups.  
 
 
i) Group differences pre-training:  
 
All questionnaire data fell within 3 SDs of the mean; therefore no data was excluded 
from analysis.  There were no between-group differences on any of the measures at 
time 1. These results are displayed in Table 3.1 below. Levene’s test for Equality of 
Variances was non-significant for all measures apart from the SCS, F (1, 35) = 4.81, p 
< .05. Therefore a t-test not assuming homogeneity of variances was computed for the 
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SCS measure. There was however still no significant difference in SCS scores 
between the two groups at baseline. 
 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) at time 1 and t-tests comparing group 
characteristics at time 1.  
Measure 
Relaxation: Mean (SD) 
N = 18 
Mindfulness/Self-Compassion: Mean (SD) 
N = 19 
t-value sig. 
IES  42.61 (14.59) 43.42 (12.07) -0.18 n.s. 
IES - intrusive 19.11 (7.68) 22.58 (7.07) -1.43 n.s 
IES – avoidance 23.50 (8.66) 20.84 (6.37) 1.07 n.s 
BDI-II 20.44 (14.85) 19.37 (11.13) 0.25 n.s. 
SCS 2.71 (.93) 2.52 (0.68) 0.72 n.s 
MAAS 3.58 (.73) 3.18 (0.97) 1.42 n.s. 
 
 
ii) Correlations between the measures at time 1:  
 
Table 3.2 overleaf is a correlation matrix displaying the relationships between the 
measures at baseline, collapsed across training group. As predicted, both the measures 
of mindfulness and self-compassion were negatively correlated with BDI-II scores. 
Also as predicted, individuals reporting higher levels of mindfulness also reported 
higher self-compassion. In terms of intrusive memory experience, there was no 
significant correlation between overall IES score and mindfulness. However, looking 
at the subscales of the IES, higher levels of mindfulness were associated with less 
memory ‘intrusiveness’, although mindfulness was not related to memory 
‘avoidance’. Higher self-compassion, conversely, was related to lower overall IES 
scores, and again higher self-compassion was related to lower levels of ‘intrusiveness’ 
but was not significantly related to avoidance. 
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Table 3.2 
A correlation matrix displaying correlations between the self-report measures at baseline. 
 Measure 1. IES 2. IES-I 3. IES-A 4. BDI-II 5. MAAS 6. SCS 
1 IES       
2 IES - intrusiveness .87 **      
3 IES - avoidance .88 ** .53 **     
4 BDI-II .35 * .31 .30    
5 MAAS -.32 -.37 * -.18 .64 *   
6 SCS -.35 * -.35* -.27 .81 ** .63 **  
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10 , two-tailed. 
 
2) Post-intervention data:  
i) Group differences following training: 
To compare the effects of the intervention, a 2 (within-subjects factor: time 1, time 2) 
x 2 (between-subjects factor: relaxation group, mindfulness/self-compassion group) 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for each of the self-report measures to 
compare the effects of the interventions.  
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a) Impact of Event Scale (IES):  
 
Overall IES scores:  
 
There was a main effect of time on IES scores, F (1, 35) = 19.42, p =.01 partial η2 = 
.36. IES scores were lower at time 2 (mean = 33.30, SD = 2.12) than time 1 (mean = 
43.02, SD = 2.20). The time x group interaction was not significant, F (1, 35) = 2.36, 
p > .05. IES scores at time 1 and time 2 are displayed in Figure 3.1 below.  
 
Figure 3.1. IES scores at time 1 and time 2, split by intervention group. 
 
Intrusiveness subscale:  
There was a main effect of time on the intrusiveness subscale, F (1, 35) = 17.36, p  = 
.01, partial η2 = .33. Intrusiveness scores were lower at time 2 (mean = 14.64, SD = 
1.36) than at time 1 (mean = 17.14, SD = 1.50). The time x group interaction however 
was not significant, F (1, 35) = 2.31, p > .05. The IES intrusiveness scores at time 1 
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and time 2 are displayed in Figure 3.2 below. 
 
Figure 3.2. IES intrusiveness scores at time 1 and time 2, split by intervention group. 
Avoidance subscale: 
There was a main effect of time on the avoidance subscale, F (1, 35) = 9.33, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .21. Avoidance scores were lower at time 2 (mean = 18.55, SD = 1.32) 
than at time 1 (mean = 22.17, SD = 1.25). The time x group interaction was not 
significant, F (1, 35) = .73, p > .05. The IES avoidance scores at time 1 and time 2 are 
displayed in Figure 3.3 below.  
 
Figure 3.3. IES avoidance scores at time 1 and time 2, split by intervention group.  
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b) BDI-II:  
 
There was a main effect of time on the BDI-II, F (1, 35) = 30.42, p =.01, partial η2 = 
.47. BDI-II scores were lower at time 2 (mean = 13.75, SD = 1.82) than at time 1 
(mean = 19.91, SD = 1.82).  The time x group interaction was also significant, F (1, 
35) = 8.58, p =.01, partial η2 = .20. Post hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) 
revealed that the reduction in BDI-II scores between time 1 and time 2 was 
significant for the mindfulness/self-compassion group (change 9.42), t (18) = 5.01, p 
= .01 and only just reached significance in the relaxation group (change 2.88), t (17) = 
2.52, p = .02.  This is displayed in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4. BDI-II scores at time 1 and time 2, split by intervention group. 
 
c) MAAS: 
 
There was a main effect of time on the MAAS, F (1, 35) = 8.48, p =.01, partial η2 = 
.20. Participants reported higher levels of mindfulness at time 2 (mean = 3.74, SD = 
.12) than at time 1 (mean = 3.38, SD = .14). The time x group interaction was also 
significant F (1, 35) = 7.45, p= .01, partial η2 = .18. Paired samples t-tests (Bonferroni 
corrected) revealed this reflected a significant increase in MAAS scores in the 
mindfulness/self-compassion group, t (18) = -3.18, p = .01 between time 1 and time 2, 
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but not a significant increase in MAAS scores in the relaxation group, t (17) = -.22, p 
> .05 between these periods. This is displayed in Figure 3.5 below.  
 
Figure 3.5. MAAS scores at time 1 and time 2, split by intervention group.  
 
d) Self-Compassion Scale (SCS):  
There was a main effect of time on SCS scores, F (1, 35) = 11.17, p = .01, partial η2 = 
.24. Participants reported being more self-compassionate at time 2 (mean = 2.91, SD 
= .13) than at time 1 (mean = 2.61, SD = .13). The time x group interaction was 
significant F (1, 35) = 5.85, p = .02, partial η2 =.14. Paired-sample t-tests (Bonferroni 
corrected) revealed this reflected a significant increase in SCS scores in the 
mindfulness/self-compassion group, t (18) = -3.61, p = .01 between time 1 and time 2, 
but no significant increase in SCS scores in the relaxation group, t (17) = -.79, p > .05 
between these times. This is displayed in Figure 3.6 overleaf.  
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Figure 3.6. SCS scores at time 1 and time 2, split by intervention group.  
 
3) The relationship between changes in mindfulness and self-compassion, and 
changes on the IES and BDI-II:  
 
The correlation matrices on the next page display the changes on the self-report 
measures, reported for the mindfulness/self-compassion group (Table 3.3) and the 
relaxation groups (Table 3.4) separately. Significant correlations are presented below 
the table in figures. In the mindfulness group, total change in IES scores positively 
correlated with changes on the IES intrusiveness subscale and changes on the 
avoidance subscale. In support of the idea that changes in mindfulness/self-
compassion were important for the improvements, specific mechanism of effect 
observed in the intervention, increases in mindfulness and self-compassion both 
correlated with decreases in BDI-II scores. In this group, reduction in BDI-II score 
also positively correlated with reduction in memory intrusiveness. Additionally, 
changes in mindfulness also positively correlated with changes in self-compassion. In 
the relaxation group, the only significant relationship was between changes on the IES 
total score and changes on each of the subscales. The significant correlations are 
presented in Figure 3.7 and 3.8 respectively. 
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Table 3.3 
Correlation matrix for the change scores in the mindfulness/self-compassion group,  
 Measure 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 
1 Change IES      
2 Change – IES intrusiveness  .78 **     
3 Change – IES avoidance  .59 ** -.05    
4 Change BDI-II .40 .56* -.08   
5 Change MAAS -.30 -.28 -.12 -.53 *  
6 Change SCS -.11 -.03 -.15 -.56 * .60 ** 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10 , two-tailed. 
 
Table 3.4 
Correlation matrix for the change scores in the relaxation group 
 Measure 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 
1 Change IES      
2 Change – IES intrusiveness  .88 **     
3 Change – IES avoidance  .84 ** .50*    
4 Change BDI-II .39 .42 .27   
5 Change MAAS .12 -.15 .38 .00  
6 Change SCS -.32 -.39 -.14 -.05 -.16 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10, two-tailed.   
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Figure 3.7. Figures displaying the significant correlations between changes on the self-report measures, 
in the mindfulness/self-compassion group. 
 
 
It is important to note the when the outlier on the change BDI-II/change SCS Figure 
(bottom left) was removed, the correlation between the changes on these measures 
was no longer significant, r = .26, p > .05. Therefore, it may be that this finding was 
driven by one participant’s natural fluctuation rather than due to the intervention 
itself.  
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Figure 3.8. Figures displaying the significant correlations between changes on the self-report measures, 
in the relaxation group. 
 
Discussion: 
 
The present study tested the efficacy of a short mindfulness and self-compassion 
based intervention on the distress associated with intrusive memories in a low mood 
sample.  The mindfulness/self-compassion intervention was compared to a relaxation 
control intervention.  Previous research has demonstrated that reactions to intrusive 
memories are more important in determining intrusion-related distress than the 
frequency of the memories experienced (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 
2008b). Appraisals such as ‘having this memory means there is something wrong with 
me’ increase the distress associated with the memory (Starr & Moulds, 2006; 
Williams & Moulds, 2008b) and may encourage avoidance strategies (e.g. thought 
suppression) that prevent successful emotional processing of the memory (Rachman, 
1980). This in turn increases the frequency with which the memory is experienced. 
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Therefore, the goal of the present study was to test an intervention designed to reduce 
this emotional reactivity in a low mood sample.   
 
Mindfulness practice helps individuals learn the skills to notice and then to disengage 
from negative thought patterns before they result in a downward spiral towards 
prolonged experiences of low mood (Segal et al., 2002; Teasdale et al., 1995).  
Mindfulness-based interventions in various forms (e.g. MBSR, MBCT, brief 
interventions) have been shown to be effective in reducing rumination and depressive 
symptomatology in a variety of populations (Geschwind, Peeters, Huibers, van Os, & 
Wichers, 2012; Raes, Dewulf, Van Heeringen, & Williams, 2009; Teasdale et al., 
2000). Being self-compassionate has also been associated with a variety of benefits on 
mental health (Neff, 2003b; Neff et al., 2007) and interventions designed to increase 
levels of self-compassion have also been shown to improve mental well-being 
(Gilbert & Procter, 2006; Smeets et al., 2014; Smets, Wessel, Schreurs, & Raes, 
2012). Research on negative appraisals has shown that individuals react to intrusive 
memories both in an unmindful way (e.g. ‘because I’ve had this memory what I am 
trying to do will be ruined’, Moulds et al. (2008)), and in a uncompassionate way (e.g. 
because I can’t control this memory, I am a weak person’, Moulds et al. (2008)). 
Although there are similarities between mindfulness and self-compassion, for 
example both promote acceptance and non-reactivity (Neff, 2009), a combined 
intervention was tested as both concepts were expected to bring about specific 
benefits to intrusive memory experience. Additionally, while mindfulness training 
may increase self-compassion (Kuyken et al., 2010) and vice versa (Smeets et al., 
2014), this is not an explicit intention of the training. It was predicted that making 
both components explicit would be beneficial.  In addition, mindfulness helps develop 
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the ability to hold a balanced view of negative emotions. This balanced awareness is 
required to be able to respond self-compassionately to negative experiences (Neff, 
2003a). Therefore mindfulness is likely to be an important foundation of self-
compassionate practice (Neff & Germer, 2013), and beginning the intervention with 
mindful practice was predicted to be an important component of the training 
programme. 
 
Overall, there was a significant decrease in intrusion-related distress (as measured by 
the IES) and depressive symptomatology (as measured by the BDI-II) between the 
two time-points. However, contrary to predictions, the mindfulness/self-compassion 
intervention was no more effective at reducing intrusive-memory related distress than 
the relaxation intervention. This was the case both with the overall IES scores, and 
when the intrusiveness and avoidance subscales were analysed separately. As no 
previous research has looked at the impact of mindfulness or self-compassion training 
on intrusion-related distress, the reason behind this finding is unclear. It may reflect a 
lack of power, as the study was just a preliminary investigation and did use a small 
sample size (total N = 37). There was also no specific frequency measure. The IES 
intrusiveness subscale reflects a subjective assessment of frequency – for example, ‘I 
thought about it when I didn’t mean to’, rated as either never/sometimes/often or 
always (Horowitz et al., 1979). The intervention was expected to lead to more general 
and sustainable changes in the way in which individuals reacted to their memories by 
teaching them to react differently (i.e. to respond with understanding rather than 
thinking ‘what is wrong with me?’). Therefore, it may be that the intervention did not 
last long enough for treatment-specific effects to emerge. Follow-up investigations 
should examine the effects of a longer intervention and include a more extensive 
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follow-up period. Either way, the overall reduction in IES scores (i.e. a significant 
reduction in distress in both groups), after a relatively short intervention, is promising 
and merits further investigation.  
 
Despite the lack of an intervention-specific effect on intrusive-memory experience, an 
encouraging finding was there was a greater reduction in BDI-II scores following the 
mindfulness/self-compassion training than following the relaxation training.  
Importantly, this effect was found using an active control group rather than a waitlist 
or treatment-as usual control group, which is often used in initial investigations into 
the effect of mindfulness training (Heeren & Philippot, 2011; Teasdale et al., 2000). 
Results therefore provide further evidence for the benefits of the brief mindfulness 
interventions as compared to the more traditional eight-week programmes. This 
parallels findings from Cavanagh et al. (2013), who found benefits of a short online 
mindfulness course in a student sample. Investigating the potential of briefer 
interventions is important because these shorter interventions are more cost-effective 
than longer lasting interventions. In addition, the shorter time commitment may be 
appealing to participants interested in embarking upon mindful practice (Tappen, 
2014). The current results also support the adaptation of mindful interventions across 
a wider population of low mood individuals than first implicated by the RCTs 
conducted specifically investigating the efficacy of MBCT (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; 
Teasdale et al., 2000), which found that MBCT was selectively beneficial for 
individuals with 3 or more previous episodes of depression. The current findings are 
also in line with existing research that has found benefits of more general forms of 
mindfulness training in student and other non-clinical samples (Erogul, Singer, 
McIntyre, & Stefanov, 2014; Khoury et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2015). Combined, 
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these results are evidence that mindfulness training is beneficial beyond clinical 
samples. This is consistent with the growing emphasis on Positive Psychology, which 
is aimed at understanding what makes us flourish and succeed as way of improving 
quality of life, rather than only focusing on mental health problems (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  
 
Also in line with predictions, there was an overall significant increase in self-reported 
mindfulness pre to post-intervention. Importantly, this was reflected by a significant 
increase in self-reported mindfulness in the mindfulness/self-compassion group, but 
no significant change in the relaxation group. Similarly, the increase in self-
compassion scores reflected a significant increase in the mindfulness/self-compassion 
group but no significant change in the relaxation group. This supports the notion that 
the intervention was targeting the processes it was designed to. Furthermore, looking 
at the changes that occurred on the self-report measures pre to post intervention, there 
was a significant positive correlation between the changes in both mindfulness and 
self-compassion scores and the change in BDI-II scores; participants who reported the 
largest changes on the mindfulness and self-compassion measures also reported the 
largest change in BDI-II scores. These results suggest that the efficacy of the 
intervention did come about through the predicted intervention-specific effects, rather 
than indirect effects, such as contact with researchers, group support etc. However, as 
noted in the results section, it appears that the correlation between changes in BDI-II 
and SCS was affected by an outlier; once the participant was excluded the correlation 
was no longer significant. It is important not to completely disregard this participant’s 
progress as it may be that they responded particularly well to the intervention. 
However, it could also be the case that their large increase in self-compassion and 
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decrease in BDI-II reflected their natural fluctuation and could not be attributed to 
their participation in the intervention.  Looking at the other changes, there was, no 
relationship between changes in mindfulness or self-compassion and any decreases in 
the IES scores in this same mindfulness/self-compassion group. As such, larger 
changes in mindfulness and self-compassion were not accompanied by larger changes 
in IES scores. Again, this could be a result of characteristics of the intervention itself, 
for example the sample size, number of sessions, or the follow-up period being too 
short.  
 
Looking at baseline data provided by the questionnaires contributes to the growing 
work on the benefits of mindfulness and self-compassion, in this case extended to 
intrusive memory experience for the first time. Specifically, individuals higher in trait 
self-compassion reported lower levels of subjective memory-distress (as indexed by 
IES scores). This is further evidence that responding to negative events with self-
compassion is associated with better mental health outcomes (Leary et al., 2007; Neff, 
2009; Neff et al., 2007). There was, however, no relationship between IES scores and 
mindfulness at baseline. Items on the IES include ‘other things kept making me think 
about it’ and ‘I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought about it or was 
reminded of it’ (Horowitz et al., 1979). Therefore, it is unclear why IES scores would 
selectively be related to self-compassion and not to mindfulness, as both practices 
would promote balanced awareness of the memory over avoidant cognitive styles.  It 
may be that responding compassionately provides additional protective effects against 
intrusive memory distress. The additional benefits could, for example, come through 
being actively being kind to the self (e.g. ‘I try to be loving towards myself when I’m 
feeling emotional pain’, Neff (2003b)), over and above the balanced awareness of 
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being mindful. This novel finding awaits replication in a larger sample. In addition, 
the correlation between higher levels of trait mindfulness and self-compassion and 
lower levels of depressive symptomatology, as measured by the BDI-II, are consistent 
with a plethora of research demonstrating mindfulness and self-compassion are 
associated with better mental health (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Leary et al., 2007; Neff, 
2003b).  The correlational data also demonstrated that BDI-II scores were positively 
correlated with intrusion-related distress scores, consistent both with the role of 
negative cognitive biases in depression (Beck, 1967) and specifically the importance 
of subjective ratings of intrusive memories in maintaining depressive symptoms over 
time (Newby & Moulds, 2011b; Williams & Moulds, 2008b). 
 
 
There are some limitations to the current study. The sample consisted of individuals 
from the student population and local community. Time 1 measures reveal there was a 
good deal of variability in the sample: IES (SDs = 14.59 and 12.07 across the two 
groups) and BDI-II (SDs = 14.85 and 11.13) scores. It would therefore be useful for 
future research to assess whether the efficacy of the intervention depends on certain 
participant characteristics, for example perhaps the memory needs to meet a certain 
threshold of distress, or the effects of the intervention depends on baseline BDI-II 
scores etc. There is also some evidence emerging that the efficacy of mindful practice 
is associated with personality characteristics of the participant. For example, Vibe et 
al. (2015) found that students higher in conscientiousness benefited more from MBSR 
than students lower in conscientiousness. Although the present study was not 
conducted in a clinical sample, the IES scores (mean = 42.61, SD = 14.59 in the 
mindfulness/self-compassion group and mean = 43.42, SD = 12.07 in the relaxation 
group) seem to be comparable to distress levels previously reported by clinical 
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samples (Horowitz et al., 1979; Kuyken & Brewin, 1994), who reported means of 
39.5 (SD = 17.2) and 38.2 (SD = 21.8) respectively. Despite this visual similarity, it 
would be useful to for future investigations to use the Structured Clinical Interview 
(SCID, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, Williams (2002)) to diagnose patients into clinical 
groups, for example look separately at currently depressed, recovered depressed and 
never depressed participants in order to look more thoroughly at the potential impact 
of specific participant characteristics on the outcome of the intervention. Participants 
were also not randomly allocated to the two conditions of the study. The two groups 
responded to two different recruitment adverts. This should be addressed in future 
research. Importantly, there were no group differences on any of the self-report 
questionnaires at baseline, suggesting the two groups had comparable characteristics, 
but this still does not reflect good recruitment practices.  Furthermore, the relaxation 
group only took part in one type of training and it may therefore not have been a 
completely adequate control group to the mixed mindfulness/self-compassion 
intervention, which consisted of the two components. It would also be useful for 
future research to assess the extent to which participants adhered to the homework 
exercises they were given, in both conditions. This would indicate whether 
participants really engaged with the process outside of the group sessions and 
examine how important the homework component is to the improvements observed, 
for example whether participants have to engage in a high level of mindfulness 
practice outside of the group sessions for the observed benefits of the intervention to 
emerge. The assessment of homework adherence is especially important given the 
suggestion that depressed participants may lack motivation to complete the homework 
component of the intervention (Segal et al., 2002), as this potential issue may also 
apply to individuals experiencing low mood. It would also be important for future 
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research to include a more extensive follow-up period than one week and to determine 
whether participants continued to adopt mindfulness and self-compassion once their 
participation in the study was complete. Neff and Germer (2013), for example, found 
the benefits of Mindful Self-Compassion programme were maintained at both six 
month and one year follow-ups, which is an encouraging finding.  However, it is 
currently unclear whether the benefits of a shorter intervention, such as the one 
conducted here, are also maintained over time.  Future research should also include an 
explicit frequency measure, rather than just looking at frequency measured through 
the intrusiveness subscale of the IES, to determine whether over a longer time period 
changes in the way participants reacted to the memories would lead to decreases in 
the number of intrusions experienced. The intrusiveness subscale only reflects 
subjective estimates of frequency (e.g. pictures about it popped into my mind, rated 
on a scale of never/sometimes/often/always). Therefore it would be useful to look at a 
diary measure of frequency.  The Ehlers and Steil (1995) model of PTSD 
maintenance, which provided the rationale for the current study, posits that appraisals 
are problematic as they encourage avoidance behaviours, which contribute to the 
maintenance of intrusions as they prevent successful emotional processing and 
changes in the meaning of the original event. It is important to determine, then, 
whether reducing the impact of these changes would change the actual frequency of 
memories experienced, versus the subjective judgments of frequency.  
 
Despite these limitations, the study does provide preliminary support for a brief mixed 
intervention targeting negative appraisals of intrusive memories in a low mood 
sample. Although there were no mindfulness/self-compassion specific effects on the 
measure of intrusive memory distress, there was an overall decrease in IES scores 
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over the four-week period across both intervention groups. The specific effects of the 
intervention on this distress measure may take longer than a one-week follow-up 
period to emerge. While both groups showed significant decreases in BDI-II scores, in 
line with predictions, the difference was significant for the mindfulness/self-
compassion group, and only just reached significance in the relaxation group. In 
conclusion, with the suggested modifications for future direction, results of this study 
suggest a promising basis for an intervention for individuals experiencing distressing 
intrusive memories and concurrent low mood.  
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Chapter four. 
Cognitive control and intrusive 
memory. 
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Introduction:  
 
Much of the research into intrusive memories in low mood populations has focused 
on post-experience aspects of intrusions, for example the distress associated with the 
intrusions (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2010), or the detrimental 
consequences of memory avoidance (Newby & Moulds, 2011c; Williams & Moulds, 
2008b). However, research has also looked at whether there is a link between 
underlying individual differences in cognitive control and the experience of intrusive 
cognitions about stressful events (Verwoerd et al., 2008; Verwoerd et al., 2009; 
Wessel et al., 2008). 
 
Intrusive memories are memories of negative autobiographical events that come to 
mind when we do not deliberately recall them, or when we do not want to experience 
them (Hackmann et al., 2004). At the very least, intrusive memories can be 
conceptualized as a nuisance or a distraction from goals people are trying to achieve, 
for example trying to fall asleep or concentrate on some reading. Intrusive memories 
typically depict stressful emotional events, for example arguments or stressful job 
events, and are accompanied by distress (Newby & Moulds, 2011a; Williams & 
Moulds, 2007c).  Indeed, many people with anxiety and depressive disorders report 
being plagued by recurring intrusive memories, despite attempting to control the 
retrieval of these memories, for example by suppressing the memory (Moulds et al., 
2008; Newby & Moulds, 2011c; Williams & Moulds, 2007a). Research has 
highlighted factors that contribute to the persistence of intrusive memories after the 
intrusive memory is experienced, including the appraisals assigned to the intrusions 
(Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2010) or the ineffectiveness of memory 
suppression (Wegner, 1994; Wegner et al., 1987). However, research into why these 
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memories come to mind in the first place is much less clear. How and why do these 
memories come to mind? Is it possible to find underlying cognitive mechanisms that 
make some people more prone to these types of memories than others?  An intrusive 
memory is a memory that has not been deliberately recalled and is associated with 
distress. Reflection upon this definition leads to the question of whether some people 
are simply more prone to experiencing these memories through individual differences 
in cognitive control abilities. It is clear that not all individuals experience intrusive 
memories to the same extent in response to objectively comparable stressful life-
events (Wessel, Huntjens, & Verwoerd, 2010). Consequently, it has been suggested 
that an individual with ‘weaker’ cognitive control may experience more intrusions 
than someone with ‘better’ cognitive control (Bomyea & Amir, 2011), because 
individuals with ‘weaker’ cognitive control would be less able to adhere to current 
demands and ignore external and internal reminders of the event (Wessel et al., 2008). 
An underlying deficit in cognitive control may then interact with other cognitive 
vulnerabilities present in individuals susceptible to depression, for example biases in 
processing of emotional information (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988) 
to cause clinical levels of distress in some individuals.  
 
Previous research investigating cognitive control in individuals who experience a high 
number of memories supports the idea of underlying deficits. Initial work by Klein 
and Boals (2001) highlighted that, in a non-clinical sample, lower Working Memory 
Capacity (WMC) was associated with higher IES scores that participants filled out in 
relation to a stressful life event. More precisely, research has also indicated the 
importance of proactive interference resolution (Verwoerd et al., 2009; Verwoerd et 
al., 2011). Resistance to proactive interference is the ability to remove information 
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from working memory that is no longer relevant, for example learning a new mobile 
phone number after buying a new one (Verwoerd et al., 2011). Proactive interference 
has been assessed through serial list learning tasks. For example, Verwoerd et al. 
(2009) looked at the role of proactive interference using the AB-AC-AB list learning 
paradigm. In this task, participants first learn a pair of words (the AB list: e.g. 
butcher-meat) then learn a second pair of words (the AC list: e.g. butcher-rope).  
Verwoerd et al. (2009) found that participants who reported higher IES scores, 
completed in relation to intrusive memories experienced the week prior to the study, 
required more trials to learn the AC list (having learnt the AB list) than participants 
with lower IES scores. This suggests a deficit in the ability to inhibit the previously 
relevant information (i.e. the AB list) is associated with intrusion experience. 
Additional evidence comes from Verwoerd et al. (2011) who measured proactive 
interference using the California Verbal Learning Task (CVLT). Participants 
completed the task then watched a film, lasting 9-minutes and depicting a murder 
scene.  On the CVLT, participants are given two lists of words. Some categories 
overlap between list 1 and list 2 and some categories do not (e.g. list 1: 10 animals 
and 10 vegetables, list 2: 10 new animals and 10 flowers). Interference scores, 
measured by the impact of list 1 words on list 2 learning, predicted the number of 
intrusive memories experienced a week after viewing a stressful film fragment. 
Interference scores, however, were not associated with prior trauma or depressive 
symptomatology.  The investigation of both personally experienced and film-induced 
memories is an important balancing act between providing control over the diversity 
of memories reported, including objective severity, time since event, duration of 
exposure etc., and ensuring that findings extend to real-life intrusive memories. 
Together, these studies suggest a role for inhibition in reducing the negative 
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experience of intrusive memories, both with frequency and subjective measures, and 
with both real-life intrusions and those induced via a stressful film clip.  
 
The current investigation into the link between cognitive control and intrusive 
memories uses a different framework of cognitive control, based on the Dual 
Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver et al., 2007).  The DMC posits 
two distinct modes of control, proactive and reactive control, to account for the 
flexibility that is an inherent part of good cognitive control. This includes being able 
to switch between goal-directed behaviour and adapting to unexpected events 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver, 2012). When interference is anticipated, proactive 
control prevents interference by actively maintaining goal-relevant information (e.g. 
maintaining ‘I need to attend colour’ in the Stroop task before stimuli presentation, 
Braver (2012)). Reactive control, conversely, represents a ‘late correction’ mechanism 
which is recruited when interference is unanticipated or preparation was insufficient, 
thereby representing a ‘just in time’ form of control (Braver, 2012). A central premise 
of the DMC is that a bias towards proactive or reactive control will depend on current 
task demands and individual differences, including the availability and reliability of 
predictive information and individual differences in fluid intelligence (Braver et al., 
2007). Proactive control is more resource-demanding because contextual information 
has to be activated and maintained over time, therefore will only be the optimal form 
of control when contextual cues are sufficiently available, sufficiently reliable and the 
retention interval between cue and behaviour sufficiently small (Braver et al., 
2007).  In line with this cost-benefit trade-off, the DMC postulates that even small 
changes in internal states or in task demands could cause a shift from one mode to 
another (Braver et al., 2009). This notion of flexibility has been supported 
	  	   104	  
empirically. For example, Speer et al. (2003) manipulated expected working memory 
load on a word memory task. Participants were presented with a list of words and, 
after a short delay of 3000 ms, had to indicate whether a specific word had previously 
been presented in the list. In one condition, the average number of words presented 
was four or fewer, and in the other condition, the average number of words was eight 
or more. Eight words were expected to exceed Working Memory Capacity (WMC) 
and therefore participants were expected not to be able to maintain the whole list at 
one time, and therefore expected to rely on a reactive strategy. The authors 
subsequently compared trials from both lists where the actual number of words 
presented was six; i.e. the difference was only in expectation of list length. Both 
behavioural and brain activation data indicated that in the short list trials, participants 
engaged in a proactive strategy, as they responded faster and more accurately in the 
low-load condition. This suggests that participants actively maintained the short list of 
words over the delay period. In terms of the brain activation data, during the short-list 
trials, activation was maintained over the delay period, also supporting the use of 
proactive control. Conversely, in the long-list conditions, brain activation patterns 
decreased over the delay, but increased following the presentation of the probe. This 
suggests a reactive processing style. This study is an elegant demonstration that subtle 
changes in task expectations can promote a shift between proactive and reactive 
processing.   Furthermore, Braver (2012) suggests that low mood and task-irrelevant 
thoughts experienced as part of ruminative processes associated with low mood (see 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) for a review) will undermine the resources required for the 
maintenance of proactive control. Consequently, the experience of low mood is 
expected to be associated with reduced reliance on proactive control and increased 
reliance on reactive control processes (Braver et al., 2007; West, Choi, & Travers, 
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2010). This latter increase in reactive control is presumably an adaptive response to 
the former reduction in proactive control (West et al., 2010). Accordingly, West et al. 
(2010) determined that increased BDI-II scores were associated with reduced 
activation of neuronal measures associated with proactive control (measured by the 
amplitude of the pre-stimulus low wave) and increased activation of measures 
associated with reactive control (measured by the amplitude of the medial-frontal 
negativity) during a counting Stroop task. However, no behavioural differences were 
found between the groups in this study; the differences only emerged in the ERP data. 
This leaves the findings difficult to interpret. Saunders and Jentzsch (2014) looked at 
the impact of depressive symptomatology on proactive and reactive processing in the 
classic and emotional Stroop using behavioural measures. As summarized in the 
introduction chapter, in this design, proactive control is indexed by speed-accuracy 
trade-off adjustments (SATs), specifically the ability to use the prioritize speed versus 
prioritize accuracy instruction to appropriately adapt behaviour. Reactive control is 
indexed by Congruency Sequency Effects (CSEs); i.e. the modulation of behaviour 
after the experience of high conflict, specifically reflected through increased control 
in order to reduce the influence of the irrelevant dimension on subsequent trials.  
Saunders and Jentzsch (2014) found that proactive processes were unaffected by 
depressive symptomatology (as measured by the BDI-II) in both the classic and 
emotional tasks. In terms of reactive control, group differences selectively emerged in 
the emotional-face Stroop task, where the high BDI-II (score ≥ 17) group showed 
reduced CSEs in comparison to the low BDI-II (score < 7) group. This suggests a 
selective deficit in reactive control processing in the face of emotional interference in 
the high BDI-II group. These previous findings concerning the impact of depressive 
symptomatology on cognitive control are important when looking at intrusion 
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vulnerability, as both ruminative processes and depressive symptomatology have been 
shown to be important factors in intrusive memory experience (Williams & Moulds, 
2007c; Williams & Moulds, 2008b). However, no previous research has looked 
specifically at proactive and reactive processes in relation to intrusive memory 
experience.  
 
In the current study, proactive and reactive control will be measured by the AX-
Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT). Specifically, this task measures the ability 
to use contextual information and maintain this context overtime. This task has not 
previously been used to look at potential control deficits in relation to intrusive 
memory experience. It has previously been used to assess context representation and 
context maintenance abilities in both aging (Braver et al., 2009) and clinical 
populations, including depression and schizophrenia (Barch et al., 2001; Msetfi et al., 
2009). During the task, letters are presented on screen one at a time as one of four 
cue-target pairs. Participants are instructed to make different responses depending on 
the combination of letter-pairs presented. A left-handed response (keyboard press: z) 
is required only when the letter X is preceded by the letter A (i.e. an AX trial). Any 
other cue-target pairs (i.e. AY, BX and BY trials) require a right-handed response 
(keyboard press: m). Irrespective of the trial type, responses are made only after the 
second letter is presented. Therefore, the task is a measure of context maintenance as 
the correct response to the target letter X depends on which cue letter was presented 
(A or B). An important characteristic of the simple AX-CPT is that 70% of the trials 
are AX trials. The other 30% of trials are split equally between the three other trial 
types. This disproportionate number of AX trials introduces two response biases, 
which in turn provide more information about how individuals use context 
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information. The first bias induced is the tendency to make a ‘target’ response to any 
trial with the target letter X; the context information provided by the B-letter in a BX 
trial must therefore be used to override this tendency. The second bias is to make a 
‘target’ response to an AY trial; in this case, good context maintenance would 
therefore result in an incorrect ‘target’ response. In this case, the tendency to make a 
‘target’ response must be inhibited (Braver et al., 2001). Therefore, performance on 
both ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ trials is indicative of individual processing trends. BY 
trials act as control conditions because neither bias is induced in these trial types, 
given that neither the cue nor the probe letter indicate a ‘target’ response will be 
required. Therefore, on the AX-CPT, proactive control is control based on 
characteristics of the cue-letter and reactive control is control engaged by the target-
letter (Braver et al., 2007). A proactive processing style would activate context 
representation based on the cue stimulus and maintain this representation over the 
stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA), such that a response would be prepared in line 
with cue-driven expectancies (i.e. a ‘target’ response prepared after a cue-letter A, a 
‘non-target’ response prepared after a cue-letter B). Therefore while proactive control 
is advantageous for a BX trial, it is disadvantageous for an AY trial, where the 
expectation generated by the cue is misleading. Deficits in proactive control will also 
result in poorer AX performance, although in light of the response biases induced by 
the disproportionate frequency of AX trials, AX performance would not be as 
impaired as BX performance (Braver et al., 2001). Conversely, there would be no 
preparatory processing following the cue letter in a reactive control and therefore 
when the target letter is presented, information about the cue letter needs to be 
retrieved to determine the appropriate response (i.e. was the cue letter an A or a B?). 
Reactive processing can therefore be used to prevent an error when the cue-driven 
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expectancy is false (i.e. in an AY trial). Deficits in proactive control could result from 
two types of impairment; either the context representation was not sufficiently strong 
in the first place (i.e. cue-related information was not optimally used), or it could 
reflect an inability to adequately maintain this representation over-time. In order to 
differentiate between these two possibilities, half the trials in the task comprise of a 
short SOA between cue and target-letter, and half the trials have a longer SOA. If 
context maintenance is the specific impairment, then BX performance would be 
poorer in the long SOA trials compared to the short SOA trials, while AY 
performance would improve. If context maintenance is intact then BX performance 
will be stable or improve with the longer SOA, while AY performance will be stable 
or worsen with time (Paxton et al., 2008).  
 
Despite the lack of existing research using the AX-CPT to investigate intrusion 
vulnerability, there has been some work exploring how low mood impacts AX-CPT 
performance on the AX-CPT. Msetfi et al. (2009) looked at the impact of depressive 
symptomatology (as measured by the BDI-II) on task performance. Students with 
BDI-II scores ≥ 9 showed impaired context maintenance (i.e. deficits in maintaining 
activated information over time) compared to non-depressed students (BDI score < 8). 
During the long (10 s) SOAs only, high BDI-II participants made more errors on the 
BX trials than any other trial types, while low BDI-II participants made more AY 
errors, which was expected given the expectancy bias generated by the high frequency 
of AX trials (Msetfi et al., 2009). This pattern specifically suggests that high BDI-II 
participants did not seem to maintain the context information over the long SOA, 
whereas participants with low BDI-II scores could adequately maintain this 
information. These results coincide with the conclusion drawn by West et al. (2010) 
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that low mood influences cognitive processing and changes an individual’s 
dependence on proactive and reactive processing. Previous work on intrusion 
vulnerability has not differentiated between proactive and reactive control processes. 
However, given that the ability to be flexible between the two modes of control is an 
essential aspect of cognitive control (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007), it is important 
to assess whether individuals experiencing a high number of memories perform 
differently on this simple task than individuals experiencing a lower number of 
memories. In terms of potential differences between intrusive and more everyday 
forms of negative involuntary memories discussed in the introduction chapter, the 
study will look at both potential types of negative involuntary memory. The Intrusive 
Memory Interview will be used to measure traditional forms of intrusive memory, and 
the diary measure will be used to measure any negative involuntary memory 
participants experience during a one-week period.  
The present study:  
 
In summary, the goal of the present study is to ascertain whether there is a link 
between AX-CPT performance, measuring context processing and context 
maintenance abilities, and intrusive memory experience in a non-clinical sample. 
Various indices of intrusive memory experience will be assessed; incorporating both 
frequency and consequences aspects of memory experience. In turn, frequency of 
intrusive memories will be assessed two ways. Firstly, participants will be asked to 
retrospectively report the number of ‘spontaneous’ memories about a ‘past 
negative/event/circumstance/situation’ (Hackmann et al., 2004) they experienced 7 
days prior to completing the task, via the Intrusive Memory Interview. This will 
termed the retrospective measure and the measure is in line with previous research 
	  	   110	  
into intrusive memories (Newby & Moulds, 2011a; Williams & Moulds, 2007c; 
Williams & Moulds, 2008a, 2008b). As a second frequency measure, participants will 
also be asked to keep a diary of intrusive memories experienced during the seven days 
after completing the task. According to the definitions provided by Kvavilashvili 
(2014), this measure will not address whether the memories recorded in the diary 
‘repeatedly intrude upon consciousness’ (p. 101), which is her criterion for an 
intrusive memory, as compared to a negative involuntary memory. Therefore, this is a 
general measure of the number of negative involuntary memories experienced, 
because the memories reported in the diary are not necessarily experienced 
repeatedly. In both cases, the important question is whether individual differences in 
cognitive control are linked to the number or the consequences of unrecalled negative 
memories.  
The second index of intrusive memory experience will look at the consequences of 
the memory. This is in line with research highlighting the importance of the way 
individuals react to their memories (Moulds et al., 2008; Newby & Moulds, 2010; 
Starr & Moulds, 2006) in determining intrusive memory experience, rather than 
simply being associated with the frequency of the memory. In further support of the 
importance of subjective assessments of memories reported by low-mood participants, 
the memories typically concern commonplace events most individuals have 
experienced, such as arguments or embarrassing situations (Brewin et al., 1996b; 
Williams & Moulds, 2007c), rather than being of exceptional or traumatic life-events, 
for example memories of car crashes or life-threatening events, as observed in PTSD 
(Ehlers & Steil, 1995). Furthermore, in terms of negative involuntary (i.e. not 
necessarily repetitive) memories, Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011) determined 
that the involuntary memories reported by dysphoric individuals during their vigilance 
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task, discussed in the introduction chapter, were not objectively more negative than 
the negative memories reported by non-dysphoric individuals (as rated by the 
researchers), even though the dysphoric individuals rated their memories as being 
more negative. This is consistent with the idea that negative cognitive biases 
associated with low mood individuals (Beck & Alford, 2009) extend to involuntary 
memory systems (Watson et al., 2012). Therefore, it is important to determine 
whether some people are more prone to experience these negative unrecalled 
memories more often, or whether is it the consequences of these memories that 
become so problematic.  The consequences aspect of intrusion experience will be also 
assessed in two different ways. The IES will be used to assess the relationship 
between task performance and subjective affective impact specifically in relation to 
the intrusive memory reported during the Intrusive Memory Interview (e.g. ‘any 
reminder brought back feelings of it’, ‘I had waves of strong feelings about it, 
Horowitz et al. (1979)). The RRS will then be used as a measure of trait ruminative 
tendencies (i.e. general responses to sad mood and feelings). Braver (2012) predicted 
that rumination would specifically impact proactive control processes. However, 
previously Msetfi et al. (2009) did not find any deficits related to trait rumination on 
the AX-CPT. Therefore, it is unclear how rumination will impact task performance.  
In light of the occurrence of intrusive memories in depressed and low mood 
individuals (Moulds et al., 2008; Newby & Moulds, 2010, 2011c), the study will also 
investigate the role of depressive symptomatology (as measured by the BDI-II) on 
task performance. As well as a mean split analysis of the BDI-II data, a second 
analysis using a more extreme BDI-II group split will be used. This is to more 
sensitively establish any effects of depressive symptomatology on task performance 
and to counteract the limitation of mean/median split based analyses. Therefore, 
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following Saunders and Jentzsch (2014), the high extreme BDI-II group will consist 
of participants with a BDI-II score ≥ 17 and the low group will consist of participants 
with a BDI-II score < 7. This method of selection ensures a high ‘true positive’ rate 
for depression in the high group (Beck et al., 1996, Saunders & Jentzsch, 2014) and 
minimal endorsement of depressive symptomatology in the low group.  
During the results section, the correlations between the measures will also be 
presented. For all these dependent variables, groups (high versus low) will be 
determined using mean splits. The mean, as opposed to the median, was used to 
dichotomize the groups as the mean number of intrusive memories (mean = 4.99, SD 
= 5.13) was higher than the median (median = 3.75). Therefore, a mean split was used 
to make the task more sensitive at uncovering a potential link between intrusive 
memory experience and cognitive control, as the split would be conducted at a 
slightly higher value.  
Predictions:  
1) Overall task:  
 
Significant main effects of SOA (short, long) and condition (AY, BX, BY) are 
predicted. Accordingly, reaction times (RTs) are predicted to be faster and error rates 
lower for the long SOA compared to the short SOA trials, as in the long SOA trials 
participants have more time to use the cue-based information to prepare a response. 
There are also expected to be significant differences in performance between AY, BX 
and BY trials; post-hoc comparisons are predicted to show higher RTs and error rates 
for AY as compared to both BX and BY trials, as in AY trials participants are 
expected to incorrectly proactively prepare a ‘target’ response after the cue-letter A is 
presented. There is also expected to be a difference between BX and BY trials, with 
higher RTs and error rates to BX trials given the potentially misleading information 
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given by the target-letter X, whereas in BY trials neither the cue nor the probe letter 
indicates a ‘target’ response would be required. 
 
2) Group comparisons: 
 
It is predicted that cognitive control, as indexed by the AX-CPT, will be affected by 
intrusive memory frequency (both retrospective and diary measures) and 
consequences of the memory (both the IES and RRS measures) and depressive 
symptomatology (as measured by the BDI-II). Specifically, individuals reporting a 
higher number of memories and higher scores on the other self-report measures (IES, 
RRS and BDI-II) are predicted to show less proactive control (cue-based processing) 
and more reactive (target-based processing) control, indexed through better 
performance on AY trials, but impaired BX performance. Individuals reporting a 
lower number of memories and scoring lower on the self-report measures are 
expected to show more reliance on proactive control, therefore are expected to 
perform better on BX trials, but more poorly on AY trials.  
 
3) Correlations between intrusive memories and questionnaires:  
 
The relationships between the measures will be examined to determine the 
characteristics of the sample.  Newby and Moulds (2011a) found no significant 
between group differences in the number days on which currently depressed, 
recovered depressed and never depressed individuals had experienced an intrusive 
memory over the previous week, although the never depressed group had experienced 
the memory fewer times within a day than the currently depressed group. Therefore, it 
is unclear whether the correlation between the memory frequency (retrospective or 
diary rating) and BDI-II score will be significant on a continuous measure of 
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depressive symptomatology.  Previous research suggests that the frequency of 
intrusive memories does not correlate with intrusive memory-related distress, as 
measured on a 100-point scale (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2007c). 
However, previous research does suggest there is a significant positive correlation 
between subjective distress, as measured by the IES, which is the measure of 
subjective distress to be used in current study, and BDI-II scores (Hauer, Wessel, & 
Merckelbach, 2006). This is consistent with the suggestion that negative cognitive 
biases in low mood individuals are also reflected in the experience of both involuntary 
and voluntary memories (Watson et al., 2012). A significant correlation between trait 
rumination and intrusion-related distress (measured by the IES) is also expected to be 
significant based on previous research, which used a 100-point rating scale for 
distress (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b), rather than the IES used 
in the current study. A positive significant correlation between RRS and BDI-II is also 
expected also on the basis of existing research (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Spasojević & 
Alloy, 2001).  
Methods: 
Participants:  
 
The study was given ethical approval by the University Teaching and Research Ethics 
Committee (UTREC). Participants volunteered for the study through the SONA 
system (which is open to students and the local community) on the basis of having 
recently experienced intrusive memories and being fluent English speakers. 
Participation involved two sessions (1 hour and 30 minutes total). In total 38 
participants took part, 1 of whom was excluded due to reporting a frequency of 
intrusive memories more than 3 SDs above the mean  (= 54 memories, details below) 
and 2 of whom withdrew before the second session. No other data fell more than 3 
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SDs above the mean, therefore no other data were excluded. Consequently, 35 
participants remained for data analysis (26 female, 9 male, age range 18-29). Power 
analysis revealed that a sample size of 34 would be required to detect a medium effect 
size at the 95% confidence interval using the .05 criterion of statistical significance. 
Therefore, the sample size was relatively small. Participants were reimbursed £10 
total for their time.  
Stimuli were single letters presented 40 mm x 40 mm in size, presented in black font 
and presented centrally on a white screen. The cue letter consisted either of an A or a 
B, and target letters consisted either of an X or a Y. The target-letter X required a 
‘target’ response (keyboard press: z) only if preceded by the letter A. Any other 
combination of cue-target letter pairs (i.e. AY, BX, BY trials) required a ‘non-target’ 
response (keyboard press: m). Each trial began with a fixation cross on screen (300 
ms), followed by the cue-letter (300 ms), followed a blank screen (SOA: 700 ms or 
4700 ms), followed by the target-letter (presented until response) and finally a blank 
screen was presented (300 ms). See Figure 4.1 for an example of a single trial. The 
task was made up of 4 blocks, each containing 100 cue-target-pair trials. The SOA 
was randomly chosen, and each SOA was presented equally often in each block. 70% 
of trials were AX trials, the rest were divided equally between AY, BX and BY trials 
(10% each), with trial order randomly chosen within each block. At the end of each 
block, participants were shown their mean accuracy rate for the previous block (as a 
%) and could take a short break before continuing. Participants first completed 2 
practice blocks (of 10 cue-target pairs), and were given the mean accuracy rate after 
each practice block and the opportunity to ask the researcher any questions before 
beginning the experimental trials.  
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Figure 4.1. Example of a single trial on the AX-CPT.  
Procedure:   
 
Participants first completed the AX-CPT task, lasting approximately 30 minutes. 
Participants were then taken through the Intrusive Memory Interview and completed 
the IES, BDI-II and the RRS self-report questionnaires in a randomized order. 
Participants were then given the instructions for keeping the diary over the next 7 
days, after which they returned to the research laboratory to hand in their diaries, to be 
debriefed and to be reimbursed. 
Results:  
 
Firstly, the overall task data will be presented, followed by the group comparisons. 
The overall task data will be analysed using a 1-way repeated-measures ANOVA with 
the within-subjects factor SOA (short, long) for the ‘target’ trials. For the ‘non-target’ 
trials, a repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors SOA (short, 
long) and condition (AY, BX, BY) will be conducted. The following group splits will 
then be conducted; retrospective, diary, IES, RRS and BDI-II. The group ‘target’ trial 
comparison will comprise of a 1-way repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-
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subjects factor SOA (short, long) and the between-subjects factor (as defined in the 
following sections). For the ‘non-target’ trials, this will comprise of a repeated-
measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors SOA (short, long) and condition 
(AY, BX, BY) and the between-subjects factor. For the between-group analyses, only 
effects involving the factor group will be reported. Bonferroni corrections were made 
to post-hoc comparisons to minimise the risk of a Type II error. However, given the 
relatively small sample size, Bonferroni corrections were not made to the initial 
between-group comparisons.  
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1) Overall Task Data:  
 
Mean RTs and error rates for all trial types are displayed in Figure 4.2 below, split by 
short (700 ms) and long (4700 ms) SOA trials.  
 
Figure 4.2. Mean RT and error rates (with standard error bars) to all trial types, split by short and long 
SOA trials.  
 
i) ‘Target’ (AX) trials:  
Reaction Times (RTs): The main effect of SOA was not significant, F (1, 34) = 1.67, 
p > .05.  
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Error rates: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showed that the error data were not normally 
distributed, Ds (35) > 0.22, ps < .01. The data were therefore arcsine transformed 
before being submitted into a repeated-measures ANOVA. However, the means 
reported in the text and shown in the figures are based on the original data. There was 
a significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 34) = 15.29, p =.01, partial η2 = .31. A higher 
percentage of error rates were made on the long SOA trials (mean = 1.10%, SD = .22) 
than on the short SOA trials (mean = 0.43%, SD = .13).  
 
ii) ‘Non-target’ (AY, BX, BY) trials:  
RTs: There was a significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 34) = 23.62, p =.01, partial η2 
= .41. RTs were significantly faster for the long SOA (mean = 587 ms, SD = 28.2) 
than for the short SOA trials (mean = 646 ms, SD = 30.8). The main effect of 
condition was also significant, F (2, 68) = 104.21, p =.01, partial η2= .75. Pairwise 
comparisons were subsequently conducted. After Bonferroni corrections, the p value 
needed to be less than .02 for the effect to reach significance. These comparisons 
revealed this reflected slower RTs for AY trials (mean = 740 ms, SD = 32.55) than for 
both BX (556 ms, SD = 25.81) and BY (mean = 554 ms, SD = 31.59), Fs > 110.52, ps 
< .01, both partial η2s > .78.  The difference between BX and BY trials, however, was 
not significant, F (2, 68) = .04, p > .05. The condition x SOA interaction was 
significant F (2, 68) = 13.67, p = .01, partial η2= .32. There was a significant 
difference between the two SOAs for BX (85 ms) and BY trials (62 ms), both Fs > 
14.55, both ps < .01, both partial η2s > .30, but no significant difference (after 
Bonferroni corrections) between the two SOAs for AY (28 ms) trials, F (1, 34) = 
4.41, p = .05, partial η2 =11.  
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Error rates: The main effect of condition was significant, F (2, 68) = 19.94, p = .01, 
partial η2= .37. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed this reflected a 
significant difference between the percentage of errors made between AY (mean = 
5.28%, SD = 1.07) and both BX (mean = 2.23%, SD = .54) and BY trials (mean = 
0.36%, SD = .15), both Fs > 8.60, ps < .019 and both partial η2s > .21.  Significantly 
more errors were also made to BX trials than to BY trials, F (1, 34) = 14.83, p = .01, 
partial η2= .30. No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.31, ps > .05.  
 
Task summary:  Some predictions of the task were met. On ‘target’ trials, more errors 
were made in the long SOA trials, and for ‘non-target’ trials, RTs were faster for the 
long SOA trials. This suggests participants used the longer SOA to prepare a response 
based on the cue-letter, i.e. results show that participants demonstrated proactive 
control. This is also supported by the finding that participants were slower and made 
more errors to AY trials, where the context suggested by the cue-letter was 
misleading. However, the lack of BX/BY difference in the RT data is problematic. It 
suggests that participants gained enough information for the cue-letter B to prepare a 
‘non-target’ response and were able to adequately maintain this information over 
time, without needing to rely on the target-letter for any context information. The 
BX/BY difference did emerge in the error data, with significantly more errors made in 
BX trials as compared to BY trials. This reflects an important characteristic of the 
task. However, the overall number of errors was low. This reduced the sensitivity of 
the task to find group differences in reactive control when conducting the group 
comparisons. The effect of SOA also differed depending on the trial type; responses 
were only significantly faster for long SOA trials, as compared to short SOA trials, 
when the cue-letter was B and therefore the correct response was already clear.  
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2) Group comparisons:  
 
Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics for each of the measures. It also explains 
the composition of the high and low groups based on mean splits. 
 
Table 4.1 
Means and standard deviation (SD) for the self-report scales and the composition of the groups based 
on mean splits. 
Variable  Mean S.D. Group split value N high N low 
Retrospective 4.99 5.13 ≥ 5 14 21 
Diary 2.46 1.48 ≥ 3 16 19 
IES 33.34 13.49 ≥ 33 16 19 
RRS 48.74 13.03 ≥ 49 16 19 
BDI-II 13.49 9.08 ≥ 13 18 17 
Extreme BDI-II 14.54 10.59 High ≥ 17, Low < 7 13 11 
 
As found in the previous study, the intrusive memories that participants reported 
during the Intrusive Memory Interview were consistent with existing research into 
intrusive memories (Brewin et al., 1996, Newby & Moulds, 2012). These included 
relationship/family problems (e.g. argument with a school bully in Primary School, 
seeing parents argue), work/school issues or personal failure (e.g. remembering a 
difficult University exam, getting a bad essay grade back) and illness/death of another 
(e.g. learning that a Grandparent had died). The mean rating of intrusive memory 
distress was 65.45 out of 100 (SD = 19.84). 
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i) ‘Target’ (AX) trials:  
 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below display the F-values for ‘target’ trials for RT and error data 
respectively. No values were significant; performance to ‘target’ trials was not 
affected by any of the between-subjects comparisons. 
 
Table 4.2 
 F-values for reaction times to ‘target’ trials.  No values were significant.  
 Retrospective  Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group  0.86 1.78 0.31 1.04 1.62 0.73 
Group x SOA 2.83 0.38 0.44 0.70 0.45 0.39 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
 
Table 4.3 
F-values for error rates to ‘target’ trials. No values were significant. 
 Retrospective  Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group  0.78 0.17 0.22 0.35 0.02 0.15 
Group x SOA 0.20 0.01 0.18 0.24 0.37 0.14 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
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ii)   ‘Non-target’ (AY, BX, BY) trials:  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 display the F-values for ‘non-target’ trials for each between-group 
variable, for reaction times and error rates respectively. There was only one 
significant effect, which was found in the error data and involved the diary group 
categorization. No effects were significant in the RT data. The significant F-value is 
presented in bold and the corresponding figure presented below the table.    
 
Table 4.4 
F-values for reaction times to ‘non-target’ trials. No values were significant.  
 Retrospective Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 0.43 0.42 0.59 1.22 1.89 0.38 
Group x condition 0.35 0.01 0.76 0.75 1.19 1.65 
Group x SOA 1.05 1.53 0.09 0.74 0.39 0.02 
Group x condition x SOA 2.74 0.15 2.09 0.92 2.60 0.86 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
Table 4.5 
F-values for error rates to ‘non-target’ trials. Significant F-values are presented in bold.  
 Retrospective Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 0.01 0.01 0.40 1.11 0.45 0.27 
Group x condition 1.14 0.51 0.16 0.63 0.18 0.51 
Group x SOA 1.62 6.96 ** 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.03 
Group x condition x SOA 0.90 0.93 0.62 0.65 0.98 0.69 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
The diary group x SOA interaction was significant, F (1, 33) = 6.96, p =.01, partial 
η2= .17. The high diary group made significantly more errors in the long SOA trials,  
F (1, 15) = 6.86, p = .02, partial η2 = .31, whereas there was no significant difference 
in the number of errors made between the two SOAs for the low diary group,  
F (1, 18) = 0.85, p > .05. This effect is displayed in Figure 4.3 below.  
	  	   124	  
 
Figure 4.3: Mean error rates (as a %, with standard error bars) over the 2 SOAs, split by high versus 
low diary group.  
 
Group comparisons summary: Task performance was not affected by any of the 
between-subjects variables, except for one significant finding in the error data. Here, 
participants in the high diary group showed a deficit in proactive control. Specifically, 
the high diary group made significantly more errors in the long SOA than in the short 
SOA trials, which was the opposite pattern to the low diary group, who made (non-
significantly) fewer errors in the long SOA than the short SOA. This suggests that 
experiencing a high number of negative memories impairs the ability to maintain 
context overtime. However, the overall low error rates means this finding should be 
interpreted with caution.   
 
3) Correlations between intrusive memories and questionnaires:  
 
Table 4.6 below displays the correlations between the self-report measures. In this 
sample, the more intrusive memories an individual reporting having experienced the 
week before their participation in the study, the higher the intrusive-memory related 
distress and the higher the depressive symptomatology they reported. There was also 
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a significant correlation between the IES and RRS scores; individuals reporting higher 
trait levels of rumination reported more intrusion-related distress. This conceptually 
makes sense, as both scales are looking at the affective impact of a negative cognition, 
whether specifically related to intrusive memories, or negative cognitions more 
generally. The significant positive correlation between RRS and BDI-II scores 
replicates a substantial amount of existing literature showing that rumination is an 
important cognitive process in depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Spasojević & 
Alloy, 2001). In general, the correlations found suggest that there was sufficient 
variation in the sample, even if this did not translate into group differences in 
cognitive control. Figure 4.4 displays the significant correlations. 
 
Table 4.6 
Correlations between the self-report measures. Significant correlations are displayed in figures below.  
 Measure 1. Retrospective 2. Diary 3.  IES 4. RRS 
1 Retrospective     
2 Diary 0.14    
3 IES .41 * .08   
4 RRS .28 .07 .63 **  
5 BDI-II .42 * .01 .63 ** .73 ** 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10 , (two-tailed). 
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Figure 4.4. Displaying the significant correlations between the self-report measures.  
Discussion: 
 
The current study investigated whether individual variability in cognitive control, 
assessed by the AX-CPT task, would account for why some individuals are more 
susceptible to experiencing high numbers of intrusive and negative involuntary 
memories, or suffer more from the consequences of experiencing these memories. 
Given that intrusive memories are memories that have not been deliberately recalled, 
are memories about past negative events and are distressing to experience (Newby et 
al., 2014; Newby & Moulds, 2011c), it has been suggested that people with ‘weaker’ 
cognitive control may be more prone to experiencing these unwanted memories 
(Wessel et al., 2010; Wessel et al., 2008). Accordingly, Bomyea and Amir (2011) 
	  	   127	  
suggest that individual differences in the cognitive control relate to the number of 
intrusions experienced. This idea is supported by previous research in student 
samples, specifically individual differences in the ability to resolve proactive 
interference, using both the trauma-film paradigm (Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et 
al., 2008) and self-reported intrusive memories (Verwoerd et al., 2009). The present 
study sought to extend this research by investigating the role of basic cognitive 
control abilities in intrusion vulnerability, using a task based on the Dual Mechanisms 
of Control (DMC) framework, which distinguishes between proactive and reactive 
control (Braver et al., 2007). On the AX-CPT, performance to different trial types 
reflects individual differences in cognitive processing; good context representation 
(i.e. using information provided by the cue letter) will be beneficial for some trial 
types (BX trials), but not for others (AY trials). As posited by the DMC, therefore, 
proactive control is beneficial for BX trials but not for AY trials, whereas reactive 
control is beneficial for AY trials but not for BX trials (Braver et al., 2007). The goal 
of the present study was to ascertain whether differences in proactive and reactive 
cognitive processing would explain why some individuals are more prone to 
experiencing memories that have not been deliberately recalled than individuals who 
do not experience intrusive or negative involuntary memories on such a regular basis.  
 
On the AX-CPT, cue and target information generally affected performance. RTs 
were faster and error rates lower for both BX and BY trials than for AY trials, 
suggesting that participants used information about the cue, as well as the target 
probability (70% of trials were AX trials), to prepare responses following the cue 
letter, which in AY trials turned out to be misleading. However, contrary to earlier 
studies on the AX-CPT (Braver et al., 2001), there was no difference in RTs between 
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BX and BY trials. These findings suggest that participants gained sufficient 
information from the cue-letter B and were consequently able to prepare the 
appropriate ‘non-target’ information, without needing to rely on any target-based 
processing.  Importantly, this was the case for both SOAs. The BX/BY difference did 
emerge in the error data. As predicted, participants made more errors to BX trials than 
to BY trials, suggesting some degree of reactive, i.e. target-based, processing. 
However, the low overall number of errors reduced the sensitivity of the task to find 
group error-related differences. It seems that the SOA was not long enough to 
encourage much target-letter based processing, as participants could easily maintain 
the context (i.e. information portrayed by the cue-letter) over both the short and long 
duration intervals. This limitation will be discussed in more detail later. There was a 
significant interaction between condition and SOA, which revealed a significant 
difference in RTs between the two SOAs for BX and BY trials, but not for AY trials. 
This is further support that participants could fully prepare a ‘non-target’ response 
following a B letter, as the longer the SOA, the more they could prepare and therefore 
the faster they were to respond with a ‘non-target’ response when the target-letter was 
presented. In contrast, the expectancy violation leading to slower RTs on the AY trials 
(where preparatory processing for a ‘target’ response had to be overridden) was 
similar across SOAs. Therefore it is likely that only group differences in proactive 
(cue-based) processing (Braver et al., 2007) would have been discernable with the 
current set of data.  
 
In fact, the only between-group difference that emerged was on the diary group 
categorization, in terms of a differential impact of the two SOAs on the percentage of 
errors made to ‘non-target’ trials. Specifically, the high diary group made 
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significantly more errors in the long SOA trials, while the low diary group made more 
errors in the short SOA trials. This suggests that individuals who experience a high 
number of negative involuntary memories (importantly these are not necessarily 
intrusive, repetitive, memories according to Kvavilashvili (2014)) are impaired in 
maintaining the context information provided by the cue over time, consistent with 
the idea of a deficit in proactive control (Braver et al., 2007).  However, as noted 
above, the overall low error rate across both ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ trials limits the 
strength of this conclusion.  It is, nonetheless, some indication of an involuntary-
memory related deficit in proactive control. There were no other group differences in 
the frequency measures, either in the retrospective ratings or the diary measures. That 
only one finding was significant suggests against the idea that individuals with 
‘weaker’ cognitive control are generally more susceptible to experiencing a higher 
frequency of intrusive memories (Wessel et al., 2010; Wessel et al., 2008), 
specifically not on a basic measure of context maintenance abilities. Given that the 
aim of the study was to establish whether there was a basic difference in the ability to 
prevent upsetting or unwanted memories coming to mind, both intrusive and negative 
involuntary measures were deemed appropriate for this initial investigation; the study 
was looking at a memory for any negative event which comes to mind without being 
deliberately recalled. However, aside from the initial indication of a proactive deficit 
in the high diary group, task performance was not overall affected by the frequency of 
negative memories on either measure. A lack of between-group differences in AX 
performance also supports the lack of proactive deficit. Future research should more 
thoroughly investigate the potential intrusive/negative involuntary memory distinction 
to determine to what extent the memories recorded through the diary pertain to the 
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same event, or whether the memories are more everyday 'one-off’ experiences. 
Memory content analysis may be a good method of addressing this issue. 
 
Along with the frequency measures, the consequences of the memory were also 
assessed.  Firstly, Impact of Event Scale (IES) scores, completed in relation to the 
memory highlighted in the Intrusive Memory Interview, were investigated as a 
measure of subjective level of ‘intrusiveness’ of the intrusive memory participants 
reported. It seems logical that the appraisal aspect of intrusions, rather than simply the 
number of memories experienced, would be related to indices of cognitive control. 
Conceivably, individuals who experience their intrusive memories with higher levels 
of distress would be more motivated to try and avoid experiencing the memory. This 
may be how cognitive control abilities become important in regulating these 
memories. Investigating the relationship between IES scores and task performance 
also incorporates some of the diversity in events reported by participants which 
simply looking at frequency measures does not. One participant may have 
experienced their memory only two times during the previous week, but be more 
upset by, and therefore try to recruit more control over, these two memories than 
another participant who experiences five less distressing intrusive memories over 
same time period. However, once again there were no significant effects involving 
IES group, suggesting that the lack of substantial frequency findings was not due to 
the crudity of the frequency measures. Trait rumination was also looked at as a 
consequence measure. However, task performance also did not vary as a function of 
rumination, suggesting against the prediction that some individuals are more 
vulnerable to getting ‘stuck’ on their intrusive memories due to deficits in cognitive 
control, or that rumination would impact proactive control and the maintenance of 
	  	   131	  
context information (Braver, 2012). The lack of rumination-related impairments is 
consistent with Msetfi et al. (2009) who also looked at AX-CPT performance and 
found no difference between high and low ruminators.   
 
The role of general low mood on task performance was also investigated. This was 
important given it has consistently been demonstrated that intrusive memories are a 
key symptom of depression that interact with ruminative thought processes to 
maintain symptoms of low mood (Newby & Moulds, 2011c; Starr & Moulds, 2006; 
Williams & Moulds, 2010). Previous research making the distinction between 
proactive and reactive processes to investigate the impact of low mood has found that 
higher BDI-II scores were associated with decreased neuronal indices of proactive 
control and increased neuronal indices of reactive control (West et al., 2010). 
However, these differences only emerged in the ERP data. There were no behavioural 
differences observed. As discussed earlier, previous research using the AX-CPT has 
found depressive-related impairments on the AX-CPT. Msetfi et al. (2009) found that 
high BDI-II scorers (BDI-II > 9) made significantly more errors on BX trials than on 
AY trials only in the long SOA conditions, suggesting a specific deficit in 
maintaining context, rather than a deficit in using context more generally. 
Performance was similar to non-depressed participants for the short SOA. Conversely, 
the present study did not find any differences between high and low BDI-II scorers on 
the AX-CPT task, in either the short or the long SOA. Methodological differences 
may account for these differences. The most important difference was that Msetfi et 
al. (2009) compared a short (1000 ms) SOA to a long SOA (10000 ms), which again 
suggests the long SOA (4700 ms) was not long enough in the present study. 
Additionally, participants in the Msetfi et al. (2009) study were only given 1000 ms to 
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respond to the target-letter, whereas in the current study the target-letter remained on 
screen until a response was made. Furthermore, they manipulated the SOA between-
subjects rather than within-subjects, so the trade-off between cue and target 
processing may have been subtler, as flexibility was not compared within the same 
group of individuals. Finally, Msetfi et al. (2009) also only looked at differences in 
the error rates rather than reaction times, and error rates were low in the current set of 
data. 
 
Interestingly, the lack of proactive deficits as a function of depressive 
symptomatology on a non-valenced task is consistent with Saunders and Jentzsch 
(2014). On both the classic and emotional Stroop tasks, they found that high BDI-II 
participants made similar speed/accuracy adjustments (i.e. could make goal-related 
changes to their behaviour) to low BDI-II participants, in both the classic and 
emotional Stroop tasks. They did find differences in reactive control, in the emotional, 
but not the classic Stroop task. This finding awaits replication in the next study but 
does initially supports the idea that the low mood individuals are not characterized by 
a deficit in proactive control.  
 
In terms of the correlations between the measures, it is interesting to consider the 
relationship between the two frequency measures, as they were not significantly 
correlated. As previously discussed, the two measures theoretically assessed different 
subtypes of negative involuntary memories.  Although it was argued that the diary 
measure potentially incorporated a wider type of negative involuntary memory than 
the intrusive memory measure, the number of memories in the diary was actually 
significantly lower than the retrospective measure  (t (34) = 2.90, p =.01). It is 
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important to note that the measures also assess the number of memories experienced 
over two different week periods, therefore direct comparisons cannot be made. In 
addition to these potential theoretical differences, the way in which the measures are 
collected may have an effect on the number of memories reported. Firstly, rating 
intrusive memories retrospectively may have meant participants unintentionally 
overestimated their experiences of intrusive memories when being asked to think back 
over the past 7 days, especially in view of the negative cognitive biases that 
characterize low mood populations (Williams, 1997). Furthermore, although the 
number of questions in the diary was kept to a minimum, participants may not have 
completed the diary appropriately if they experienced a memory when it was 
inconvenient to note the details, for example while falling asleep or in a group of 
people. Therefore, diary records may have underrepresented the number of memories 
participants experienced. Another interesting potential is that participants really did 
experience fewer memories the second week as a result of normalization processes, 
for example as a consequence of being asked in a research setting about memories 
they may have worried were abnormal. This normalisation process may have reduced 
any attempts at memory suppression.  The Ironic Process Theory (Wegner, 1994) 
maintains that memory suppression paradoxically increases the number of intrusive 
memories experienced. Therefore participants may have experienced fewer memories 
if they stopped trying to suppress the memory, or ruminated less about having 
experienced a memory.  This possible explanation awaits further investigation, for 
example with a study that counterbalances the order in which retrospective and diary 
measures are completed, or that compares the measures in a between-subjects design. 
In terms of the implications for the current programme of research, it suggests that 
both measures should continue to be used, when both measures are appropriate, in 
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case the different methodologies truly are measuring different aspects of involuntary 
memory and do show a different relationship with cognitive control on a more 
sensitive task. For the other correlations, the more memories participants reported 
retrospectively, the more distress they reported. This is contrary to previous research 
(Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b) that found no significant 
relationship between frequency and distress (measured on an 100 point scale, rather 
than with the IES). This is interesting as both studies used subjective measures, and is 
consistent with the idea that although the events reported by high BDI-II participants 
are not objectively more negative than those reported by low BD-II participants, they 
are rated as being more negative (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011). Again, this is 
supported by the non-traumatic nature of intrusive memories reported by depressed 
individuals; they reflect non-traumatic types of negative life events, such as 
interpersonal arguments and relationship break-ups (Brewin et al., 1996b; Moulds & 
Krans, 2015). The finding that trait rumination correlated with intrusion-related 
distress supports the idea that both are looking at consequences of the memory (i.e. 
the tendency to get stuck on a negative memory). Therefore people who tend to 
ruminate more when feeling sad also report more distress specifically following a 
memory that was not deliberately recalled.  
 
In conclusion, the current study did not find any clear intrusive memory related 
deficits on the AX-CPT. The only significant finding was that individuals who 
recorded a high number of negative involuntary memories in the diary made more 
errors on long duration trials, suggesting a deficit in proactive control. The next study 
uses a similar methodology, but extends the focus from intrusive memory to 
involuntary memory more generally, i.e. without limiting the focus to intrusive or 
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negative involuntary memories. This wider emphasis stems from the considerable 
amount of research conducted into involuntary memory, without a specific focus on 
clinical disorders. This research suggests that involuntary memories are a common 
feature of memory and cautions against the conceptualization of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying intrusive memories as fundamentally maladaptive (Berntsen, 
2011; Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009). These conclusions suggest that before 
inferences about the role of cognitive deficits in intrusion vulnerability can be drawn, 
it is important to establish whether individual differences in cognitive control 
contribute to the overall number of involuntary memories experienced, irrespective of 
the valence of the memory.  
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Chapter five. 
Cognitive control and 
involuntary memory. 
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Introduction:  
 
This chapter will argue that it is important to extend the current research investigating 
the role of cognitive control in intrusive memory vulnerability to incorporate 
involuntary memories more generally. This would include memory that comes to 
mind without being deliberately recalled; the memory could be positive, negative or 
neutral. Although it has been shown that intrusive memories are experienced by 
healthy populations (Hauer et al., 2006; Newby & Moulds, 2011a; Verwoerd et al., 
2009) and that depressed individuals do experience positive and neutral involuntary 
memories (Watson et al., 2012), clinically-focused research has predominantly only 
focused on intrusive memories. This focus has persisted despite considerable 
empirical and theoretical support for the idea that intrusive memories are not 
necessarily different to negative involuntary memories (Berntsen, 2010, 2011; Moulds 
& Krans, 2015; Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009). For example, no research looking at 
deficits in cognitive control as a potential vulnerability factor has looked at the wider 
experience of involuntary memory, beyond using self-report measures of cognitive 
failures (Kamiya, 2014). The association between intrusive memories and mental 
health conditions supports an initial emphasis on these negative intrusive memories. It 
has been shown that intrusive memories, and reactions to intrusive memories, play a 
part in the maintenance of emotional disorders, for example depression and PTSD 
(Ehlers, 2010; Newby & Moulds 2011b). Therefore delineating potential vulnerability 
factors is an important step towards better understanding these memories. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the introductory chapter, there are three main reasons for 
broadening the emphasis from intrusive to involuntary memory experience. Firstly, as 
noted above, intrusive memories are not just experienced by people with mental 
health issues (Hauer et al., 2006; Newby & Moulds, 2011a). Secondly, not all 
	  	   138	  
involuntary memories are negative in valence (Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 
2004), and research suggests positive involuntary memories may not be conceptually 
different from intrusive or negative involuntary memories (Berntsen, 2011; 
Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009). Thirdly, in low mood populations, positive memory 
recall may be associated with a decrease in mood, rather than the increase in mood 
that healthy individuals report following a positive memory (Joormann & Siemer, 
2004; Joormann et al., 2007; Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012). These arguments will 
now be recapped, before the current study is presented.  
 
As discussed in the introduction chapter, non-clinical populations do report 
experiencing intrusive memories, as measured by the Intrusive Memory Interview 
(Hackmann et al., 2004). Specifically, Newby and Moulds (2011a) found no 
significant differences between the number of days on which currently depressed, 
recovered depressed and never depressed individuals reported intrusive memories. 
Additionally, numerous studies have used non-clinical samples to investigate 
characteristics of intrusive memories (Williams & Moulds, 2007c; Williams & 
Moulds, 2008b) or vulnerability factors (Verwoerd et al., 2008; Verwoerd et al., 
2011). Therefore it is apparent that, even though this research is conducted with a 
clinical emphasis, i.e. to better understand the role these memories play in PTSD or 
depression, intrusive memories are not just experienced by clinical samples. Despite 
this, the clinical focus solely on negative memories may implicitly suggest that 
unrecalled memories are always unwanted or always problematic. However, Berntsen 
and colleagues’ research into involuntary memory as a more general concept instead 
views involuntary memory as a basic mode of remembering, sharing similar encoding 
and maintenance features to voluntary memory (Berntsen, 2011). Accordingly, 
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Berntsen (2011) argues that while involuntary memories can sometimes become 
problematic, such as the case with intrusive memories studied in the clinical context, 
the mechanisms underlying these memories are not themselves necessarily purely 
problematic mechanisms. Furthermore, they argue that these distressing intrusive 
memories can be accounted for using the same mechanism as more everyday 
experiences of involuntary memory (Berntsen, 2011). Therefore, while the proportion 
of positive and negative involuntary memories experienced may change as a function 
of depressive symptomatology (Rasmussen & Bernsten, 2009), there is little evidence 
to say intrusive memories are necessarily conceptually different to ordinary non-
repetitive unrecalled memories (Berntsen, 2011). Their work has shown that 
involuntary memories are common, although the specific number varies both over 
time and between individuals (Berntsen, 2011). Indeed, in general samples, 
involuntary memories are mostly rated as positive in valence (Berntsen, 1998; 
Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Berntsen & Rubin, 2008). Even in a sample of students 
meeting criteria for PTSD on the Post-Traumatic Stress Diagnostic (PDS) 
questionnaire, equal amounts of negative and positive involuntary memories were 
recorded in the diary, which participants completed open-endedly without time 
constraints, until they had a total of 50 memories (Berntsen, 2001). Additionally, 78% 
of the memories recorded did not involve the traumatic event participants had 
experienced, questioning the idea that involuntary memories primarily consist of 
special events. Returning to the repetitive element of intrusive memories posited by 
Kvavilashvili (2014), Berntsen and Rubin (2008) investigated recurrent memories, 
both positive and negative, in a large Danish population via a telephone survey. 
Approximately half of the 1,504 participants surveyed said they had experienced a 
recurrent memory over the past year, the majority (58%) of which were positive or 
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highly positive. By contrast, only a fifth of the memories were rated to be negative or 
highly negative.  These results suggest that even recurrently experienced memories 
are not restricted to memories of negative events.  The implications from this work 
are that in some circumstances, the ability to inhibit any involuntary memory 
(whether positive or negative) may be an important individual difference that 
determines who will experience a high number of memories they did not deliberately 
recall. The impact of cognitive control may not depend on the valence of the memory. 
Existing investigations into the impact of cognitive control on involuntary memories 
have only used self-report measures of cognitive failures. Nonetheless, Verwoerd and 
Wessel (2007) and Kamiya (2014) provide initial evidence of a significant positive 
relationship between frequency of involuntary memories (both positive and negative) 
and scores on a self-report measure of cognitive failure, as measured by the Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire. The questionnaire measures failures in perception, memory 
and motor functions (Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982). The current 
study seeks to extend this initial evidence using a task that measures cognitive control.  
 
The third reason for looking at involuntary memory more inclusively is that a positive 
memory may not always have a positive impact on mood. This suggestion comes 
from work on voluntary memory recall in low mood populations. Voluntarily 
recalling a positive memory may be an effective mood regulation strategy for a 
healthy individual who is experiencing a transient sad mood (Joormann & Siemer, 
2004). However, Joormann et al. (2007) demonstrated that, although currently-
depressed participants were able to successfully access positive memories, positive 
memory recall in this group caused a decrease in current mood ratings. Never-
depressed individuals reported an increase in positive mood, while there was no effect 
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of positive memory recall on mood in the formerly-depressed participants. Werner-
Seidler and Moulds (2012) extended this finding to demonstrate a differential impact 
of analytical and experiential processing on the effects of positive memory recall on 
mood. They showed that, whereas currently and recovered-depressed participants 
induced to an analytical processing mode (e.g. ‘think about the causes, meanings and 
consequences of what happened’) prior to their positive memory recall demonstrated 
no change in mood, both groups reported an increase in mood following a concrete 
induction condition (e.g. ‘play the scene over in your head like you are replaying a 
movie of how the event unfolded’). These findings demonstrate a parallel with 
research by Watkins (2004) and Watkins and Teasdale (2004) on analytical and 
experiential processing styles conducted into negative voluntary memory, discussed in 
the introduction chapter. This work has demonstrated that analytical thinking (e.g. 
when the individual focuses on why they feel down or depressed) is linked to indices 
of maladaptive processing in low mood populations, for example, overgeneral 
memory (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004) and poor problem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 
2005). Conversely, encouraging participants to an experiential mode of thinking (e.g. 
when an individual focuses on how they feel) has been shown to reduce overgeneral 
memory bias and improve problem solving, respectively (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Although these studies focused on voluntary memory, the 
findings imply that the detrimental effects of negative intrusive memories on mood 
may also apply to non-negative involuntary memories. For example, if an individual 
responds to a positive involuntary memory with an analytical thinking manner (e.g. 
‘why aren’t things this good now?’), they may experience a decrease in mood. As a 
result, these individuals may be similarly motivated to prevent either a negative 
involuntary memory or a positive involuntary memory coming to mind. Therefore, 
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assuming that individual differences in cognitive control will only be important for 
negative memories may be too simplistic. Even when positive or neutral memories 
have a positive impact on mood, they may still be distracting to the current task. 
Therefore individual differences in the ability to control these memories may be 
important in determining whether or not these kinds of memories are commonly 
experienced. The current study addresses this by extending upon the previous chapter 
to incorporate a more general investigation of involuntary memory. 
 
The lack of clarity in terminology between the terms intrusive and negative 
involuntary memory, as highlighted by Kvavilashvili (2014), may also impact studies 
of intrusive memory and cognitive control. Although the Intrusive Memory Interview 
explains to participants that an intrusive memory would include a memory of ‘any 
negative event/circumstance or situation that has actually happened to you’ 
(Hackmann et al., 2004) it remains unclear whether participants report (or even 
accurately recall) memories of all negative events during this procedure, or whether 
they only report highly negative, important or repetitive memories. If participants are 
interpreting the definitions slightly differently, this introduces a degree of subjectivity 
in cases where the content of the memory is not explicitly defined, for example when 
memories do not specifically refer to a film-clip or concern one specific past stressful 
event. This confound is especially problematic in light of the retrospective 
assessments predominantly used in the intrusive memory literature; an involuntary 
memory of a negative past event may be experienced only briefly and forgotten if not 
immediately recorded (Berntsen, 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2014). Likewise, perhaps 
only highly emotional memories are remembered.   Therefore, asking participants 
about involuntary memories (without using the word ‘intrusive’) may make the 
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estimates of involuntary memories for negative events more accurate.  It is important 
to establish baseline estimates of involuntary memories, and any link between 
cognitive control and memory experience, before later turning to a more specific 
focus on one subsample of involuntary memory.   
 
Frequency of involuntary memories will be assessed using a diary method, as 
primarily used in the involuntary memory literature (Berntsen, 2001; Berntsen, 2010; 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Watson et al., 2012). Given the predicted high number of 
involuntary memories experienced over a week, previous work suggests the frequency 
can be between 3-5 per day (Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen, 2001), and in light of the 
suggestion that many of these memories will be forgotten if not recorded immediately 
(Berntsen, 2011), only the diary method, and not the retrospective ratings method 
used in the previous chapter, was deemed appropriate for the current research 
question. To account for the possibility that participants may not completely comply 
with diary keeping instructions, for example because it is too time consuming, 
participants will be asked to complete one final questionnaire when they hand their 
diaries in. This questionnaire will ask participants to estimate the number of memories 
they experienced but did not record in the diary, whether because they experienced a 
memory when it was not convenient to record the details, or it was a memory they did 
not wish to disclose etc.  There will therefore be two frequency measures in this 
study; the diary measure and the summative measure, which equates to the number of 
memories in the diary plus the number of additional memories indicated on the 
questionnaire.  
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The present study:  
 
In summary, the current study explores whether individual differences in cognitive 
control, as measured by the AX-CPT, are linked to the number of involuntary 
memories experienced in a non-clinical student and community sample. During the 
first session, participants will complete the AX-CPT task and two self-report 
questionnaires; the BDI-II and RRS, because of the traditional focus of intrusive 
memories in depression. Participants will then keep a diary of any involuntary 
memories they experience over the next week. One week later, participants will return 
to hand in their diaries and complete a final questionnaire assessing the number of 
involuntary memories they experienced but did not record in the diary, before being 
debriefed. As before, group categorization on all variables (high versus low) will be 
split around the mean (once again, the mean number of involuntary memories in the 
diary was higher than the median; mean = 6.4, median =5 (SD=3.53)). In addition to 
the mean split analyses of BDI-II scores, the impact of extreme BDI-II scores (low 
extreme BDI-II < 7, high extreme BDI-II ≥ 17) on task performance will again be 
assessed.  
Predictions:  
1) Overall task:  
 
As the task was conducted in exactly the same way as the previous study, the overall 
task data is expected to replicate the previous findings. Therefore, significant main 
effects of SOA (short, long) and condition (AY, BX and BY) are expected. 
Specifically, RTs are predicted to be shorter and error rates lower for long SOA trials, 
as compared to short SOA trials, as participants have more time to use cue-based 
information to prepare a response in the long SOA trials. RTs are also predicted to be 
longer and error rates higher for AY trials as compared to BX and BY trials, as 
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participants are expected to incorrectly prepare a ‘target’ response following the cue-
letter A during the AY trials. The unexpected lack of BX/BY difference in terms of 
RTs in the previous study awaits replication, but the BX/BY difference is predicted to 
emerge in the error data, as it did in the previous study.  
 
2) Group comparisons:  
 
It is predicted that cognitive control, as indexed by AX-CPT performance, will be 
affected by involuntary memory frequency, both diary and summative measures, 
irrespective of valence of the memory. Individuals experiencing a higher number of 
memories are expected to show less proactive control and consequently more reactive 
control, indexed through impaired BX performance and better AY performance, than 
individuals experiencing a low number of involuntary memories, who are expected to 
show impaired AY performance but better BX performance. Neither the previous 
study nor Msetfi et al. (2009) found task performance to be affected by rumination, 
therefore, although rumination will be measured as a means of assessing the potential 
detrimental impact of the consequences of the memory, task performance is not 
predicted to be impacted by trait rumination. Given the contradictory results of the 
previous chapter and Msetfi et al. (2009) it is unclear whether task performance will 
be affected by depressive symptomatology, as measured by the BDI-II.  
 
 
3) Correlations between involuntary memories and questionnaires:  
 
There is predicted to be a significant correlation between the diary and summative 
measures of involuntary memories, as both measures are assessing involuntary 
memories experienced over the same time period. Based on a wealth of existing 
research citing the role of rumination in depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
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Spasojević & Alloy, 2001), including the significant positive relationship found in the 
previous chapter, the correlation between RRS and BDI-II scores is also expected to 
be significant. It is unclear whether there will be significant correlations between the 
frequency measures of involuntary memories and the BDI-II or the RRS.   
 
4) Valence of involuntary memories in relation to depressive symptomatology:  
 
Based on the concept of involuntary memory as a basic mode of remembering 
(Berntsen, 2011) and specific work by Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011) and 
Watson et al. (2012) looking at involuntary memories in dysphoric and depressed 
samples, high BDI-II participants are predicted to record both positive and negative 
involuntary memories in the diary. The proportion of extremely positive and 
extremely negative memories will then be calculated. No research has looked at the 
relationship between the proportion of positive and negative memories reported in 
daily life as a function of BDI-II score. In their discussion section, Watson et al. 
(2012) report the percentages of positive (50%), negative (34%) and neutral (15%) 
memories reported by their currently depressed sample, but not the percentages 
reported by the never depressed group so no comparisons between the two 
experiences can be made. Consequently, it is unclear whether there will be a 
significant correlation between the proportion of positive and negative memories and 
BDI-II scores.  
Methods:  
Participants:  
 
The study was granted ethical approval by the University Teaching and Research 
Ethics Committee (UTREC). Participants (students and members of the community) 
were recruited through the Psychology & Neuroscience departmental SONA system 
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and via adverts posted on the University memo bulletins. To meet study eligibility 
participants had had to have recently experienced involuntary memories and speak 
English fluently. In total, 31 participants were recruited. One participant was excluded 
as they reported a diary frequency of memories 3 SDs above the mean (frequency = 
37, details below). Consequently, 30 participants remained for the analysis (26 
female, 4 male, age range 17-35). No other data points were more than 3 SDs above 
the mean, therefore no other data were excluded. Power analysis revealed that a 
sample size of 36 would be required to detect a medium effect size at a 95% 
confidence interval using a .05 criterion of statistical significance. Therefore the 
sample size actually used was very small. Participants were reimbursed £10 total for 
their participation.  
AX-Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT):  
The task was presented exactly as in the previous study. See the previous chapter for 
details. 
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Procedure:   
 
After providing informed consent, participants completed the AX-CPT task (lasting 
approximately 30 minutes), followed by the BDI-II and RRS in a randomized order. 
Participants were given the definition and an example of an involuntary memory and 
asked to provide an example to ensure they had fully understood the definition. 
Following this, participants were given the paper diaries and the instructions for the 
next week. Seven days later participants returned to the research laboratory to hand in 
their diaries and fill out the final questionnaire. Finally participants were debriefed 
and reimbursed £10 for their time.  
Results: 
 
As in the previous study, the overall task data will be presented first.  Then the groups 
will be compared on task performance. For the ‘target’ trials this will comprise of a 1-
way repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factor SOA (short, long) 
and the between-subjects factor; specifically using the diary measure, the summative 
measure, the RRS and the BDI-II splits. For the ‘non-target’ trials, this will comprise 
of a repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors SOA (short, long) 
and condition (AY, BX, BY) and the between-subjects factor. For the between-group 
analyses only effects involving the factor group will be reported. As for the previous 
AX-CPT study, Bonferroni corrections were made to the post-hoc comparisons only.  
 
1) Overall Task Data:  
 
Mean RTs and error rates for all trial types are displayed in Figure 5.1, split by short 
(700 ms) and long (4700 ms) SOA trials.  
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Figure 5.1. Mean RTs and error rates (with standard error bars) for each trial type, split by the two 
SOA trials (short versus long).  
 
i) ‘Target’ (AX) trials:  
RTs: The main effect of SOA was not significant F (1, 29) = 1.36, p > .05.  
 
Error rates: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests revealed that the error data were not 
normally distributed, Ds (30) > 0.23, ps <.01. The data were therefore arcsine 
transformed and submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA. As for the previous 
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study, the means reported in the text and shown in the figures are based on the 
original data. The main effect of SOA was not significant, F (1, 29) = 1.14, p > .05.  
 
ii) ‘Non-target’ (AY, BX, BY) trials:  
RTs: There was a significant main effect of SOA, F (1, 29) =37.18, p = .01, partial η2 
= 56. RTs were significantly faster for the long SOA (mean = 575 ms, SD = 25.40) 
than for the short SOA (mean = 650 ms, SD = 29.36). There was also a significant 
main effect of condition F (2, 58) = 108.74, p =.01, partial η2 = .79. Pair-wise 
comparisons were then conducted. After Bonferroni corrections, the p value needed to 
be smaller than .02 to reach statistical significance. These comparisons revealed this 
reflected slower RTs for AY trials (mean = 732 ms, SD = 29.48) compared to both 
BX (mean = 561 ms, SD = 27.50) and BY trials (mean = 545 ms, SD = 26.82), both 
Fs > 118.18, ps < .02, both partial η2s > .80. BX and BY trials did not differ 
significantly from each other, F (1, 29) = 3.19, p > .02.  The condition x SOA 
interaction was also significant, F (2, 58) = 14.09, p = .01, partial η2 = .34. There was 
a significant difference between the two SOAs for BX (120 ms) and BY (85 ms) 
trials, both Fs > 28.30, both ps < .01, both partial η2 > .50. This difference was not 
significant for AY trials (21ms), F (1, 29) = 2.64, p > .05. 
 
Error rates: The main effect of SOA was not significant, F (1, 29) = 0.43, p > .05. 
The main effect of condition was significant, F (2, 58) = 36.99, p = .01, partial η2=.56. 
Pair-wise comparisons revealed this reflected a significantly higher percentage of 
errors made to AY (mean = 8.33%, SD = 1.3) than to both BX (mean = 1.92%, SD = 
.50) and BY trials (mean = 0.50%, SD = .22), Fs > 31.04, ps < .01, partial η2= .46. 
Significantly more errors were also made to BX trials than BY trials, F (1, 29) = 9.07, 
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p = .01, partial η2 = .25. The SOA x condition interaction was not significant, F (2, 
58) = 0.59, p > .05.  
 
Task summary: In summary, the overall task data replicates the findings of the 
previous study. The effect of SOA (faster RTs on ‘non-target’ trials on long SOA 
trials) supports the use of proactive control in the task; participants used the cue 
information to prepare a response. The effects of condition that were found in the 
previous study were also replicated; participants were slower and made more errors 
on AY trials as compared to BX and BY trials. This again demonstrates proactive 
control, i.e. demonstrates that participants were also to prepare a response after the 
cue-letter, and maintain this information over both SOAs. As found previously, 
participants also made more errors to BX compared to BY trials (as previously found, 
error rates were low: 0.83% for ‘target’ trials, 3.58% for ‘non-target’ trials), but RTs 
did not show this BX/BY difference. The differential impact of the SOA on BX/BY 
trials as compared to AY trials also replicates results from the previous study; there 
was only a significant difference between the SOAs for B-letter trials when 
participants could fully prepare a ‘non-target’ response and benefit more for the 
longer SOA.  
 
2) Group comparisons: 
Table 5.1 overleaf displays the descriptive statistics for each of the questionnaires. It 
also explains the composition of the high and low groups based on mean splits.  
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Table 5.1 
Means and standard deviations (SD) on the self-report scales, and the composition of the groups based 
on mean splits.  
Variable Mean S.D. Group split value N high N low 
Diary 6.4 3.53 ≥ 6 13 17 
Summative 12 7.89 ≥ 12 12 18 
RRS 46.73 8.08 ≥ 47 15 15 
BDI-II 9.23 5.65 ≥ 9 16 14 
Extreme BDI-II 9.21 7.04 High ≥ 17, low < 7 5 9 
 
i)  ‘Target’ (AX) trials:  
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below display the F-values for ‘target’ trials for each between-
group variable, for reaction times and error rates respectively. There were two 
significant between-group differences in the RT data, involving BDI-II group and the 
extreme BDI-II group. No effects reached significance in the error data. Significant F-
values are presented in bold, and the figures for these significant effects are presented 
below the table.   
 
Table 5.2 
F-values for reaction times to ‘target’ trials, for each between-group variable. Significant F-values are 
presented in bold. 
 Diary Summative RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group  0.19 1.04 1.73 1.00 7.61* 
Group x SOA 0.37 0.11 0.56 4.52* 3.22 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
 
The BDI-II x SOA interaction was significant, F (1,28) = 4.52, p = .04, partial η2 = 
.14. For the high BDI-II group, target responses were significantly slower for short 
SOA trials (636 ms, SD = 27.8) as compared to long SOA trials (604 ms, SD = 30.8) 
SOA, F (1, 15) = 5.84, p = .03, partial η2 = .28. However, there was no difference 
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between the SOAs for the low BDI-II group, F (1, 13) = 0.48, p > .05 (mean short = 
567 ms, SD = 36.9, mean long = 576 ms, SD = 46.4). This is displayed in Figure 5.2 
below.  
 
Figure 5.2. Mean RTs (with standard error bars) over the two SOAs and split by high and low BDI-II 
group.  
 
The main effect of extreme BDI-II was significant, F (1, 12) = 7.60, p = .02, partial  
η 2 =.39. Participants in the high extreme BDI-II group generally responded slower 
(mean = 677 ms, SD = 45.31) than participants in the low extreme BDI-II group 
(mean = 521 ms, SD = 33.77). This is displayed in Figure 5.3 overleaf. 
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Figure 5.3. Mean RTs (with standard error bars) to ‘target’ trials, split by high and low extreme BDI-II 
group. 
 
Table 5.3 
F-values for error rates to ‘target’ trials, for each between-group variable. No effects reached 
significance.  
 Diary Summative RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group  1.40 0.01 0.02 1.74 0.01 
Group x SOA 3.42 0.40 2.11 0.63 1.27 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
 
ii) ‘Non-target’ (AY, BX, BY) trials:  
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 display the F-values for ‘non-target’ trials for each between-group 
comparison. In the extreme BDI-II group there was a speed-accuracy trade-off; high 
extreme BDI-II participants responded slower, but made fewer errors, than low 
extreme BDI-II participants. This demonstrated that the high extreme BDI-II group 
was more conservative in their responses. In the error data, there was an effect in the 
RRS group, where high ruminators made more errors in long SOA trials as compared 
to short SOA trials. Significant F-values are presented in bold, and the figures for 
these significant effects are presented below the table.   
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Table 5.4 
F-values for reaction times to ‘non-target’ trials, for each between-group variable. Significant F-
values are presented in bold. 
 Diary Summative RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 0.25 0.77 0.81 1.94 17.97** 
Group x condition 0.07 0.41 0.17 0.11 0.21 
Group x SOA 0.55 1.41 1.82 0.17 0.39 
Group x condition x SOA          0.13 0.14 0.56 0.23 1.27 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
The main effect of extreme BDI-II group was significant, F (1, 12) = 17.97, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .60. The mean RT in the low extreme BDI-II group was faster (mean = 
526 ms, SD = 31.59) than the high extreme BDI-II group (mean = 744 ms, SD = 
42.38). This is displayed in Figure 5.4 below. However, as this appears to be a 
difference in speed accuracy trade-off as the high extreme BDI-II group made 
significantly fewer errors than the low extreme BDI-II group (see error data below, 
represented in Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.4. Mean RTs (with standard error) to ‘non-target’ trials, split by high versus low extreme BDI-
II group.  
 
As mentioned above, this finding reflects that the high extreme BDI-II group were 
more conservative, as they made fewer errors than the low extreme BDI-II group. 
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There was a significant main effect of extreme BDI-II group: F (1, 12) = 10.83, p  = 
.01, partial η2= .47. The mean percentage of errors made was higher in the extreme 
low BDI-II group (mean = 5.37%, SD = 0.81) than in the extreme high BDI-II group 
(mean = 1.83%, SD = 1.08). This effect is displayed in Figure 5.5 below.  
 
Figure 5.5. Mean error rates (with standard error bars) to ‘non-target’ trials, over the two SOAs and 
split by high and low extreme BDI-II group.  
 
Table 5.5 
F-values for error rates to ‘non-target’ trials, for each between-group variable. Significant F-values 
are presented in bold. 
 Diary Summative RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 0.62 0.71 2.45 0.69 10.83** 
Group x condition 0.63 0.27 2.78 (*) 0.32 3.39 (*) 
Group x SOA 0.11 0.10 7.66 * 0.71 3.52 (*) 
Group x condition x SOA 0.88 0.59 0.99 0.99 0.49 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
  
The RRS group x SOA interaction was significant, F (1, 28) = 7.66, p = .01, partial 
η2= .22. Participants in the high RRS group made significantly more errors on the 
long SOA trials (mean = 5.57%, SD = .93) as compared to the short (mean = 3.11%, 
SD = .74), F (1, 14) = 4.39, p = .05, partial η2 = .24. The difference between the short 
(mean = 2.22%, SD = .93) and long (mean = 3.44%, SD = 0.73) SOAs was not 
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significant for the low RRS group, F (1, 15) = 2.66, p > .05.This effect is displayed in 
Figure 5.6 below.  
 
Figure 5.6. Mean error rates (with standard error bars) made to ‘non-target’ trials, over the two SOA 
and split by high and low RRS group.  
 
Group comparisons summary:  Contrary to predictions, there was no link between the 
frequency of involuntary memories participants reported and task performance, either 
in terms of the diary measure or the summative measure. On the consequences of the 
memory measures, only a group effect of rumination emerged in the error data for 
‘non-target’ trials. Specifically, high ruminators made significantly more errors to 
‘non-target’ trials in the long SOA trials, while low ruminators made more errors in 
the short SOA ‘non-targets’ trials, although this difference was not significant in the 
low rumination group. This is consistent with the idea that engaging in rumination 
impairs the ability to maintain context information over time (Braver, 2012). The 
other group differences that emerged were in relation to depressive symptomatology. 
The high BDI-II group responded significantly slower to ‘target’ trials with a short 
SOA compared to ‘target’ trials with a long SOA, but this effect was slightly reserved, 
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but not significantly so, in the low BDI-II group. This, contrary to predictions, 
suggests a slight deficit in context maintenance in the low BDI-II group. 
In terms of the extreme BDI-II comparisons, the low extreme BDI-II group responded 
faster (to ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ trials), but made more errors (in ‘non-target’ trials) 
than the extreme high BDI-II group. This therefore reflects a difference in speed-
accuracy trade-off, rather than any difference in context processing or context 
maintenance abilities.  
 
3) Correlations between involuntary memories and questionnaires:  
 
Table 5.6 is a correlation matrix displaying the relationship between the self-report 
measures. There was a significant correlation between the diary and summative 
measures. This is consistent with predictions, because the measures both assess the 
number of memories experienced over the same time point.  It also supports the 
validity of the diary measure, as the participants who had the most memories in their 
diaries still had the most memories when memories that were not recorded were also 
included. The significant correlation between RRS and BDI-II replicates a consistent 
finding in the depression literature, i.e. that low mood is associated with ruminative 
processes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Treynor et al., 2003; Williams & Moulds, 2008b) 
and replicates results of the previous chapter. Significant correlations are presented in 
Figure 5.7. 
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Table 5.6 
 A correlation matrix for the questionnaire measures. Significant correlations are displayed in Figure 5.8. 
 Measure 1. Diary 2. Summative 3. RRS 
1.  Diary    
2.  Summative 0.61 **   
3.  RRS 0.14 0.02  
         4. BDI-II 0.26 0.15 0.44 * 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10 , two-tailed 
 
Figure 5.7. Displaying the significant correlations found in the self-report measures. 
 
4) Valence of the involuntary memories:  
 
The correlation between mean valence of the involuntary memories and BDI-II was 
not significant, r (30) = .13, p > .05, two-tailed. To avoid the possibility that positive 
and negative memory ratings were just cancelling each other out, the relationship 
between extremely negative (memories rated a 0 or a 1 on the 5-point scale) or 
extremely positive (memories rated a 4 or a 5) and mood was then explored. This was 
done by calculating the number of extremely negative and extremely positive 
memories experienced, as a proportion of total memories experienced. For example, if 
one participant reported 4 memories in total, 2 of which were rated a 0 out of 5 and 2 
of which were rated a 5 out of 5, the proportion of memories would be 0.5 negative 
and 0.5 positive respectively. The correlations between these proportions and BDI-II 
scores were then calculated.  
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The correlation between extremely negative memories and BDI-II score was not 
significant, r (30) = -.14, p > .05, two-tailed. The correlation between extremely 
positive memories and BDI-II score was also not significant, r (30) = -.02, p > .05, 
two-tailed. These results suggest that, in a general student and community sample, 
experiences of involuntary memories do not vary systematically as a function of 
depressive symptomatology, as measured by the BDI-II. 
Discussion:  
 
The current study investigated a potential link between individual differences in 
cognitive control and the number of involuntary memories experienced. This was an 
extension of previous research, which has looked at deficits in cognitive control and 
the experience of intrusive and negative involuntary memories. Specifically, it has 
previously been demonstrated that individual differences in proactive interference are 
associated with intrusive memory experience (Verwoerd et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 
2011). In conjunction with the previous chapter, the present study aimed to determine 
if deficits would be found on the AX-CPT, which is a more basic measure of 
cognitive control than the tasks used in this previous research looking at proactive 
interference. Importantly, the task is based on the Dual Mechanisms of Control 
(DMC) theory which distinguishes between proactive and reactive modes of control 
(Braver et al., 2007). The DMC highlights the importance of potential shifts between 
the two processing modes as a function of individual differences, or differences in 
task specific parameters (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007; Speer et al., 2003). 
Therefore using the DMC is an important addition to existing research into potential 
mechanisms underlying the heightened numbers of involuntary memories. Another 
specific goal of this study was to look more broadly at involuntary remembering, 
incorporating both positive and negative memories than the previous sole focus on 
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negative intrusive memories. While the clinical literature has focused heavily on these 
intrusive memories (Newby & Moulds, 2011c, 2011d; Williams & Moulds, 2008b), 
Berntsen and colleagues’ extensive research into involuntary memory suggests that 
memories for traumatic or highly stressful events are not fundamentally different to 
more everyday types of involuntary memories (Berntsen, 2011; Berntsen & Rubin, 
2008). Therefore, before conclusions can be drawn about the role of cognitive control 
in intrusive memory experience, it is important to establish whether individual 
differences in cognitive control also contribute to the number of involuntary 
memories experienced. This has not previously been addressed, beyond self-report 
measures of cognitive failures (Kamiya, 2014, Verwoerd & Wessel, 2007). These 
studies did provide initial evidence that there is a link between individual differences, 
highlighting that higher levels of cognitive failure were associated with higher 
numbers of involuntary memories (of all valences). However, this relationship needs 
to be further investigated using cognitive tasks. Another important reason to extend 
existing research was the finding that positive voluntary memory recall can be 
accompanied by a decrease in mood in dysphoric or depressed populations (Joormann 
& Siemer, 2004; Joormann et al., 2007). Therefore, the ability to inhibit an unrecalled 
memory may not be limited to emotionally negative memories. 
 
As found in the previous chapter, only some of the task predictions were met. For 
example, RTs were significantly faster for both BX and BY trials than for AY trials, 
suggesting that participants used the cue letter B to prepare a ‘non-target’ response. In 
addition, there was no significant difference in RTs between BX and BY trials, 
although again more errors were made to BX trials as compared to BY trials. Once 
more, the overall error rate to ‘non-target’ trials was low (3.58%), which meant that 
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the task might not have been sensitive enough to subsequently uncover any potential 
group differences in BX/BY performance. The lack of RT difference between BX and 
BY trials suggests that participants were always able to prepare the appropriate ‘non-
target’ response following the cue-letter B, without needing to wait for additional 
information from the letters X or the Y. Importantly, this cue-information was 
adequately maintained over both SOA conditions, rather than decaying in the long 
SOA condition. This finding suggests that there was no need for participants to 
engage in any reactive (i.e. target-letter) processing. As in the previous chapter, the 
long SOA was shorter than that used in previous studies (Msetfi et al., 2009) and 
reflects a substantial limitation of the current design. In contrast, the expectancy 
violation leading to slower RTs on the AY trials was similar across the two SOAs, 
rather than being larger in the short SOA. This again suggests participants adequately 
maintained the context provided by the cue-letter (in this case the letter A) over both 
SOA conditions. These problems limit the conclusions of the task, as by not tapping 
into reactive control, the task did not address the flexible nature of cognition inherent 
in the DMC framework of cognitive control (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007). This 
limitation will be addressed in the subsequent chapter by using a more extreme 
difference between the short and long SOAs trials, and to bring the SOAs into line 
with existing research (Braver et al., 2001; Msetfi et al., 2009). 
In terms of the group comparisons, no differences in task performance were found 
between individuals who experienced a high or a low number of involuntary 
memories, using either the diary or summative frequency measures. These findings 
call into question the idea that some people regularly experience unrecalled memories 
as a result of fundamental deficits in their ability to regulate cognitive control 
(Bomyea, Amir, & Lang, 2012; Verwoerd et al., 2011), in this case specifically 
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context representation and context maintenance. These findings are consistent with 
the previous study that looked only at intrusive memories, which only found an error 
effect in the diary measure, but extends this lack of deficit to all types of involuntary 
memories. Importantly, like the current study, existing research into underlying 
deficits in cognitive control has used non-clinical samples as a first step towards 
establishing the potential role of cognitive control in intrusion vulnerability. Therefore 
it seems that the lack of findings in the current study are not simply attributable to the 
sample used. 
 
In light of the highlighted difficulties of measuring involuntary memories (Rasmussen 
et al., 2014), it is interesting to look at the relationship between the two frequency 
measures. The mean number of additional memories reported on the final 
questionnaire was 5.52 (SD = 6.30), and the summative measure of involuntary 
memories was significantly higher than the number of memories in the diary, mean = 
4.43 (SD = 4.01), t (30) = -4.70, p = .01.  This suggests this extra questionnaire was 
useful, as not all involuntary memories were covered by the diary measure.  However, 
interestingly, there was a significant correlation between the measures; individuals 
reporting higher number of memories in the diary also reported a higher number of 
memories overall. This suggests that both measures are assessing similar experiences 
of involuntary remembering, even if not all memories are recorded in the diary.  
Consequently, the lack of group difference in cognitive control on either frequency 
measure suggests it is not simply the case that the diary method is not assessing the 
true frequency of involuntary memories. This is an interesting finding in the context 
of the suggestion made Verwoerd et al. (2011) that the number of diary recordings 
may reflect the ability to keep the goal of remembering to record memories in the 
	  	   164	  
diary active. Employing the second, shorter, retrospective questionnaire may 
somewhat counteract this potential confound, as memories that participants forgot to 
report may still be included. However, it is important to note that the overall number 
of memories reported by participants was still low, as compared to other 
investigations of involuntary memory (Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen, 2001; 
Finnbogadottir & Berntsen, 2013; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). This may 
reflect participants’ lack of motivation to complete the diary properly. This is 
supported by work by Rasmussen, Ramsgaard, and Berntsen (2015) who found that 
frequency records were higher for frequency estimates gathered by a mechanical 
counter, as compared to memories recorded on a smartphone. As a result, it would be 
useful for future work to test whether using a mechanical counter or a mobile 
smartphone recording technology would uncover deficits in cognitive control in 
relation to intrusive or involuntary memory experience.  
 
In addition to memory frequency, the impact of trait rumination on task performance 
was investigated. This was to account for the idea that it may not be the involuntary 
memory per se that impacts well-being, but the consequences and the way individuals 
react to the memory that is important. For example, some people may be more prone 
to getting stuck on the memory, potentially mirroring the demonstrated importance of 
appraisals individuals assign to their intrusive memories (Starr & Moulds, 2006; 
Williams & Moulds, 2008b). In the context of the DMC, it has been suggested that 
ruminative processes will act as task-irrelevant thoughts and reduce the ability to 
maintain context overtime (Braver, 2012). However, consistent with the previous 
study, there was no difference in reaction times between high and low trait 
ruminators. In the error data, the high rumination group did indeed make a higher 
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percentage of errors in the long SOA ‘non-target’ trials, in comparison to the low 
rumination group who made a higher percentage of errors in the short SOA ‘non-
target’ trials. This is consistent with the suggestion made by Braver (2012). However, 
given the low overall number of errors on the ‘non-target’ trials (3.58%), this finding 
should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, it does provide initial evidence that 
proactive processes, specifically context maintenance over a long duration period, are 
impaired in high trait ruminators. In turn, this may indicate that individuals who suffer 
more from their intrusive memories have a deficit in proactive control. 
 
The impact of depressive symptomatology, as measured by the BDI-II, on task 
performance was also investigated. This was done using both the traditional mean 
split categorization, and looking only at the extreme BDI-II scores. Contrary to 
previous research using the AX-CPT (Msetfi et al., 2009) but not the previous study 
(chapter four), there was no overall deficit as a function of high BDI-II. In fact, on 
‘target’ trials, the high BDI-II group actually benefited more from the long SOA than 
the low BDI-II group in terms of reaction time performance. The other BDI-II related 
differences in task performance were on the extreme categorization, and reflected a 
difference in speed accuracy trade-off. Specifically, the high extreme BDI-II group 
was more conservative in their responses (i.e. they were slower, but made fewer 
errors).  Previously Msetfi et al. (2009) demonstrated that high BDI-II participants 
were selectively impaired in context maintenance, i.e. selectively made more errors on 
BX trials in long SOA trials. As highlighted in the discussion section of the previous 
chapter, there are a variety of methodological differences between this task and the 
one used by Msetfi et al. (2009) that may account for the different findings; again, the 
relatively short long SOA in this work as compared to existing research is 
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problematic. On the other hand, as discussion in the previous chapter, the current lack 
of proactive impairment in relation to symptoms of low mood is consistent with 
Saunders and Jentzsch (2014). They found no depressive-related proactive 
impairments in classic and emotional Stroop tasks, which they assessed by 
manipulating speed-accuracy instructions. In this design, the ability to modify 
behaviour based on the instruction, specifically performing slower but making fewer 
errors and vice versa, is the index of proactive control. Interestingly, the same study 
only found depressive-related deficits in reactive control, indexed by the effect of 
conflict on subsequent trial performance, on the emotional, and not the classic, Stroop 
task. This highlights the importance of looking at performance on emotional tasks to 
assess cognitive control, which will be addressed in the subsequent chapter.  
 
The current study also investigated characteristics of the involuntary memories 
recorded in the diary as a function of depressive symptomatology; a question that has 
not received a great deal of research attention (Watson et al., 2012). Firstly, there was 
no significant correlation between BDI-II scores and the number of memories 
recorded, as well as no significant correlation between BDI-II score and the mean 
valence of the memories. These findings are as predicted by Berntsen and colleagues’ 
research into involuntary memory, which concludes that involuntary memories are a 
common feature of memory, in both healthy and disordered cognition (Berntsen, 
2010; Rubin et al., 2008). Outside of a focus of repetitive involuntary memories of 
negative events, existing research has shown that involuntary memories are not 
restricted to the recall of special or traumatic events (Berntsen, 2001), are commonly 
experienced by healthy individuals (Berntsen, 1996, 2010), and low mood and 
clinically depressed individuals experience both positive and negative involuntary 
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memories (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Watson et al., 2012) . Therefore, these 
non-significant correlations are not surprising. As the valence of the memories was 
rated by participants themselves in the current study (rather than consisting of 
objective ratings), these results do contrast with Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011) 
who found that dysphoric participants rated their memories as being more negative 
than non-dysphoric participants.  It would be useful to extend the current investigation 
to specifically recruit dysphoric participants, versus just looking at BDI-II data 
continuously in a student sample, to investigate this further. The comparison of 
voluntary and involuntary memories conducted by Watson et al. (2012) suggests that, 
irrespective of the mode of retrieval (i.e. voluntary or involuntary), clinically 
depressed participants report more negative memories, stronger emotional reactions to 
the memories, and higher levels of rumination and avoidance than never-depressed 
individuals. This was not supported on a continuous scale of depressive 
symptomatology in a non-clinical sample, and this is important for future research to 
investigate further.  
 
In the meantime, these non-significant correlations support the idea that a sole focus 
on intrusive memories in the clinical literature is unjustified, as it is not examining the 
full range of involuntary memories experienced by depressed participants. As 
highlighted by Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011), it is important to investigate 
‘everyday’ negative involuntary memories experienced in low mood, as they are 
likely to impact mood.  For example, if dysphoric individuals do in fact experience 
frequent negative involuntary memories, and involuntary memories do have a 
heightened detrimental impact on mood (Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; 
Watson et al., 2012), then this could start a vicious cycle of an increased number of 
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involuntary memories and further decreases in mood (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 
2011). In addition, Watson et al. (2012) argues that, in light of the finding that 
intrusive memories represent only some of the involuntary memories low mood 
samples experience, we should be looking at general involuntary memory in 
depressed participants in order to better understand the role of intrusive memories in 
depression. This statement supports the extension of the existing intrusive memory 
vulnerability research; it was important to establish any potential link between deficits 
in cognitive control and involuntary memory experience.  
 
Along with the aforementioned adjustments to the SOAs, the subsequent study will 
address the possibility that the lack of deficits in cognitive control stem from the 
unvalenced stimuli used in the task. This consideration stems from research looking at 
cognitive control and low mood, which has demonstrated that dysphoric and 
depressed participants are impaired on tasks which require the processing of 
emotionally negative information (Joormann, 2004; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, 
Franck, & Crombez, 2005). The next study will also return to a sole focus on intrusive 
memories, partly due to the potential limitations of assessing involuntary memories, 
and also since the research that has previous found a link between deficits in cognitive 
control was looking exclusively at intrusive memories. This may make the task more 
sensitive to individual differences in cognitive control. However, none of this existing 
research has looked at performance on emotional tasks. In light of the limitations of 
the AX-CPT task, the subsequent study will additionally look at performance on the 
emotional Stroop as a different means of assessing proactive and reactive control, to 
ensure the lack of clear findings are not just an artefact of the AX-CPT.   
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Chapter six. 
Emotional cognitive control and 
intrusive memories. 
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Introduction: 
 
The study presented in this chapter will explore potential cognitive control 
impairments in individuals who experience a high number of intrusive memories, 
using emotional measures of cognitive control. The use of emotional tasks is an 
important extension of the studies presented in the previous two chapters, as the lack 
of intrusion related-deficits that were found may be a result of the non-valenced 
material used. The rationale for this suggestion comes from the existing literature 
looking at cognitive control and depression. Specifically, Gotlib and Joormann (2010) 
and Kircanski, Joormann, and Gotlib (2012) conclude that depression is characterized 
by the elaboration of negative material, as well as difficultly disengaging from this 
negative material.  Therefore, depressive-related deficits in cognitive control most 
consistently emerge when the task requires the processing of emotional information 
(Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann & 
Siemer, 2004; Koster et al., 2005). Given the association between intrusive memories 
and depressive symptomatology (Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; Newby & Moulds, 2010, 
2011b), and the emotionality of intrusive memories, i.e. that they are a memory of a 
negative distressing event, it is important to investigate whether the importance of 
emotional stimuli in uncovering cognitive deficits also applies to the experience of 
intrusive memories. This may account for the lack of intrusive memory-related 
deficits in cognitive control in the previous chapters. Therefore, the tasks in this 
chapter investigate the impact of irrelevant emotional information (both positive and 
negative) on performance in two emotional cognitive control tasks. Emotional 
variants of the Stroop and AX-CPT tasks will be used. The emotional Stroop task is 
used to address some of the previous issues of the AX-CPT. The key question is 
whether people experiencing a high number of intrusive memories are differentially 
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affected by the irrelevant emotional material than people who experience fewer 
intrusive memories. No previous research has used affective cognitive tasks to explore 
the question of intrusive memory vulnerability.  As in chapter four, indices of both 
intrusive and negative involuntary memories will be collected. Although both these 
types of memories will be referred to as spontaneous or intrusive memories during the 
experimental procedure, the data will be analysed using criteria provided by 
Kvavilashvili (2014), who criticizes the ambiguity about which type of memory is 
being studied. Specifically, the Intrusive Memory Interview (Hackmann et al., 2004) 
will be used to provide a retrospective measure of the number of intrusive memories. 
The retrospective measure 1 (retro 1) will consist of the number of memories 
experienced in relation to the same event (a traditionally defined ‘repetitive’ intrusive 
memory). In addition, the retrospective measure 2 (retro 2) will consist of the total 
number of negative involuntary memories experienced over the past week and 
reported during the interview. As in the previous two studies, participants will also 
keep a diary of any negative involuntary memories experienced over the 7-day period 
after the study, another measure of negative involuntary memories.  This thorough 
assessment of memory experience is also consistent with the argument presented 
throughout the thesis, namely that intrusive memories do not necessarily conceptually 
differ from other forms of involuntary memories (Berntsen, 2011), and therefore 
investigations into underlying cognitive deficits need to consider a wider focus of 
memory experiences. Nevertheless, a cautious approach is taken by using this specific 
terminology. As noted above, the three measures of memory frequency (retro 1, retro 
2 and diary) will be analysed separately, in order to carefully distinguish between 
potentially different ‘types’ of involuntary memories.  
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The first task is the emotional AX-CPT. Akin to the AX-CPT used previously, the 
emotional variant requires participants to respond to cue-letter pairs; making a ‘target’ 
response only to AX trials and ‘non-target’ responses to AY, BX and BY trials. 
However, in the emotional version the letters are superimposed onto happy or sad 
faces. Importantly, the faces and the emotional information provided by the faces, are 
irrelevant to the response requirement. Therefore, the task assesses the ability to 
maintain context in the presence of irrelevant emotional information. The emotional 
AX-CPT has previously been used to demonstrate that performance of patients with 
schizophrenia was more impaired when the letters pairs were on happy faces 
compared to sad or neutral faces (Park, Kim, Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2011). Control 
participants’ performance was not affected by the background faces.  The authors thus 
concluded that the processing of the happy faces in individuals with schizophrenia 
took resources away from the actual requirements of AX-CPT, thereby impacting 
their performance. It remains to be determined whether low mood and other variables 
related to intrusive memory experience, for example memory-related distress and 
rumination, have a similar impact on task performance. 
 
In addition to incorporating emotional stimuli, there will be another modification to 
the AX-CPT, namely a change in the SOAs used. This is to the address the previous 
two studies’ lack of BX/BY difference, i.e. lack of reactive control measure. As 
previously discussed, the long SOA condition used for chapter four and five was too 
short. Performance suggests that participants were sufficiently able to maintain cue-
based information over both SOAs, and did not need to engage in any target-based 
processing. Consequently, in the current study the target letter will be presented either 
1000 ms or 10 000 ms after the cue letter, compared to the 700 ms and 4700 ms SOAs 
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used previously. This brings the study into line with Msetfi et al. (2009) who, in 
contrast to the previous two chapters, found that high BDI-II participants were 
selectively impaired in the ability to maintain context over time. This adjustment to 
the long SOA is important because if the interval between the cue and target becomes 
too long, proactive control will become too costly to maintain and increased reliance 
on reactive (i.e. target-letter) control (Braver et al., 2007) would become the optimal 
form of processing on the task. Increasing the sensitivity of the task in this way may 
reveal intrusive memory group differences in cognitive control that did not previously 
emerge.   
 
The second measure of cognitive control in this study will be the emotional Stroop 
task. The Stroop task is a common measure of cognitive control, and changes on 
Stroop task performance as a function of aging (Cohn, Dustman, & Bradford, 1984) 
and depression (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Moritz et al., 2002) have previously been 
demonstrated. In the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), participants are presented 
with a word written in either a compatible or incompatible ink colour (i.e. the word 
‘red’ written in red or blue ink) and must make a response based on the colour of the 
ink. Reaction times and error rates are consistently higher during incompatible trials, 
for example when participants must respond to the word red written in blue ink, than 
for compatible trials, when the ink colour matches the word presented (MacLeod, 
1991). The classic Stroop task has been modified in two different ways to incorporate 
the processing of affective conflict. In the emotional-word version (Mitterschiffthaler 
et al., 2008), participants are presented with a depressive-related word (e.g. tired, sad) 
and again respond to the ink colour of the word. In the emotional-face version (Etkin 
et al., 2006), participants are presented with the word happy or sad presented below a 
happy or sad face, and are instructed to respond to the valence of the face. In both 
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cases the words are task-irrelevant. The emotional-face Stroop task will be used in the 
current study to determine if these irrelevant faces impact performance.  
 
There are two aspects of Stroop task performance which can be looked at in terms of 
potential individual differences in proactive and reactive control. As per Saunders and 
Jentzsch (2014), speed accuracy trade-off (SAT) instructions can be manipulated to 
determine whether individuals can effectively use an instruction to modify their 
behaviour. This would entail responding faster when instructed to prioritise speed, 
and making fewer errors when instructed to prioritise accuracy. The ability to use the 
instruction to modify behaviour reflects sustained biasing of behaviour prior to 
stimulus presentation; i.e. proactive control (Braver, 2012) and can be indexed by 
comparing performance (both reaction times and error rates) on blocks where 
participants are instructed to respond quickly, to blocks where participants are 
instructed to respond accurately (Saunders & Jentzsch, 2014).  Reactive control can 
be indexed through examining the effect of previous trial compatibility on current trial 
performance. This is termed the conflict sequence effect (CSE) and typically reflects 
reduced interference following an incompatible trial, as compared to a compatible 
trial (Botvinick et al., 2001). The CSE is assumed to reflect increased top-down 
attentional control after the detection of conflict (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992), 
in order to reduce the impact of irrelevant stimulus dimensions on future trials 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). This modification 
therefore represents reactive control, i.e. a ‘late correction’, mechanism (Braver, 
2012). It should be noted that one other interpretation is that the CSE indicates a 
short-term increase in proactive control, that is activated in a reactive manner. 
However, it is argued that the short-term scale of the increase in attentional control, 
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and the speed at which the increase is implemented (Jiménez & Méndez, 2014, 
Scherbaum, Dshemuchadse, Fischer & Goschke, 2010), as compared to the long-term, 
sustained, effects of proactive control (Braver, 2012, Dipisapia & Braver, 2006), does 
underline the utility of a Dual Mechanisms account. For example, in the current 
Stroop task, proactive control is reflected by the long-term biasing of attention on a 
block-by-block basis, whereas the CSE reflects changes on more trial-by-trial basis. 
Therefore, for the purpose of the present study, the CSE will be taken as a measure of 
reactive control, although this potential limitation is important to bear in mind going 
forward.  As noted above, these indices of proactive and reactive control, SATs and 
CSEs, have not been looked at in relation to intrusive memory experience.  
Some work has looked at CSEs in relation to depression symptomatology. A study by 
Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007) suggested that depressive-related deficits emerge 
particularly in relation to negative events, for example following the execution of an 
error, or in relation to perceived failure.  While the low BDI-II group (≤ 5) showed a 
typical conflict adaptation effect, participants with high BDI-II scores ( ≥ 13) did not 
show a reduction in the Stroop effect after a previous incompatible trial compared to a 
previous compatible trial. In contrast, the low BDI-II group did. This suggests that 
high BDI-II participants had a reduced ability to moderate their behaviour from one 
trial to the next, reflecting a deficit in reactive control. Consistent with that finding, 
Saunders and Jentzsch (2014) demonstrated that high BDI-II participants (BDI-II 
scores ≥ 17) showed reduced CSEs on the emotional-face Stroop, compared to low 
and medium BDI-II participants (BD-II < 17). Conversely, contrary to their 
predictions, proactive control (speed accuracy trade-offs) did not vary as a function of 
depressive symptomatology. Therefore, the current study aims to determine whether 
the selective deficit in reactive control is replicable in the current study, as the DMC 
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predicts a depressive-related deficit in proactive control. Importantly, in the Saunders 
and Jentzsch (2014) paper, no differences in either proactive or reactive control 
emerged on the classic Stroop task, supporting the importance of emotional tasks to 
uncover depressive related deficits. This is further motivation to examine whether 
emotional tasks are important to discover intrusive memory related deficits.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the studies that have looked at the link between 
intrusive memory and cognitive control have mainly focused on proactive interference 
(Verwoerd et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 2011). These studies have demonstrated that 
individual differences in proactive interference susceptibility are associated with 
intrusive memory experience; a higher ability to resist proactive interference was 
related to fewer intrusive memories of a film-fragment (Verwoerd et al., 2011) and 
fewer intrusive memories of a past stressful event (Verwoerd et al., 2009). When 
Verwoerd et al. (2009) looked at proactive interference, they also looked at 
performance on the classic Stroop task as a measure of response inhibition. On the 
Stroop task, they looked at the proportional increase in RTs between incongruent (e.g. 
the word RED written in blue) and neutral trials (e.g. asterisks (***) written in blue). 
This comparison reflects a pure measure of the cost of incompatibility on the task, 
rather than including trials when performance is facilitated by congruency, for 
example the finding that responses are typically faster to the word RED written in red 
ink than responses to asterisks presented in RED (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994).  Using 
hierarchical multiple regression, Verwoerd et al. (2009) found that there was no 
relationship between Stroop performance and the IES scores for participants’ past 
stressful event. The authors therefore concluded that response inhibition does not play 
a role in intrusion vulnerability.  However, as reasoned above, the emotional content 
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of intrusive memories may mean that intrusive-memory related deficits require 
affective cognitive tasks to emerge. As such, using the emotional Stroop is an 
important extension of this previous study. The present study will also use a more 
precise measure of memory frequency than the Verwoerd et al. (2009) study, which 
used the IES as the measure of intrusive memory experience. The IES does not 
specifically index intrusive frequency, but instead asks participants to rate subjective 
aspects of frequency in relation to vague statements (e.g. pictures about it popped into 
my mind; never, often, sometimes, always). While an abundance of research supports 
the importance of such subjective evaluations of memories for determining distress 
(Newby & Moulds, 2011c; Williams & Moulds, 2008b), research into potential 
cognitive deficits should begin with a clear assessment of memory frequency, along 
with subjective measures. Therefore, as for the study on intrusive memory presented 
in chapter four, both frequency specific measures (retrospective and diary ratings) and 
measures looking at the consequences of the memory (the IES and the trait rumination 
scale) will be used to index the overall experience of these memories. 
 
In summary, the present research has two aims. The first aim is to determine if more 
robust measures of proactive and reactive control than those provided by the AX-CPT 
are necessary for an underlying link between cognitive control deficits and intrusive 
memory experience to emerge. This will be addressed using the Stroop task. The 
second aim is to incorporate emotional stimuli into both the AX-CPT and Stroop 
tasks, in order to determine if the null findings of the previous two empirical chapters 
reflect the unvalenced material used. Once again, the correlations between the 
questionnaires will also be looked at, in order to replicate relationships found in the 
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previous chapters and to form a clear picture of the characteristics of the sample being 
tested.  
Predictions:  
1) Emotional AX-CPT:  
 
As predicted for the previous AX-CPT studies, significant main effects of SOA (short, 
long) and condition (AY, BX, BY) are predicted. The effect of SOA is predicted to be 
dependent on context maintenance abilities; if participants can adequately maintain 
context over the duration, BX performance should stay constant or improve in long 
SOA trials, whereas performance on AY trials is predicted to stay constant or get 
worse with the increased delay. Conversely, if context maintenance is impaired, then 
BX performance should worsen with delay, while AY performance should improve. 
Performance is also expected to differ significantly between AY, BX and BY trials. 
Specifically, RTs are expected to be longer and error rates higher to AY trials than to 
BX and BY trials. With the extension of the long SOA, there is also predicted to be a 
difference in performance BX and BY trials, with longer RTs/more errors made in to 
BX trials as compared to BY trials.  	  	  
2) Emotional Stroop:  
 
Significant main effects of SAT instruction (speed, accuracy) and compatibility 
(compatible, incompatible) are predicted. Specifically, RTs are predicted to be faster 
and error rates higher under speed instructions than under accuracy instructions. RTs 
and error rates are also predicted to be higher for incompatible than compatible trials; 
the classic Stroop effect. Additionally, RTs and error rates are expected to be affected 
by the compatibility of the previous trial, in that the Stroop effect will be reduced 
following an incompatible trial than following a compatible trial (indexed through a 
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current compatibility x previous compatibility interaction), suggesting the presence of 
conflict adaptation effects. 
 
3) Group comparisons: 
 
It is subsequently predicted that cognitive control, as measured by the emotional AX-
CPT and Stroop tasks, will be affected by between-group differences in intrusive-
memory experience (both frequency and consequences of the memory measures) and 
depressive symptomatology. On the AX-CPT, predictions which were not previously 
met are expected to emerge given the changes to the SOA, and the incorporation of 
emotional stimuli. Specifically, participants experiencing a high number of intrusive 
and negative memories, and scoring more highly on the other self-report measures 
(intrusive-memory distress, trait rumination and depressive symptomatology) are 
expected to show less proactive control (cue-letter processing). As a consequence of 
this reduced proactive control on the task, they are therefore expected to need to rely 
more on reactive control (target-letter processing). This would emerge as better AY 
performance, but impaired BX performance. As these variables are predicted to 
impair the maintenance of contextual information, these findings are predicted to be 
more pronounced in the long SOA trials. On the Stroop task, participants experiencing 
more memories and scoring more highly on the questionnaires are predicted to be 
more impacted by the irrelevant emotional information. This may be reflected through 
a reduced ability to use the speed/accuracy instruction to make block-by-block 
modifications to behaviour (i.e. proactive control), or showing reduced behaviour 
modification after the experience of conflict. Previously, predictions in the thesis were 
that participants scoring highly on the questionnaires would show a specific deficit in 
proactive control. Conversely, Saunders and Jentzsch (2014) previously demonstrated 
that, on the emotional Stroop, participants high in depressive symptomatology, as 
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measured by the BDI-II, showed a deficit in their ability to modify behaviour 
following conflict, i.e. a deficit in reactive control, and no deficit in proactive control. 
The lack of proactive control deficit was contrary to their predictions. Therefore, it 
remains to be determined whether any intrusive-memory related deficits on the 
emotional Stroop will be in proactive or reactive control.  
Method:  
Participants:  
 
The study received ethical approval from the University Teaching and Research and 
Ethics Committee (UTREC). Participants volunteered for the study through the 
SONA system and through adverts on the University memo bulletins. To take part, 
participants had to have recently experienced an intrusive memory and speak English 
fluently. In total 44 participants took part in the study. One participant was excluded 
as they reported a number of intrusive memories more than 3 SDs above the mean 
(reporting 70 intrusive memories during the Intrusive Memory Interview, details 
below). Consequently, 43 participants remained for the analysis (31 female, 12 male, 
age range 17-28). No other data points were more than 3 SDs above the mean and 
therefore no other data were excluded. Due to a technical error, only data for 42 
participants is available for the AX-CPT task. Power analysis revealed that sample 
size of 34 would be required to detect a medium effect size at a 95% confidence 
interval using an alpha of .05. Participants were reimbursed £10 for their time.  
Emotional AX-CPT:  
 
Stimuli were single letters, presented on the nose of a face (100 mm x 70 mm) taken 
from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) set of happy and sad faces. For both tasks, faces 
were masked to remove hair, body and any background information. The faces were 
presented in grey scale and the letters were in white font. See Figure 6.1. The cue 
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letter consisted of either an A or a B letter, and target letters consisted either an X or a 
Y. The target-letter required a left-handed ‘target’ response (keyboard letter z) only if 
preceded by the letter A. Any other cue-target pair required participants to make a 
right-handed ‘non-target’ response (keyboard letter m). Each trial began with a 
fixation cross on screen (300 ms), followed by the cue-letter (300 ms), followed by a 
SOA (either 1000 ms or 10 000 ms), followed by the target-letter (presented until 
response) and finally the screen was blank (300 ms). See Figure 6.1 for an example of 
a single trial sequence below. 
 
Figure 6.1. An example of single trial sequence in the Emotional AX-CPT task  
 
The task consisted of 2 blocks, each containing 108 trials. At the end of each block 
participants could take a short break. 70% of the trials were AX trials, and the rest 
were divided equally between AY, BX and BY trials (10% each). Within those 
frequencies, half of the cue-target combinations were presented on a happy face, half 
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were presented on a sad face. The cue-target letter pairs were always presented on the 
same face, displaying the same valence. After being taken through the instructions, 
participants began with a practice block consisting of 10 cue-target letter pairs and 
were given feedback after each practice trial. They were subsequently given the 
opportunity to ask the researcher any questions before beginning the experimental 
trials.  
Emotional Stroop task:  
 
The stimuli were presented centrally on screen. The stimuli set consisted of 16 faces; 
4 male, 4 female, each with a happy and a sad version (Ekman & Friesen, 1976).  The 
faces measured approximately 60 mm x 35 mm.  The word ‘HAPPY’ or ‘SAD’ 
(printed in capital letters) was presented below each face, see Figure 6.2 for an 
example. Each letter measured approximately 10 mm x 7 mm. Participants completed 
two blocks, each made up of 200 stimuli and could take a short break between each 
block. Stimuli were presented until response, and between each trial, a fixation point 
appeared for 1500 ms. At the beginning of each block, participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly or as accurately as possible and these instructions were reversed 
for the subsequent block. Participants were instructed to make either a left-handed 
(keyboard letter z) or right-handed response (keyboard letter m) depending on 
whether the face was happy or sad. This was balanced across participants. After being 
provided with the instructions participants completed 8 practice trials and continued 
onto the experimental trials.  
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Figure 6.2. An example of a compatible condition in the Emotional-Face Stroop task.  
 
Procedure:  
After providing informed consent, participants completed the two computer tasks in a 
randomized order. Participants were then taken through the Intrusive Memory 
Interview and completed the IES, RRS and BDI-II, in a randomized order. Next 
participants were given the instructions for keeping the diary over the next 7 days, 
after which they returned to the research laboratory to hand in their diaries and to be 
debriefed and reimbursed for their time.   
Results:  
 
1) Overall task data:  
 
Emotional AX-CPT: 
  
Overall task data will be analysed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factors valence (happy, sad) and SOA (short, long) for the ‘target’ 
(AX) trials. For the ‘non-target’ trials, a repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-
subjects factors valence (happy, sad), SOA (short, long) and condition (AY, BX, BY) 
will be conducted.  After the overall data is presented, the groups will be compared on 
task performance. The following group splits were conducted: retro 1, retro 2, diary, 
IES, RRS, BDI-II and extreme BDI-II. For the ‘target’ trials this will consist of a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors valence (happy, sad) and 
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SOA (short, long) and the between-subjects factor (as defined in the following 
sections). For the ‘non-target’ trials, this will comprise of a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the within-subjects factors valence (happy, sad), SOA (short, long) and 
condition (AY, BX, BY) and the between-subjects factor (as defined in the following 
sections). For the between-group analyses, only effects involving the factor group will 
be reported. Bonferroni corrections were made to post-hoc comparisons.  
 
RTs and error rates for all trial types are displayed in Figure 6.3 below, split by short 
(1000 ms) and long (10 000 ms) SOA intervals. 
 
Figure 6.3. Mean RTs and error rates (with standard error bars) for each trial type over the two SOAs. 
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i) Target (AX) trials:  
 
RTs: The main effect of SOA was significant, F (1, 41) = 42.77, p = .01, partial η2 = 
.51. RTs were significantly faster for the short SOA condition (mean = 654 ms, SD = 
27.88) than for the long SOA condition (mean = 738 ms, SD = 28.45). The valence x 
SOA was significant, F (1, 41) = 5.38, p = .03, partial η2 = .17. Responses were faster 
for sad than happy stimuli at the long SOA (mean happy = 732 ms, SD = 28.4, mean 
sad = 744 ms, SD = 29.3), but this effect was slightly reversed for the short SOA 
(mean happy = 659 ms, SD = 28.3, mean sad = 650 ms, SD = 28). Neither 
comparison, however, was significant, both Fs < 1.77, both ps > .05. No other effects 
reached significance, ps > .10.  
 
Error rates: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests revealed that the error data were not 
normally distributed, Ds (42) > 1.7, ps < .01. The data were therefore arcsine 
transformed and submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA. However, the means 
reported in the text and shown in the figures are based on the original data.  The main 
effect of valence was marginally significant, F (1, 41) = 8.70, p = .05, partial η2= .18. 
More errors were made to sad stimuli (mean = 2.96%, SD = .42) than to happy stimuli 
(mean = 1.61%, SD = .26). The main effect of SOA was also significant, F (1, 41) = 
5.45, p = .03, partial η2= .12. More errors were made in the long SOA (mean = 2.85%, 
SD = .39) than the short SOA (mean = 1.72%, SD = .29). The valence x SOA 
interaction was significant, F (1, 41) = 5.50, p = .02, partial η2= .12. For the long 
SOA, participants made significantly more errors to sad stimuli (mean = 4.05%, SD = 
.63) as compared to happy stimuli (mean = 1.65%, SD = .37), F (1, 41) = 13.60, p = 
.01, partial η2= .25. However at the short SOA, there was no difference between 
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happy (mean = 1.56%, SD = .35) and sad stimuli (mean = 1.87%, SD = .38), F (1, 41) 
= 0.34, p > .05.  
 
ii) Non-target (AY, BX, BY) trials:  
 
RTs: The main effect of SOA was significant, F (1, 41) = 12.09, p = .01, partial η2= 
.23. RTs were significantly faster to the short SOA (mean = 700 ms, SD = 28.51) 
condition than for the long SOA condition (mean = 743 ms, SD = 27). The main 
effect of condition was also significant, F (2, 82) = 63.28, p = .01, partial η2 =.61. 
Responses to AY trials were significantly slower (mean = 841 ms, SD = 31.20) than 
both BX (mean = 675 ms, SD = 29.56) and BY trials (mean = 649 ms, SD = 26.41), 
both Fs > 48.70, ps < .01, partial η2s > = .55. The difference between BX and BY 
trials was not significant, F (1, 41) = 3.39, p > .05. The valence x SOA interaction 
was significant, F (1, 41) = 6.63, p = .01, partial η2= .14. That is, the main effect of 
SOA was only present for the happy stimuli, F (1, 41) = 17.59, p = .01, partial η2= .30 
(mean short: 690 ms, SD = 28.02, mean long: 762 ms, SD = 30.0) but not for the sad 
stimuli, F (1, 41) = .62, p > .05 (mean short: 711 ms, SD = 31.1, mean long: 724ms, 
SD = 26.1). No other effects were significant, all Fs < 1.8, all ps > .05.  
 
Error rates: The main effect of condition was significant, F (1, 40) = 25.86, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .39. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that the 
difference in errors made to AY (mean = 10.74%, SD = 1.64) and BX trials (mean = 
7.32%, SD = 1.37) was not significant, F (1, 41) = 3.55, p > .05, partial η2 = .08. The 
difference in errors made to AY and BY (mean = 0.52%, SD = .22) trials was 
significant, F (1, 41) = 56.48, p = .01, partial η2 = .58. Importantly, the difference in 
errors made to BX and BY trials was significant, F (1, 41) = 32.91, p = .01, partial η2 
= .45. No other effects were significant, Fs < 2.40, ps > .09.  
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Task summary: Some of the effects of the previous AX-CPTs used in chapters four 
and five were replicated. RTs were slower to AY trials than to both BX and BY trials. 
Furthermore, even with the increased SOA, there was still no significant difference in 
RTs to BX and BY trials. As the previous two chapters, however, this difference did 
emerge in the error rate data, where participants made more errors to BX trials as 
compared to BY trials. This BX/BY difference is important as it demonstrates that 
participants did not always fully use the cue-letter information in the task, as the X in 
BX trials was misleading. The addition of valence to the task did not greatly impact 
participants’ RT performance. The only effects were some valence x SOA 
interactions, which are a bit muddled. Participants were more conservative in their 
responses to happy stimuli on ‘target’ trials with a long SOA, as compared to those 
with a short SOA.  However on ‘non-target’ trials, participants were significantly 
faster to happy stimuli short SOA trials as compared to happy stimuli long SOA. 
There has not been a lot of research using the emotional AX-CPT, so the general lack 
of impact of valence is difficult to interpret. Extending the SOAs reversed the effect 
of SOA found in the previous two chapters; participants in this study were slower (on 
both ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ trials) and made more errors (on ‘target’ trials only) in 
the long SOA trial, as compared to short SOA trials. This suggests participants did 
have some difficulty with, or no longer saw the benefits of, maintaining context over 
time. This finding supports the Dual Mechanisms Theory of cognitive control, which 
highlights the importance of flexibility (Braver et al., 2007).  
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Emotional Stroop task:  
 
The Stroop data were analysed using a 2 (SAT instruction: speed, accuracy) x 2 
(previous compatibility: compatible, incompatible) x 2 (current compatibility: 
compatible, incompatible) repeated-measures ANOVA.  
 
RTs: There was a significant main effect of instruction, F (1, 42) = 44.19, p = .01, 
partial η2 =.51. RTs were significantly faster under speed instructions (mean = 569 
ms, SD = 13.65) than under accuracy instructions (mean = 694 ms, SD = 22.4).  
The main effect of previous compatibility was not significant, F (1, 42) = .02, p > .05. 
The main effect of current compatibility was significant, F (1, 42) = 23.9, p = .01, 
partial η2= .36. RTs were faster to compatible trials (mean = 621 ms, SD = 15.53) 
than for incompatible trials (mean = 642 ms, SD = 16.69). No interactions were 
significant, all Fs < .93, all ps > .05.  
 
Error rates: The main effect of instruction was significant, F (1, 42) = 28.76, p = .01, 
partial η2 = .41. The percentage of errors made was higher under speed instructions 
(mean = 10.16%, SD = 1.15) than under accuracy instructions (mean = 5.58%, SD = 
.97). The main effect of previous compatibility was not significant, F (1, 42) = 2.51, p 
> .05. The main effect of compatibility was significant, F (1, 42) = 25.62, p= .01, 
partial η2=.38. The percentage of errors made was higher for incompatible trials 
(mean = 9.38%, SD = 1.11) than for compatible trials (mean = 6.37%, SD = .91). No 
interactions were significant, all Fs < 2.17, all ps > .15. 
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Task summary: Overall, participants responded faster when told to prioritize speed, 
and made fewer errors when told to prioritize accuracy. This reflects appropriate 
speed-accuracy trade-offs, i.e. proactive control. RTs and error rates were also higher 
for incompatible trials as compared to compatible trials, indicating the presence of a 
Stroop effect. Surprisingly, however, no significant interaction between previous 
compatibility and compatibility was found, suggesting the absence of the CSE effect. 
Therefore, group analyses were subsequently conducted without this factor. Group 
comparisons were therefore conducted with a 2 (SAT instruction: speed, accuracy) x 
2 (compatibility: compatible, incompatible) repeated-measures ANOVA with group 
as a between-subjects factor.  
 
2) Group comparisons:  
Table 6.1 below displays the descriptive statistics for each of the questionnaires. It also 
explains the composition of the high and low groups; consistent with the previously 
presented studies, these were based on mean splits. As noted above, there was a 
technical problem recording AX-CPT performance for one participant, therefore the 
AX-CPT groups contain one fewer participant than the Stroop groups.  
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Table 6.1 
Means, standard deviations (SD) for each of the questionnaire measures and the composition of the 
groups based on mean splits. 
Variable Mean S.D. Group split value N High 
(AX-CPT) 
N Low 
(AX-CPT) 
N High 
(Stroop) 
N Low 
 (Stroop) 
Retro 1 5.10 8.42 High ≥ 5 18 24 19 24 
Retro 2 7.16 7.85 High ≥ 7 15 27 16 27 
Diary 4.53 4.01 High ≥ 5 18 24 19 24 
IES 33.67 16.75 High  ≥ 34 21 21 22 21 
RRS 45.77 11.15 High  ≥ 46 21 21 22 21 
BDI-II 11.30 7.98 High  ≥ 11 21 21 22 21 
Extreme BDI-II 11.53 9.44 High  ≥ 17, low < 7 13 17 13 17 
 
Once again, the intrusive memories consisted of similar events to previous research 
(Brewin et al., 1996, Newby & Moulds, 2012). These were relationship/family issues 
(e.g. a relationship break up, argument with Father), work/school issues or personal 
failure (e.g. provisional PhD supervisor telling me she couldn’t be my supervisor, 
performing badly in a dance show) and death/illness of another (e.g. watching the 
ducks as my Grandfather died, being with my Dad when he almost died).  The mean 
rating of intrusive memory distress was 64.04 out of 100 (SD = 20.64). 
Emotional AX-CPT:  
i) ‘Target (AX) trials’: 
 
F-values for ‘target’ trials for each between-group comparison are presented below in 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3, for reaction times and error rates respectively. Only one 
comparison was significant and one comparison approached significance. Figures for 
the significant values are presented below the tables.    
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Table 6.2 
F-values for reaction times to ‘target’ trials for each between-group variable. Significant F-values are 
presented in bold. 
 
 Retro 1 Retro 2 Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group  2.08 1.34 0.69 0.29 0.15 0.38 0.12 
Group x valence 0.53 0.11 0.55 0.26 0.42 0.44 0.10 
Group x SOA 1.20 1.80 2.45 0.01 1.51 0.02 0.90 
Group x valence x SOA 0.23 0.48 1.80 0.02 2.91 3.40 4.61 * 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
 
Table 6.3 
F-values for error rates to ‘target’ trials for each between-group variable. Significant F-values are 
presented in bold. 
 
 Retro 1 Retro 2 Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group  0.20 0.60 0.05 0.88 0.16 0.03 0.01 
Group x valence 0.38 0.77 3.78 (*) 0.84 0.49 0.11 0.06 
Group x SOA 0.85 0.10 0.10 1.65 0.07 0.32 0.48 
Group x valence x SOA 1.02 0.46 1.43 0.22 1.67 0.27 1.46 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
RTs: The extreme BDI-II group x valence x SOA group interaction was significant, F 
(1, 28) = 4.61, p = .04, partial η2 = .14. Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) 
revealed that the valence x SOA interaction was only present in the low extreme BDI-
II group, F (1, 16) = 6.42, p = .02, partial η2 = .29, but not in the high extreme BDI-II 
group, F (1, 12) = 0.45, p > .05. Further breakdowns of the low extreme BDI-II group 
performance showed a significant difference between the SOAs for both the happy    
(t (17) = -3.32, p = .01) and sad (t (17) = -4.27, p = .01) stimuli. However, the 
difference was larger in the sad stimuli (difference = 106 ms) than in the happy 
stimuli (difference = 71 ms). These effects are displayed in Figure 6.4 below.  
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       High extreme BDI-II group                          Low extreme BDI-II group
Figure 6.4. Mean RTs (with standard error bars) for ‘target’ trials, for the high and low extreme BDI-II 
groups respectively.  
 
Error rates: The diary group x valence interaction approached significance, F (1, 40) 
= 3.78, p = .06, partial η2= .09. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed 
this reflected a significant effect of valence in the high diary group, F (1, 17) = 14.42, 
p = .01, partial η2= .46, where more errors were made to sad stimuli than happy 
stimuli (mean sad = 3.68%, SD = .63, mean happy = 1.40%, SD = .40). There was no 
effect of valence in the low diary group, F (1, 23) = 0.95, p > .05, partial η2= .04 
(mean happy = 1.76%, SD = .35, mean sad = 2.42%, SD = .54). This is displayed in 
Figure 6.5 below.   
     
Figure 6.5. Mean error rates (with standard error bars) for happy and sad stimuli, split by high and low 
diary groups.  
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ii) Non-target ‘(AY, BX, BY)’ trials:  
 
There were five between-group comparisons on ‘non-target’ trials that were 
significant, and two that approached significance. F-values for all comparisons are 
presented in the Tables 6.4 and 6.5 below, for reaction time and error rates 
respectively. Figures for the significant values are presented below the tables.  
 
Table 6.4 
 F-values for reaction times to ‘non-target’ trials. Significant F-values are presented in bold.  
 Retro 1 Retro 2 Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 1.10 1.48 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.17 
Group x condition 1.99 0.16 1.22 3.83* 0.84 0.83 0.04 
Group x valence 2.95 0.34 0.01 0.72 0.27 0.38 0.26 
Group x SOA 0.02 0.06 1.36 0.52 2.07 0.01 1.65 
Group x condition x valence 1.56 0.43 0.58 0.06 0.60 0.02 0.02 
Group x condition x SOA 0.75 1.41 1.85 1.09 0.87 2.79 3.34* 
Group x valence x SOA 4.23* 1.87 2.14 0.45 0.41 0.48 0.04 
Group x valence x SOA x condition 1.03 0.27 0.10 1.29 0.50 0.16 1.49 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
Table 6.5 
 F-values for error rates to ‘non-target’ trials. Significant F-values are presented in bold.  
 Retro 1 Retro 2 Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 0.39 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.60 0.76 
Group x condition 0.14 0.98 0.01 0.12 0.01 1.65 0.93 
Group x valence 0.15 0.25 0.01 0.23 1.17 0.12 1.57 
Group x SOA 0.36 0.07 0.30 0.19 2.09 0.07 0.22 
Group x condition x valence 1.03 0.98 0.26 3.06(*) 0.95 0.24 0.64 
Group x condition x SOA 2.97 (*) 3.74 * 0.71 1.08 1.76 1.79 1.04 
Group x valence x SOA 1.87 2.42 5.68 * 0.65 0.03 0.01 0.12 
Group x valence x SOA x condition 1.18 1.08 10.28 ** 0.22 0.07 0.14 0.08 
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
 
RTs: The retro1 group x valence x SOA interaction was marginally significant, F (1, 
40) = 4.23, p =.05, partial η2 = .10. Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) 
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showed that the valence x SOA interaction was significant in the low retrospective 
group, F (1, 23) = 11.02, p = .01, partial η2 = .32, but not in the high retro 1 group, F 
(1, 17) = .04, p > .05. Further breakdowns of the low retro 1 group performance 
showed that the effect of SOA was significant in the happy stimuli, F (1, 23) = 15.61, 
p = .01, partial η2 = .40 (mean short: 697 ms, SD = 42.5, mean long: 788 ms, SD = 
42.7), but not significant in the sad stimuli, F (1, 23) = 0.21, p > .05, partial η2 = .01 
(mean short = 754 ms, SD = 47.3, mean long = 745 ms, SD = 36.7). These effects are 
displayed in Figure 6.6 below.   
 
                             High retro 1 group                                             Low retro 1 group 
 
Figure 6.6. Mean RTs (with standard error bars) for ‘non-target’ trials, for high and low retrospective 
memory groups respectively.  
 
The IES group x condition interaction was significant, F (1, 40) = 3.83, p =.03, partial 
η2 = .09. In the high IES group there was a significant difference between AY (mean 
= 825 ms, 37.4) and both BX (mean = 705 ms, SD = 47.7) and BY trials (mean = 641 
ms, SD = 37.6), both Fs > 11.27, both ps < .01. Importantly, there was also a 
significant difference between BX and BY trials, F (1, 20) = 8.79, p = .01, partial η2 = 
.31. In the low IES group, there was a significant difference between AY (mean = 858 
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ms, SD = 50.6) and both BX (mean = 645 ms, SD = 34.9) and BY (mean =657 ms, 
SD = 37.9) trials, Fs > 53.9, ps < .01, both partial η2 > .73, but no significant 
difference between BX and BY trials, F (1, 20)= 0.57, p > .05.  These effects are 
displayed in Figure 6.7 below.  
 
Figure 6.7. Mean RTs (with standard error bars) for ‘non-target’ trials, split by high and low IES 
groups.  
 
The extreme BDI-II x SOA x condition interaction was significant, F (2, 56) = 3.34, p 
= .04, partial η2= .11. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the SOA x condition 
interaction was significant in the high extreme BDI-II group, F (2, 24) = 5.39, p = .01, 
partial η2= .31, but not in the low extreme BDI-II group, F (2, 32) = 0.21, p > .05. 
Further pairwise comparisons showed that for the high extreme BDI-II group, the 
difference between the SOAs was significant for AY trials, F (1, 12) = 19.97, p =.01, 
difference = 89 ms), but that the difference between SOAs was not significantly 
different for BX,  F (1, 12) = 0.10, p > .05, difference = 12 ms, or BY trials, F (1, 12) 
= 0.48, p > .05, difference = 19 ms. These effects are displayed in Figure 6.8.  
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                          Short SOA   Long SOA 
 
Figure 6.8. Mean RTs (with standard error bars) for ‘non-target’ trials split by high and low extreme 
BDI-II groups. 
 
Error rates: The retro 1 group x condition x SOA interaction was marginally 
significant, F (2, 80) = 2.97, p = .05, partial η2= .10. Further pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the SOA x condition interaction was not significant in the low retro 1 
group, F (2, 46) = 0.82, p > .05. After Bonferroni corrections, the SOA x condition 
interaction only approached significance in the high retro 1group, F (2, 34) = 3.15,     
p = .05, partial η2= .16. Therefore this interaction was not broken down any further. 
These effects are displayed in Figure 6.9. 
                       Short SOA       Long SOA 
Figure 6.9. Mean error rates (with standard error bars) for the ‘non-target’ trials, split by high versus 
low retro 1 group.  
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The retro 2 group x condition x SOA was also significant, F (2, 80) = 3.74, p = .03, 
partial η2= .09. Post-hoc tests showed this reflected a non-significant SOA x condition 
interaction in the low retrospective 2 group, F (2, 52) = 1.40, partial η2 = .26 and, after 
Bonferroni corrections, only a slight trend towards significance in the high retro 2 
group, F (2, 28) = 2.94, p = .07. This effect was therefore not further broken-down.  
 
The diary group x valence x SOA interaction was significant, F (1, 40) = 5.68, p = 
.02, partial η2= .12. The valence x SOA interaction was significant in the low diary 
group, F (1, 23) = 13.23, p = .01, partial η2= .37 but this interaction was not 
significant in the high diary group, F (1, 17) = 0.51, p > .05.  Further pairwise 
comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that in the low diary group the main 
effect of valence was significant in the short SOA, F (1, 23) = 12.89, p = .02, partial 
η2=  .36, but not in the long SOA, F (1, 23) = 2.03, p > .05, partial η2= .08. In the 
short SOA, the low diary group made more significantly errors to sad stimuli (mean = 
7.5%, SD = 4.35) as compared to happy stimuli (mean = 4.35%, SD = 0.98). These 
effects are displayed in Figure 6.10 below. 
 
                          High diary group                                          Low diary group 
Figure 6.10. Mean RTs (with standard error bars) for ‘non-target’ trials as a function of SOA (short, 
long) and valence (happy, sad), for the high and low diary group retrospectively.  
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The diary group x valence x SOA x condition interaction was also significant, F (1, 
40) = 10.28, p = .01, partial η2= .20. The valence x SOA x condition interaction was 
significant in the low diary group, F (2, 46) = 9.01, p = .01, partial η2 = .28 but only 
approached significance in the high diary group, F (2, 34) = 2.84, p = .07, partial η2= 
.43. Further post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) within the low diary group 
showed that the valence x SOA x condition interaction was significant for AY and BX 
trials, F (1, 23) = 12.45, p = .01, partial η2 = .35 and for AY and BY trials, F (1, 23) = 
12.33, p = .01, partial η2 = .35. However, this was not significant for BX and BY 
trials, F (1, 23) = 2.84, p > .05, partial η2 = .07. Additional pairwise comparisons of 
the low diary group performance (further Bonferroni corrected) showed these in turn 
reflected a significant difference between the short and long SOA for sad AY stimuli, 
t (23) = 3.55, p = .01, where more errors were made to the long SOA trials as 
compared to short SOA trials. This comparison was also significant for the happy AY 
stimuli, t (23) = -2.44, p = .02, where more errors were made for short SOA trials 
(mean = 11.94%, SD = 3.1) as compared to long SOA trials (mean = 5.70, SD = 
1.67). None of these comparisons were significant for BX or BY trials, all ts < 1.44, 
all ps > .16. These effects are displayed in Figure 6.11 below.  
               High diary group                                             Low diary group      
Figure 6.11. Mean error rates (with standard error bars) for ‘non-target’ trials, over the two SOAs and 
for the high and low diary group retrospectively.  
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The IES x condition x valence interaction was marginally significant, F (1, 80) = 
3.06, p = .05, partial η2= .20. Post-hoc tests (Bonferroni corrected) revealed this 
reflected a non-significant condition x valence interaction in the low IES group, F (2, 
40) = 0.37, p > .05 and a significant condition x valence interaction in the high IES 
group, F (2, 40) = 4.70, p = .02, partial η2 = .19. Further analysis confirmed that, in 
the high IES group, the main effect of valence was only significant for AY trials, F (1, 
20) = 6.22, p = .02, partial η2 = .24, where more errors were made to sad AY stimuli 
(mean = 12.36%, SD = 2.09) as compared to happy AY stimuli (mean = 9.1%, SD = 
1.69). The main effect of valence was not significant for BX and BY trials, Fs < 2.10, 
ps > .05. These effects are displayed in Figure 6.12 below.  
 
                                          High IES                                                      Low IES 
Figure 6.12. Mean error rates (with standard error bars) for ‘non-target’ trials, split by high and low 
IES group.  
 
Stroop task: 
 
Stroop task performance did not differ on the basis of any of the between-group 
comparisons, in either the reaction time or error data. On each of the intrusive 
memory measures and the other self-report questionnaires, high and low groups 
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performed similarly on the task. Table 6.6 and 6.7 below display these F-values for 
the Stroop task, for reaction times and error rates respectively.  
Table 6.6 
F-values for reaction times in the Stroop task. No F-values were significant. 
 Retro1    Retro2 Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 0.01 0.86 0.28 0.01 0.18 0.13 1.17 
Group x SAT 0.01 0.45 0.01 1.52 0.45 0.90 0.10 
Group x compatibility 0.54 0.23 0.21 0.04 0.51 0.45 0.31 
Group x SAT x compatibility 0.36 0.03 0.01 0.29 0.65 2.08 3.27 
 
 
Table 6.7 
F-values for error rates in the Stroop task. No F-values were significant.  
 Retro1 Retro2 Diary IES RRS BDI-II Extreme BDI-II 
Group 0.10 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.29 1.45 0.04 
Group x SAT 0.09 0.11 0.44 0.10 1.09 0.06 0.01 
Group x compatibility 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.58 1.11 0.49 0.56 
Group x SAT x compatibility 0.98 1.77 0.78 0.08 1.57 0.13 0.05 
 
3) Correlations between self-report questionnaires:  
The correlations between the questionnaire measures are presented in the matrix 
below, see Table 6.8. Firstly, there was a significant positive correlation between the 
two retrospective frequency measures; participants who reported a higher number of 
intrusive memories in relation to one specific previous event, as per Kvavilashvili 
(2014), also reported more intrusive memories overall during the Intrusive Memory 
Interview. In addition, the relationship between the frequency of both retrospective 
measures and IES scores was significant; the more times the participants experienced 
the intrusive/negative involuntary memory, the higher the level of subjective distress 
they also reported. Additionally, participants higher in trait rumination reported more 
intrusive memory-related distress. The correlation between IES and BDI-II scores was 
also significant, in that the higher the depressive symptomatology, the higher the 
intrusion-related distress. The significant correlation between RRS and BDI-II is 
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consistent both with our previous research (chapter 4, chapter 5) and a wealth of 
existing research (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Spasojević 
& Alloy, 2001), demonstrating that rumination is a maladaptive response to low 
mood. Furthermore, the significant correlations are once again evidence that there was 
variation in the sample. Figure 6.13 displays the significant correlations below the 
table.  
 
Table 6.8 
Correlation matrix displaying the correlations between the questionnaire measures. Significant 
correlations are presented in Figure 16.  
 Measure         Retro 1 Retro 2 Diary IES RRS BDI-II 
1 Retro 1       
2 Retro 2 .81 **      
3 Diary .21 .26     
4 IES .34 * .43 ** -.16    
5 RRS .03 .10 -.17 .32 *   
6 BDI-II .12 .13 .12 .45 ** .45 **  
** p < .01, * p < .05, (*) p < .10   
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Figure 6.13. Displaying the significant correlations on the self-report measures 
 
Discussion:  
  
The current study aimed to examine the role of cognitive control in intrusive memory 
vulnerability, using emotional tasks to extend upon the studies presented earlier in the 
thesis. This modification was done to ensure that the lack of cognitive control deficits 
found in these previous studies was not simply the result of the non-emotional stimuli 
used. This consideration was based upon research investigating cognitive control 
deficits as a function of depressive symptomatology, which has shown that 
individuals with depression show deficits when the cognitive control tasks involve 
emotional material (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Joormann, Hertel, Brozovich, & 
Gotlib, 2005; Joormann et al., 2011). No previous research has used emotional tasks 
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to investigate a potential link between cognitive control and intrusive memory 
experience. However, because intrusive memories have been highlighted as a feature 
of depression (Kandris & Moulds, 2008; Kuyken & Brewin, 1994; Kuyken & Brewin, 
1999), and because they relate specifically to negative material, it was deemed 
important to assess performance in respect to emotional cognitive control, for both 
positive and negative stimuli. Consequently, the study investigated whether 
individuals who experienced a high number of intrusive memories were differentially 
affected by irrelevant happy or sad stimuli than individuals experiencing fewer 
intrusive memories. As for the previous studies presented in the thesis, a thorough 
investigation of intrusion-memory experience was conducted, comprising of both 
frequency and consequence measures. In turn, frequency was measured in two ways, 
with retrospective and diary measures. This was to ensure the measures were as 
accurate as possible, and to cautiously distinguish between intrusive and negative 
involuntary memories in light of some of the ambiguity surrounding the distinctions 
between the two terms. This thorough investigation of memory experience is 
important, as it has consistently been shown that it is not the frequency of memories 
that is of most importance, but instead the way the individual reacts to the memory 
(Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b). 
 
Another modification was the extension of the long SOA, as compared to the previous 
studies presented in the thesis. This was an attempt to increase the sensitivity of the 
task to be able to uncover any performance differences between BX and BY trials, 
and brought the long SOA into line with existing research (Braver et al., 2001; Msetfi 
et al., 2009). This change did impact participants’ performance; in the long SOA 
conditions, participants were slower in both ‘target’ and ‘non-target’ trials and made 
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more errors in ‘target’ trials. This is opposed to chapters four and five, where 
participants responded faster and made fewer errors in the long SOA trials, and 
suggests that participants were influenced by the requirement to maintain context over 
a long duration period, as predicted by the DMC (Braver et al., 2007). This model 
states that, when the duration between the cue and target reaches a certain point, 
proactive control will not always be the optimal mode of control, due to the cost of 
context maintenance. Therefore, this finding is in support of the DMC, as the theory is 
eloquently able to account for these changes in behaviour, both within tasks and 
between populations (Braver et al., 2007, 2009; Speer, Jacoby & Braver, 2003).  
However, this effect of SOA did not interact with condition, i.e. performance was not 
selectively impaired for trials with the target letter X, where the response is 
ambiguous, as compared to the target letter Y, where the target letter indicates a ‘non-
target’ response is appropriate.  
 
A variety of between-group differences emerged on the AX-CPT, on both ‘target’ and 
‘non-target’ trials. Of these, the most interesting was the effect of IES group. While 
reaction times in the low IES group did not differ between BX as compared to BY 
trials, the high IES group responded significantly more slowly to BX trials than to BY 
trials. This suggests that the high IES group were more influenced by the target-letter 
than the low IES group, who were able to use the B cue to prepare a ‘non-target’ 
response. This suggests a specific deficit in proactive control in individuals who 
report high levels of intrusive memory distress, specifically that they were less able to 
use context to prepare or maintain behaviour. In addition, the high IES group made 
significantly more errors to AY trials with sad stimuli, as compared to AY trials with 
happy stimuli, suggesting that they were impaired by the negative stimuli. As these 
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effects were not found in chapter four which use the same IES measure, but an 
unvalenced task, it suggests that future research should use emotional tasks of 
cognitive control to best uncover intrusive-memory related deficits in cognitive 
control.  These results are initial evidence that individuals experiencing high levels of 
intrusive-memory related distress show some deficits in cognitive control.  
Looking at the other findings that emerged, the significant effects that emerged on the 
‘target’ trials reflected that the high diary group made significantly more errors to sad 
stimuli than to happy stimuli, where there was no effect of valence in the low diary 
group. This is another interesting finding which suggests that individuals experiencing 
more negative involuntary memories are more affected by irrelevant negative stimuli 
than individuals who do not experience so many memories; further evidence for a 
deficit in cognitive control. Again, this highlights the importance of using emotional 
tasks to look at potential cognitive deficits in this sample. Also on the diary group 
categorization, the effects of valence and SOA affected the high and low groups 
differently. Specifically, it was found that on the AY trials, the low diary group made 
more errors for sad stimuli with a short SOA as compared to sad stimuli for with a 
long SOA, whereas this effect was reversed for happy stimuli. It is unclear what this 
finding reflects, as it is not in the direction that was predicted. These unexpected 
findings highlight the need to be cautious when interpreting the findings that were as 
predicted. In particular, it must be noted in the interpretation of the valence x SOA 
interactions that, in light of the number of potential trial types (given that each cue-
target pair was presented with both of the two SOA and valence options), the strength 
of these interactions is relatively weak. It would be important to replicate these 
findings in a design with more trial types, and with more participants, before drawing 
any strong conclusions. However, given some earlier issues with the AX-CPT in 
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chapters four and five, it was deemed important for the current study to also use the 
emotional Stroop task as a measure of cognitive control. This limited the feasible 
duration of the emotional AX-CPT task. The same limitations apply to the valence x 
SOA interactions found in the ‘non-target’ trials. These findings reflected that the 
group reporting a low number of intrusive memories were more slowed by the long 
SOA in the happy stimuli, as compared to the sad stimuli. It is unclear why this was 
the case. In the meantime, the findings of the current study reflect some indication 
that there is some link between intrusive and negative involuntary memory experience 
and cognitive control. 
 
The other between-group effects were related to depressive symptomatology, as 
measured by the BDI-II. Crucially, these effects were only found in the extreme BDI-
II group categorization, and not in the traditional mean split analysis.  For the ‘target’ 
trials, the differential impact of valence on SOA was only significant in the low 
extreme BDI-II group, who showed a larger slowing in the long SOA for sad stimuli, 
as compared to the effect of SOA on happy stimuli. This, contrary to what would be 
predicted by previous research into the impact of depressive symptomatology on 
cognition (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), suggests that the low extreme BDI-II group 
were more affected by the irrelevant negative stimuli than the high extreme BDI-II 
group. The other effect of extreme BDI-II group reflected that the high extreme BDI-
II were particularly slowed on the long SOA AY trials (as compared to AY trials with 
a short SOA), whereas the SOA x condition interaction was not significant in the low 
extreme BDI-II. Again, this is an interesting finding as it suggests a specific 
depressive-related impairment in context maintenance. As previously discussed, this 
supports existing research using the AX-CPT (Msetfi et al., 2009). The focus on 
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depressive symptomatology was only secondary to the focus on intrusive memory, 
therefore no low mood criteria was used in participant recruitment. However, given 
the effects of BDI-II were only found in the more extreme analysis, future research 
focusing on depressive symptomatology should use this cut-off criterion. Msetfi et al. 
(2009) only looked at the impact of mild depression (BDI-II scores ≥ 9) on task 
performance, whereas the criteria for the high group on the extreme categorization 
used in the current study was a score ≥ 17. This score, according to the original BDI-
II manual reflects a high true-positive rate (Beck et al., 1996), and is also consistent 
with previous research (Saunders & Jentzsch, 2014). It would be useful for future 
work to continue to use the emotional version of the task to further explore these 
deficits.  
 
Performance on the emotional Stroop was also used to index proactive and reactive 
control processing. They were reflected through the impact of speed-accuracy 
instructions, and through Conflict Sequence Effects (CSEs), respectively. On the 
Stroop task, participants demonstrated proactive control by effectively using the 
instruction at the beginning of the block to adapt their behaviour; responding faster 
under speed instructions and more accurately under accurate instructions. However, 
contrary to predictions, there was no effect of previous trial compatibility on current 
trial performance; the classic Stroop effect was not reduced after an incompatible trial 
as compared to a compatible trial. This meant there was no measure of reactive 
control in this task either, although it is unclear why this was the case.  One 
interesting possibility pertains to the recruitment criteria used in the study 
advertisements. The specific wording of the advert was for individuals who had 
recently experienced intrusive memories, rather than not including any memory-
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related requirement. This may have resulted in a sample selection bias, and resulted in 
only participants who experience a high number of memories taking part, rather than 
gaining a true picture of general intrusive/negative involuntary memory experience 
across a general sample. Consequently, all participants may have been characterized 
by a deficit in reactive control, which would explain the lack of CSE in the current 
data set. It is important to remove this requirement from the advertisement to 
investigate this possible explanation.  
 
In terms of group comparisons on the Stroop task, no differences in the ability to 
modify behaviour based on instruction were found. This suggests that individuals who 
experience a high number of intrusive and negative involuntary memories (indexed 
either via frequency and consequences measures) do not show proactive control 
impairments. There were also no differences in task performance as a function of 
depressive symptomatology; high and low BDI-II participants performed similarly on 
the task. The lack of a depressive related deficit in proactive control parallels 
Saunders and Jentzsch (2014), who found participants high in BDI-II scores were able 
to make the same speed/accuracy adjustments as participants low in BDI-II scores, on 
both the classic and emotional Stroop task. In the same study, they demonstrated that 
reactive control was impaired in high BDI-II participants in the emotional, but not the 
classic, Stroop. Specifically, high BDI-II participants showed reduced CSEs (i.e. a 
reduced ability to adapt behaviour after high conflict) compared to low and medium 
BDI-II groups. However, as was no overall CSE in the current study, it is unclear 
whether this selective reactive deficit extends from depressive symptomatology to 
intrusive memory experience.  Although Verwoerd et al. (2009) also found no deficits 
in Stroop performance in relation to measures of intrusive-memory experience, this 
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was only investigated with the classic Stroop task. As previously argued, existing 
research suggests the importance of assessing emotional task performance in terms of 
establishing depressive-related deficits (Joormann et al., 2011; Koster et al., 2005), 
therefore it was important to extend on this finding with an emotional Stroop task, to 
determine whether the use of an emotional task was more sensitive at detecting 
intrusive-memory related deficits. However, no between-group differences were 
found in terms of the ability to modify behaviour based on instruction during the 
Stroop task, and neither of the groups were differentially affected by the compatibility 
of the stimuli. This suggests against the idea that people experience more, or suffer 
more from, memories for negative past events that they did not deliberately recall are 
characterized by deficits in cognitive control.  
 
In conclusion, the current study was conducted to address some of the limitations of 
the studies presented in the preceding two chapters, most critically by including 
emotional stimuli, addressing the relatively short long SOA used previously and by 
using different measures of proactive and reactive control. The importance of using 
emotional stimuli was supported by the findings that did emerge in this study. In 
comparison to the lack of the overall intrusive and involuntary memory-related 
deficits found previously in the thesis, some behavioural RT comparisons were 
significant. Although the findings were not clear-cut, the findings do support that the 
addition of valence to the task was important and made the task more sensitive. Most 
interestingly, the finding that the high IES group did show significantly poorer 
performance on BX trials compared to BY trials, where in both cases the cue letter B 
had already indicated that a ‘non-target’ response was required. In addition, the 
change to the SOA did affect performance. In this case, participants were slower and 
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made more errors in the long SOA trials. Despite this, there was still no difference in 
RTs between BX and BY trials. Importantly, this shift in behaviour as the result of the 
extended duration between cue and target does a support a dual mechanisms account 
of cognitive control (Braver et al., 2007).  Consistent with the other two studies 
presented here, this BX/BY difference was found in the error data; more errors were 
made in BX trials as compared to BY trials. This is an important characteristic of the 
task. However, the lack of RT difference, even with those adaptations to the 
methodology, does highlight limitations of the task. It could be too simple for the 
sample tested, a conclusion that will be further discussed in the subsequent final 
discussion chapter. These discussed limitations of the AX-CPT provided the rationale 
for also looking at Stroop task performance in the current study. However, there were 
no deficits in Stroop task performance on any of the between-group comparisons. It 
must be noted that conclusions about Stroop performance are hampered by the lack of 
CSEs in the data. Nonetheless, it can tentatively be concluded that this is evidence 
that intrusive-memory deficits do not emerge on all emotional tasks.  
 
Overall, the results of the current research do suggest that future research into 
intrusive and involuntary memory vulnerability should continue to use emotional 
stimuli in the tasks. This is perhaps an especially important consideration when using 
non-clinical samples to establish basic mechanisms underlying intrusive memories, as 
it appears to make the AX-CPT task as sensitive as possible to any individual 
differences. The subsequent closing chapter will discuss the limitations of the current 
design, and draw together conclusions emerging across the three studies into cognitive 
control.  
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Chapter seven. 
Discussion. 
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The aim of the present thesis was to build upon existing research into intrusive 
memories in depression. Once considered specific to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), individuals with depression also experience intrusive memories (Brewin et 
al., 1996b; Kuyken & Brewin, 1994). Intrusive memories refer to past negative 
autobiographical events, and come to mind without having been deliberately recalled 
(Hackmann et al., 2004). Contrary to the traumatic nature of intrusions in PTSD, the 
content of intrusive memories experienced by individuals with depression primarily 
concerns interpersonal events, for example arguments or relationship break-ups 
(Moulds & Krans, 2015), past failings (Newby & Moulds, 2012), loss of employment 
or death of others (Brewin et al., 1996b). Importantly, depressed individuals have 
been demonstrated to appraise their intrusive memories in a negative way for example 
‘having this memory means there is something wrong with me’ (Moulds et al., 2008). 
These maladaptive responses increase distress (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & 
Moulds, 2008b) and contribute to the maintenance of low mood over time (Newby & 
Moulds, 2011c). For example, distress may encourage avoidance behaviours, 
including thought suppression and rumination, which further increase the distress 
experienced (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Moulds et al., 2008). Therefore, a considerable 
amount of research has focused on factors that are important after the experience of 
intrusive memories, including the importance of these maladaptive responses. The 
primary aim of the thesis, however, was to look at why these intrusive memories 
come to mind in the first place. As intrusive memories are memories that have not 
been deliberately recalled, or memories that come to mind when we do not want them 
to, it has been suggested that the experience of intrusive memories may be related to 
individual differences in cognitive control (Bomyea et al., 2012). Therefore, three 
studies looked at a potential link between cognitive control and intrusive memory 
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experience, using the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMC) framework 
(Braver et al., 2007). Despite growing support for the DMC, existing research into 
cognitive deficits in relation to intrusive memory experience has not distinguished 
between proactive and reactive control. Therefore, the goal of the current thesis was 
to determine whether intrusive memories are experienced as a result of impaired 
cognitive control, and if so which aspect of cognitive control, proactive or reactive, is 
affected. A further goal was to include emotional cognitive control tasks, specifically 
the emotional AX-CPT and the emotional-face Stroop. Most of the existing research 
examining a link between intrusive memory experience and deficits in cognitive 
control has not used tasks that feature emotional stimuli. However, it is important to 
include an emotional component into the measure of cognitive control, as intrusive 
memories explicitly relate to a negative life event. Consequently, individuals who 
experience a high number of these memories may display a specific deficit on a task 
that includes negative emotional information.  One example of intrusive memory 
research which has used a task with an emotional component is the Colour Naming 
Interference Task used by Wessel et al. (2008) in their investigation of film-induced 
intrusive memories. This task included both positive and negative film-related words.  
They found that a lower level of interference on the task was related to better 
performance on a Random Number Generator task, which was used as a measure of 
individual updating/monitoring abilities. This supports the idea that good 
updating/monitoring plays a role in reducing interference from stressful life events, in 
this case watching a stressful film-clip. Importantly, however, performance on the 
colour-naming interference task was not directly related to indices of intrusive 
memory experience; it was only related to updating/monitoring abilities. Therefore, 
the current thesis aimed to further investigate performance on a cognitive control task 
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with an emotional component. Another important goal of the current thesis was to 
extend the investigation from potential cognitive control deficits and intrusive 
memories, to look more generally at all kinds of involuntary memories, which can be 
positive, negative or neutral. This aim was consistent with recent commentary about 
the importance of bridging the gap between clinically-focused literature, which has 
focused almost exclusively on negative intrusive memories, and research into 
involuntary memories more generally (Moulds & Krans, 2015). Crucially, the 
involuntary memory literature has demonstrated that involuntary memories are 
common, although the specific frequency varies between individuals and over time 
(Berntsen, 2011).  Most importantly, these memories are often about positive 
(Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004), or not particularly important life-events 
(Berntsen, 2001), rather than being exclusively about traumatic or highly stressful life 
events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008). Therefore, starting with the assumption that 
involuntary memories are always problematic is not theoretically justified. 
Accordingly, Rasmussen and Berntsen (2009) reason that while these memories may 
become problematic if experienced on a regular basis, or if they relate to a particularly 
stressful event, it does not necessarily follow that the mechanisms underlying 
involuntary memories are fundamentally maladaptive. This argument has 
consequences for research looking at a potential connection between deficits in 
cognitive control and intrusive memory experience; the impact of cognitive control 
may not depend on the valence of the memory. The study presented in chapter five 
was the first study to use a task to measure cognitive control when looking at 
involuntary memory experience and cognitive control. Previous research has focused 
on how the experience of involuntary memory related to self-report measures of 
cognitive failures (Kamiya, 2014; Verwoerd & Wessel, 2007).  
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Given that the exact relationships between intrusive and involuntary memories 
remains to be established, as discussed in the introduction chapter, a cautious 
approach was taken in the current programme of research. In line with previous 
research, the Intrusive Memory Interview (Hackmann et al., 2004) was used to 
measure what was then described as an intrusive memory. However, the memories 
recorded in the diary were more generally referred to as negative involuntary 
memories. These memories could refer to any past event that came to mind without 
being deliberately recalled during the study procedure, rather than concerning the 
same original event.  
 
Results of the cognitive control research will now be briefly recapped and interpreted 
in relation to previous research, before limitations and ideas for future direction are 
presented. In terms of cognitive control, using the traditional AX-CPT, contrary to 
predictions, there were significant findings.  In chapter four, there was an indication 
on the error data analysis that individuals reporting a high number of negative 
involuntary memories demonstrated a deficit in proactive control. This suggests that 
experiencing a high number of negative unrecalled memories interferes with the 
ability to accurately maintain contextual information.  In chapter five, which 
examined all types of involuntary memories, there was a similar finding on the 
consequence measure of involuntary memory experience, specifically on the measure 
of rumination. High ruminators made more errors to trials with a long SOA, compared 
to trials with a short SOA. In this case, rumination was used as a measure of trait 
tendencies to get stuck on negative cognitions, such as negative involuntary 
memories, or feelings of low mood. Therefore, this finding is an indication that 
individuals who suffer more from their involuntary memories show a deficit in 
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proactive control. The other effects that were found in the involuntary memory 
chapter were related to the extreme BDI-II group categorization. Contrary to 
predictions, individuals high in depressive symptomatology (BDI-II ≥ 17) were better 
at maintaining context on non-target trials than individuals low in depressive 
symptomatology. This finding contradicts research by Msetfi et al. (2009), who found 
that the high BDI-II group (BDI-II > 9) showed a deficit in context maintenance. 
Methodological differences between chapter five and Msetfi et al. (2009) that may 
explain this discrepancy have already been discussed, but it is important to note that 
this finding was not found in the other study in this thesis (chapter four) that used the 
AX-CPT. Therefore it is unclear how reliable this finding is. Another finding from the 
final study which looked at emotional AX-CPT performance was that the high 
extreme BDI-II were more conservative than the low extreme BDI-II group (i.e. were 
slower but made fewer errors) in their responses for non-target trials. It must be 
highlighted that there were some issues with the measure of reactive control in these 
earlier chapters. In terms of overall reaction time (RT) performance, participants were 
not impaired by the letter X in BX trials. This suggests they could always fully make 
use of the cue-letter information to already prepare a ‘non-target’ response in cue-
letter B trials. This was probably the result of a relatively short long duration period 
between the two letters, which made the task too easy. However, as predicted, 
significantly more errors were made to BX trials than to BY trials. This demonstrates 
that participants do sometimes engage in target-letter processing (Braver et al., 2007); 
information from the cue was not always fully used to prevent an error. However, as 
this difference was not found in the RT data, conclusions about potential deficits in 
reactive control awaited methodological adjustments to the task, specifically an 
extension of the long duration period.  Although these changes were subsequently 
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made in the final study, there was still no significant difference in RTs for BX 
compared to BY trials. This suggests the previous non-significant BX/BY difference 
was not wholly attributable to the short duration period between letters. This is further 
evidence that the task was possibly too easy for the sample of participants tested.  In 
addition to the repeated-measures ANOVAs used in the current data analysis, some of 
the previous work using the AX-CPT has also used signal detection measures of 
sensitivity (d’-context) to analyse error data. This method compares hit rates to AX 
trials to false alarms to BX trials, and is taken to be a more specific measure of 
sensitivity to context (Cohen, Barch, Carter, & Servan-Schreiber, 1999).  Participants 
tested in the current research did not make a high enough number of errors to make 
this analysis meaningful (total error rates for AX trials were at < 5% and total error 
rates for BX trials < 8% across all four studies). One possible way to increase the 
number of errors would be to provide a specific response window after the target 
letter is presented, as done by Msetfi et al. (2009), who gave participants 1000 ms to 
respond. This may make the task more sensitive in a young, healthy sample and 
consequently indicate a stronger link between impaired cognitive control and intrusive 
or involuntary memory experience.  
 
Other findings from the emotional version of AX-CPT were more supportive of 
predictions. Specifically, individuals reporting higher memory-distress and higher 
memory-avoidance, as measured by the Impact of Event Scale (IES), showed a deficit 
in proactive control. The IES was used to measure detrimental consequences of the 
memory. Therefore, this finding can be interpreted in respect to the suggestion by 
Braver (2012) that ruminative processes interfere with context maintenance because 
attentional resources are taken-away from task-specific resources. In the case, it is 
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specifically higher levels of intrusive-memory distress, rather than trait rumination, 
that is associated with a deficit in cognitive control.  Because the significant effect 
emerged on the measure of memory consequence, rather than on the measure of 
memory frequency, results are also consistent with existing research highlighting the 
importance of reactions to the memory, rather than the actual frequency of the 
memory per se (Moulds et al., 2008; Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 
2008b). This finding extends the role of distress in intrusive memory maintenance to 
the initial manifestation of the memory; it is higher distress, rather than higher 
frequency, that is associated with a deficit in proactive cognitive control. Therefore, 
future research should take both frequency and consequence of the memory measures 
into account. Another important finding was that, on the error rates for ‘target’ trials, 
individuals who reported high numbers of negative involuntary memories in the diary 
were more negatively impacted by negative stimuli than positive stimuli. This 
suggests a specific valence-dependent deficit in the ability to ignore irrelevant 
emotional material in these participants. It is interesting that both intrusive/negative 
involuntary memory frequency findings pertained to the diary measure of intrusive 
memories. Although, as will be discussed below, there are potential issues with the 
accuracy of diary measure, the current findings do suggest that the diary is the most 
sensitive frequency measure in terms of determining individual differences in 
cognitive control. This programme of research reflected the first application of the 
DMC to intrusive memory research and found some evidence for a deficit in proactive 
control as a function of intrusive or involuntary memory experience. Existing research 
has focused specifically on the role of proactive interference and has demonstrated an 
association between low levels of resistance to proactive interference and high levels 
of intrusive memories (Verwoerd et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 2011). Although this 
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previous research has successfully focused on one specific component of cognitive 
control, the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) was used as the framework for the 
current research because it addresses the flexibility of cognitive control. Therefore the 
current demonstration of a deficit in proactive control on both the IES and on the 
diary measure, considered in conjunction with the findings of previous research, 
suggest that there is some link between the experience of memories that are not 
deliberately recalled and individual differences in cognitive control. However, it is 
important to recognise the limitations of the current findings. Across the thesis, the 
sample sizes were relatively small and there were a number of statistical comparisons 
made for each set of task data. This increases the probability of making a Type I error, 
i.e. finding a “false positive”. Alpha corrections were applied to post-hoc comparisons 
only. Therefore, it is important to try and replicate the findings in a much larger data 
set, where alpha corrections can be made to all between-subjects comparisons, and 
using a more sensitive task than the AX-CPT.  This limitation is particularly 
important in the final study, where not all findings were in the predicted directions 
(e.g. participants in the low diary group were more negatively impacted by the sad 
stimuli than the happy stimuli, whereas this was not the case for the high diary group).   
These unexpected findings underline the importance of being cautious about the 
strength of the findings that were in line with predictions; again, it would be important 
to establish a more consistent pattern of memory-related deficits before drawing any 
concrete conclusions. An important message emerging from the final study pertains to 
the importance of using the emotional version of the AX-CPT as the most sensitive 
way of uncovering individual differences in cognitive control that are linked to 
intrusive memories. This finding is consistent with existing literature looking at the 
general effect of depression on cognitive control, which has found that depressive-
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related deficits most consistently emerge when tasks require the processing of 
emotional material (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Joormann et al., 2005; Joormann et al., 
2011). However, it is important to note that there were no significant differences 
between the groups on the emotional-Stroop task. Therefore, intrusive memory related 
deficits do not emerge on all cognitive control tasks with an emotional aspect. The 
Stroop specifically measures response inhibition; the ability to override automatically 
triggered responses when they are not appropriate (Verwoerd et al., 2009). 
Consequently, the lack of between-group differences does not lend support for the 
idea that there is a link between intrusive memory experience and response inhibition 
abilities. Verwoerd et al. (2009) also found that there was no relationship between 
performance on the classic Stroop task and intrusive memories of a stressful event in 
student participants, using regression analysis. This previous work by Verwoerd et al. 
(2009) was extended to include the emotional Stroop task, as it was argued that 
deficits might emerge on a task that included irrelevant emotional material. However, 
this was not the case and is further evidence that there is no relationship between 
intrusive memories and response inhibition, as assessed by the Stroop. Furthermore, 
in light of the contradictory results of the emotional AX-CPT and emotional Stroop 
tasks, future research should continue to use emotional tasks that rely on different 
components of cognitive control in order to provide a clearer indication of intrusive or 
involuntary memory-related deficits.   
 
While the studies presented here provide at least some indication that there is a link 
between cognitive control and intrusive memory experience, it is important to 
highlight the limitations of the work. One potential issue relates to the non-clinical 
student and community sample used throughout the thesis. Notably, these samples are 
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consistent with the type of samples used in existing research into both intrusive 
memories in depression generally (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 
2008b), as well as research looking specifically at cognitive control and intrusive 
memories (Verwoerd et al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2010). Non-
clinical participants, performing on a continuum across a particular clinical diagnostic 
measure, are often used in experimental cognitive psychology to initially investigate 
any basic effects. For example, student and community samples have been used to 
investigate the relationship between rumination and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993), between depression and overgeneral memory 
(Gibbs, 2004; Smets, Griffith, Wessel, Walschaerts, & Raes, 2013), and between 
problem solving, depression and rumination (Dennis, Astell, & Dritschel, 2012; Kao, 
Dritschel, & Astell, 2006). As advocated by Brewin (1998), the primary overarching 
aim of this kind of non-clinical research is to establish any basic effects in a non-
clinical sample, with the view to later try and generalise findings to clinical samples. 
However, there is a well-known criticism of the use of undergraduate student samples 
in behavioural sciences, which highlights the dangers of making wider inferences on 
the basis of results from this highly specific Western and highly educated sample 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). In addition, it could be argued that the lack of 
significant between-group differences in the cognitive control studies may reflect a 
lack of variation within the sample. It could be the case that all individuals are too 
high functioning and that there was an issue with ceiling effects on the task. This may, 
for example, explain the lack of difference in RTs between BX and BY trials; 
participants all used proactive control effectively to engage in cue-based processing 
and, as a consequence, there was not enough variation to find significant differences 
in reactive control. Another potential issue is that the sample was non-clinical. As 
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such, it could be argued that the intrusive memories participants experienced were 
perhaps not as distressing or as debilitating as memories reported by a less healthy 
sample, and therefore perhaps the same underlying effects do not apply to memories 
experienced by clinical populations. However, in response to these criticisms, it must 
be noted that this sample is consistent with previous research that did find 
performance differences as a function of intrusive memory experience, specifically in 
relation to proactive interference abilities (Verwoerd et al., 2008; Verwoerd et al., 
2009) and in terms of more general measures of attentional control (Verwoerd et al., 
2008; Wessel et al., 2008). Consequently, the lack of clear effects found in the current 
research cannot simply be attributed to the type of participants that were tested. In 
fact, scores on the self-report measures suggest that the current sample was actually 
characterized by higher intrusive-memory distress than reported in this previous 
research. For example, when looking at proactive interference, Verwoerd et al. (2009) 
reported the mean IES score for intrusive memories of most distressing event 
participants had ever experienced to be 14.11 (SD = 13.48). This mean is substantially 
lower than the mean IES scores in the current programme of research, which were 
33.34 (SD = 13.49) in chapter four, and 33.67 (SD = 16.75) in chapter six. These 
comparisons further support the idea that some of the null findings in chapters four 
and five are not simply an artefact of the sample tested. In fact, these scores actually 
seem more similar to Horowitz et al. (1979) who reported that the mean IES scores in 
a clinical outpatient sample was 39.5 (SD = 17.2). Nonetheless, it must be noted that 
the mean scores on the BDI-II, which was used as a measure of depressive 
symptomatology, were low in the current sample. Across the cognitive control 
studies, the mean BDI-II ranged from 9.23 (SD = 5.65) to 13.49 (SD = 9.08), and for 
the intervention study, which specifically recruited low mood participants, the mean 
	  	   224	  
BDI-II score was 20.44 (SD = 14.85). To put this into context, the original BDI-II 
manual (Beck et al., 1996) cites scores between 0-13 as indication of no or minimal 
depression, scores between 14-19 as indicative of mild depression, scores between 20-
28 as moderate depression, and scores above 29 as indicative of severe depression. 
Therefore, the mean BDI-II scores of participants tested in the current research are 
low. To counteract the criticism surrounding using mean splits, the current research 
also looked at extreme BDI-II data. While this is advantageous because there are more 
clearly defined differences between the low and high groups, it does mean that sample 
sizes are somewhat diminished. Consistent with past research (Saunders & Jentzsch, 
2014), scores above 17 were included in the high group as this, according to the BDI-
II manual, reflects a high true-positive rate for clinical levels of depression (Beck et 
al., 1996). However, it might be argued that this is still a relatively low score to 
perform the split at, given the maximum total score on the questionnaire is 63.  Across 
the three cognitive control studies, the range of the high extreme BDI-II scores were 
still only between 17-32. Nonetheless, once again it can be argued that this sample is 
consistent with the previous research into intrusive memory experience as a function 
of individual differences in cognitive control. Verwoerd et al. (2009) and Verwoerd et 
al. (2011) both used the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
Scale. Although scores on the CES-D are not directly comparable to the BDI-II scores 
collected in the current research, the mean CES-D scores of participants in this 
previous research were 11.53 (SD = 9.24) and 7.1 (SD = 6.9) respectively. Radloff 
(1977) suggest that scores above 16 on the CES-D should be used as cut-off point for 
high levels of depressive symptomatology, therefore, it can be concluded that scores 
collected in the research by Verwoerd and colleagues also reflect quite a low 
endorsement of symptoms of depression.  
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An additional limitation of the current cognitive control research is potential 
recruitment biases, because the adverts sought individuals who ‘have recently 
experienced intrusive/involuntary memories’. This specification was used to ensure 
that participants were able to notice and report on their experience of intrusive and 
involuntary memories. However, this may have resulted in frequency estimates being 
artificially inflated, with only very few participants experiencing no or very low 
numbers of intrusive or involuntary memories. This in turn may have reduced the 
ability of the design to find significant group differences, as all participants may have 
been characterized by some degree of cognitive deficit. This could, for example, be an 
explanation for why there was no conflict sequence effect (CSE) in the Stroop task 
presented in chapter six. Contrary to predictions, and contrary to previous research 
(Gratton et al., 1992; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Saunders & Jentzsch, 2014), 
participants did not make on-line performance adjustments in response to conflict. 
However, given the selection criteria outlined in the advert, which meant all 
participants were experiencing unrecalled memories to some extent, this lack of 
adjustment may reflect that all of the current participants were characterized by a 
reduced ability to modify their behaviour based on previous experiences of conflict. 
This would specifically reflect a deficit in post-interference reactive control (Braver et 
al., 2007), as has previously been demonstrated in participants with high levels of 
depressive symptomatology (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2007; Saunders & Jentzsch, 2014). 
It must be noted that, despite the wording of the advert, for the intrusive memory 
chapters, there were two or three participants who did report zero intrusive memories 
on either the retrospective, diary, or on both measures. Conversely, there were no 
participants who recorded zero memories in the involuntary memory chapter.   
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In terms of the intrusive memory study, the data from the participants reporting zero 
memories was still included in the analysis. This would have reduced the potentially 
inflated overall mean number of memories. However, it is important to address this 
issue in subsequent research. Removing any mention of previous intrusive or 
involuntary memory experience from the recruitment procedure would ensure an 
accurate picture of everyday experiences of intrusive or involuntary memories was 
attained. This would potentially uncover individual differences in cognitive control 
between people who experience no intrusive or involuntary memories, as compared to 
individuals who experience either a low or high numbers of intrusive or involuntary 
memories.  
 
Another potential criticism of the studies presented is the use of mean splits to 
establish the high and low groups for each of the dependent variables. This method of 
analysing the data were used for practical reasons, as it makes a continuous variable 
suitable for an ANOVA-based analysis. In addition, data from all participants is 
included in the analysis, rather than excluding participants with ‘medium’ scores as 
done in some previous research to accentuate group differences (Compton et al., 
2008; Watson et al., 2008). However, this form of dichotomization, such as mean or 
median splits, has been criticised (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002; 
Streiner, 2002). The biggest problem with splitting data this way is that similar scores 
will be grouped differently if they fall close to the cut-off value. The method also 
reduces statistical power. For example, Cohen (1983) demonstrates that 
dichotomising variables reduces power in a similar way to reducing sample size. This 
is especially problematic in light of the already relatively small number of participants 
tested in the present studies. With larger sample sizes, future research could use 
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regression analysis, such as used by Verwoerd and colleagues, to address the issues 
with the current method of data analysis. Another reason for using mean splits to 
analyse the current data set was that there are no clear guidelines on splitting the 
primary variables of interest into standardized groups, for example what constitutes a 
high or a low number of intrusive or involuntary memories. This is in contrast to the 
classification guidelines provided for BDI-II scores, as outlined above. A clearer 
picture of general experiences of these memories would be required for this type of 
predetermined group classification.  
 
There are also some general issues concerning the accuracy of frequency assessments 
of both intrusive and involuntary memories. Previous reports of frequency, which 
provide a reference point for comparing frequency estimates from the current 
research, will now be summarized. Looking at intrusive memories reported through 
the Intrusive Memory Interview, Newby and Moulds (2011a) note that their currently 
depressed participants reported experiencing intrusive memories on 3.75 (SD = 2.57) 
days during a one-week period, the recovered depressed participants on 3.00 (SD = 
2.41) days and never depressed on 2.79 (SD = 2.22) days. Within those days, the 
currently depressed experienced their memories 3.60 (SD = 3.68) times, the recovered 
depressed 1.92 (SD = 1.12) times, and the never depressed 1.43 (SD = 0.94) times. 
These numbers result in total frequency estimates over the week of 13.5 memories for 
the currently depressed, 6 memories for the recovered depressed and 4 memories in 
the control participants. As the sample tested in the thesis was non-clinical, 
participants were most similar to Newby and Moulds (2011a) control participants who 
reported 4 intrusive memories during the week.  Therefore, the frequencies of 
intrusive memories in the current research, also measured by the Intrusive Memory 
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Interview (mean intrusive memories over the week= 4.99, SD = 5.13 and mean = 
5.10, SD = 8.42 in chapters four and five respectively) are similar to this past 
research. When all memories reported on the Intrusive Memory Interview were 
considered in chapter six, the mean was 7.16 (SD = 7.85). In terms of the diary 
measure, which was taken as a more general measure of negative involuntary 
memories, frequencies were 2.46 (SD = 1.48) and 4.53 (SD = 4.01). These are lower 
than frequencies indicated by Newby et al. (2014) when testing the efficacy of 
cognitive bias modification and cognitive behavioural-based interventions as a 
treatment for problematic intrusive memories. Their control participants, who 
received no treatment, recorded a mean of 14.47 (SD = 12.19) intrusive memories 
over a 7-day period on their diary measure. These frequencies seem quite a bit higher 
than participants tested in current research.  Potential issues with the accuracy of the 
diary measure will be discussed after current frequency involuntary memory estimates 
are compared to previous research.  In terms of involuntary memories, while it is now 
established that they are common in daily life, there is little concrete evidence about 
their actual frequency (Rasmussen et al., 2015). Furthermore, as introduced in the 
methodology chapter, one key difference between the intrusive and involuntary 
memory literatures are the way memories are measured. Direct comparisons between 
the number of memories recorded in the retrospective and diary measures in the 
current research are not possible, as the two methods relate to two different time 
periods, either the week before or the week after participation in the study. However, 
in the context of the intrusive/negative involuntary memory distinction, it is 
interesting to note that in both the intrusive memory studies, the retrospective 
measures were higher than the diary measures. Kvavilashvili (2014) would argue that 
the diary measure is a more general measure of memory, as it includes a memory for 
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any negative past event that comes to mind during the recording period, whereas the 
Intrusive Memory Interview is a measure of one specific event. This finding may 
underline issues with the inaccuracy of diary methodology. Accordingly, there is 
some indication that different ways of measuring memory frequency can result in 
different estimates of frequency (Rasmussen et al., 2015). For example, accurately 
keeping a diary record of the memories may require too much effort for participants to 
completely adhere to the instructions. Previous discrepancies in memory frequency 
indications support this argument. Specifically, Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) 
found that the mean number of memories recorded in a diary over a 7-day period was 
10.05 (SD = 5.46, range =1-25) in a diary over a 7-day period (sample size=44). 
Compared to this finding, it does appear that the diary frequencies of involuntary 
memories (mean = 4.53, SD = 4.01) were quite low in the current research.  However, 
estimates of involuntary memory frequency provided by Rasmussen and Berntsen 
(2011), also in an undergraduate sample but when memories were indicated by 
pressing a mechanical counter, were substantially higher. In this study the mean 
number of memories recorded was 22.13 (SD = 16.74) over the course of a day 
(sample size = 48). The impact of the chosen recording procedure on the outcome of 
the frequency measure is further demonstrated by Rasmussen et al. (2015) who also 
tested undergraduate students. They showed a difference between frequency estimates 
gathered through a small mechanical counter and through a smartphone, which was 
used as an electronic diary. More specifically, when the frequency estimates were 
indexed through mechanical counters, involuntary memories were experienced over 
two and a half times as frequently over the period of one day (mean = 19.88, SD = 
17.46) as voluntary memories (mean = 8.00, SD = 6.99), and this difference was 
significant. In a different study reported in the same paper, they compared the number 
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of involuntary and voluntary memories, this time recorded using a smartphone device. 
In this case, no significant difference was found between the number of involuntary 
(mean = 14.72, SD = 8.68) and the number of voluntary (mean = 10.32, SD = 7.85) 
memories recorded. The authors suggest this discrepancy may be a result of the 
additional effort required for the smartphone measure, as compared to simply pressing 
the mechanical counter. While a smartphone is small and can be easily kept to hand, it 
still has to be unlocked by a button press to make a recording after a memory is 
experienced. The authors argue that this additional effort to record the memory 
detrimentally affected records of involuntary memory more than voluntary memories 
because involuntary memories are more frequent, and are therefore more sensitive to 
the recording procedure. This suggestion was supported by a meta-analysis they 
conducted on data collected across four studies. Specifically, it was only in the 
involuntary memory condition, and not for voluntary memories, that there was a 
reduction in the number of memories recorded through the smartphone as compared 
to the mechanical counter. This supports the authors’ prediction that involuntary 
memory records are more susceptible to increased demands of the recording 
procedure, simply due to the fact they are experienced more frequently. In 
conjunction, these results imply that when frequency is the focus of the study, the 
recording methodology should be minimally demanding. There is, nevertheless, a 
balance between gathering any type of important information about the memory, and 
trying to keep the recording methodology as reliable as possible. This trade-off was 
considered in the current design by only asking participants to answer a small number 
of questions about their memories, in a small convenient paper booklet. However, 
even this process may have been too time-consuming or awkward for participants to 
accurately record the number of memories they experienced, and may have 
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contributed to the low frequencies in the current data set. Consequently, it would be 
interesting to examine whether using a mechanical counter, instead of a diary 
measure, would vary frequency estimates enough to indicate a different link between 
memory experience and cognitive control.  Another suggestion made by Rasmussen et 
al. (2015) is to look at whether shortening the period during which participants are 
asked to keep records of their memories increases the number of memories 
participants subsequently report. They base this suggestion on research by Kamiya 
(2014). In this study, participants walked around their university campus and recorded 
all involuntary memories they experienced during this time. Records were made by 
immediately alerting the experimenter who was walking slightly behind them with a 
tape recorder. The task lasted approximately one hour, but the mean number of 
memories reported was 12.  As such, the number of involuntary memories 
experienced during this short walk was higher than the total number of memories 
reported in the diary by participants tested in chapter five over a whole week. This 
substantial discrepancy requires further investigation. It does further support the idea 
that the way involuntary memories are measured has an impact on what is recorded.  
Consequently, it would be interesting to rerun the current studies, but only asking 
participants to keep a diary, perhaps with fewer questions, over a period of three to 
four days. This methodological change would help determine if the low frequency 
estimates were somewhat the result of participant fatigue or non-compliance. Previous 
research that investigates the link between cognitive control and intrusive memories 
further suggests asking participants to record intrusive memories in a diary may 
impact the number of memories experienced. Specifically, Verwoerd et al. (2008) 
found that participants who kept a diary of film-related intrusive memories reported 
almost three times as many memories as participants who retrospectively rated their 
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intrusive memories about the film at the end of the week. The authors suggest that 
repeatedly having to remember to fill in the diary may increase the activation of the 
memory, and therefore artificially inflate the number of memories experienced. This 
high level of activation explanation may explain the high estimates of the Kamiya 
(2014) study. Although this finding relates to memories induced by film-clips, and not 
real-life intrusive memories, it is more evidence that the method used to collect 
information on the memories can impact frequency results. Together, these findings 
suggest that future research should carefully consider potential caveats to the specific 
measure that is used. Subsequent studies should also consider comparing different 
methodologies in a between-groups design to address potential implications of these 
discrepancies in terms of establishing a link between cognitive control and intrusive 
or involuntary memory experience. While there are some limitations to the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the work presented in these chapters, there are 
important reasons for continuing to investigate the link between cognitive control and 
intrusive memories. As argued throughout the thesis, understanding more about why 
some individuals experience higher numbers of unrecalled memories, or are more 
negatively affected by these memories, is crucial given the key role they have been 
shown to play in causing distress and sustaining depressive symptomatology (Newby 
& Moulds, 2010; Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b). A clearer 
picture of cognitive deficits may also permit a more in-depth understanding of 
individuals at-risk for mental health problems following stressful life events. For 
example, there is some existing evidence that a predisposition to endorse negative 
appraisals predicts future mental health problems. Specifically, Bryant and Guthrie 
(2007) established that in trainee fire-fighters, a predisposition to endorse negative 
appraisals about themselves, for example ‘I am a weak person’ or ‘I can’t rely on 
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myself’ (Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999) accounted for 20% of the 
variance in PTSD symptomatology after they had been working as a fire-fighter for 
four years, during which time they had been exposed to many traumatic episodes. 
This suggests that pre-existing maladaptive appraisals are a risk factor for later mental 
health problems. A better understanding of such risk factors suggests the potential to 
prevent these problems. There is evidence from intervention studies such as Cognitive 
Bias Modification (CBM) training programmes that appraisal biases in response to 
intrusive memories can be modified (Lang et al., 2009; Woud, Postma, Holmes, & 
Mackintosh, 2013). Examples of more adaptive appraisals include ‘In a crisis, I 
predict my responses will be helpful’ or ‘intrusive memories mean nothing is wrong 
with me’ (Lang et al., 2009; Woud et al., 2012; Woud et al., 2013). Taking part in this 
type of CBM has been shown to reduce IES scores and the number of intrusive 
memories recorded in a diary following a stressful film fragment (Lang et al., 2009; 
Woud et al., 2012). With a stronger understanding of the link between cognitive 
control and intrusive or involuntary memory experience, it would be interesting to 
determine whether training cognitive control would have an impact on intrusive or 
involuntary memory experience. 
 
In light of the already established importance of memory appraisals, in addition to 
looking at potential underlying deficits in cognitive control, the thesis also presented a 
novel intervention designed to address problematic reactions to intrusive memories. 
This was an important contribution to the literature, as there is a general lack of 
existing treatments focused on intrusive memories by individuals with depression 
(Newby et al., 2014). The intervention was based on mindfulness and self-
compassion, and was predicted specifically to counteract negative appraisals and 
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ruminative self-deprecating responses to the memories, for example ‘I should be able 
to rid myself of this memory or ‘having this memory means I am inferior to other 
people’ (Moulds et al., 2008; Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008b). 
This is theoretically important given that it has been established that these 
maladaptive reactions to intrusive memories play a role in maintaining symptoms of 
depression longitudinally (Newby & Moulds, 2011c). Therefore, promoting a more 
adaptive, balanced and self-kind response thorough mindfulness and self-compassion 
training was predicted to be beneficial for participants.  The intervention was 
compared to a control group who took part in relaxation training. This is an important 
addition to some previous research into mindfulness and self-compassion, which has 
only used waitlist control or treatment-as-usual control groups (Heeren & Philippot, 
2011; Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Van Dam, Hobkirk, Sheppard, Aviles-Andrews, & 
Earleywine, 2014). Results were encouraging. There was a significant reduction in 
intrusive-memory distress, as measured by the IES, across both the mindfulness/self-
compassion and relaxation groups. However, this reduction was not characterized by 
a larger decrease in distress in the mindfulness/self-compassion group as compared to 
the relaxation group. This outcome requires further clarification, after the limitations 
of the intervention study highlighted below have been addressed. More 
encouragingly, while there was a significant overall reduction in depressive 
symptomatology, as measured by the BDI-II, this was characterized by a significant 
decrease in BDI-II scores for the mindfulness/self-compassion group, and only a trend 
towards a significant reduction in BDI-II scores in the control group. This 
demonstrates that the intervention was particularly effective at reducing symptoms of 
depression.  Finally, as predicted, only the mindfulness/self-compassion group 
reported significant increases on the measures of mindfulness and self-compassion. 
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These findings again demonstrate that the intervention was successful. However, there 
are some limitations to the study, beyond the low mood non-clinical sample used. 
This sample characteristic is subject to the same limitations as discussed earlier in the 
chapter.  One potential problem could result from trying to operationalize or 
quantitatively measure mindfulness and self-compassion (Grossman, 2011). Both are 
traditionally Buddhist, rather than scientific, concepts (Baer, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 
1994), and one previously highlighted issue is the lack of specific definition of exactly 
what constitutes mindfulness (Grossman, 2011). This lack of clarity limits the ability 
to design an accurate measure of mindfulness, that stays true to its origins 
(Christopher, Charoensuk, Gilbert, Neary, & Pearce, 2009). While the concept of self-
compassion has been more clearly defined (Neff, 2003a), it may also be difficult to 
empirically measure, because of its Eastern philosophical roots. Furthermore, many 
empirical investigations of mindfulness to date focus on whether the intervention is 
effective in reducing symptoms of a particular disorder, rather than focusing on how 
they are successful (Heeren & Philippot, 2011). For example, the first two large trial 
studies into the efficacy of MBCT on relapse into depression (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; 
Teasdale et al., 2000), and more recent examples including Kuyken et al. (2015), did 
not use self-report measures of mindfulness to assess changes in mindfulness. They 
instead focused directly on changes of psychopathology. However, as emphasized by 
Baer (2003), to ensure good evidence-based scientific practice, it is important to 
thoroughly assess whether the benefits of training do indeed result from the changes 
in mindfulness. One example of this type of analysis is Kuyken et al. (2010) who used 
the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS: Baer, Smith, and Allen (2004)) 
to determine that the changes in mindfulness and self-compassion mediated the effect 
of Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) on depression symptomatology, 
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with a sample size of 62. In their assessment of the Mindful Self-Compassion (MSC) 
intervention, Neff and Germer (2013) also measured changes in mindfulness and self-
compassion. They used the Freiberg Mindfulness Inventory (Walach, Buchheld, 
Buttenmüller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006) and the SCS (Neff, 2003b) 
respectively. As previously discussed, this study found significantly larger increases 
on both measures in the MSC group (sample size = 25), as compared to the relaxation 
group (sample size = 27). These results suggest that the benefits observed following 
the intervention are indeed associated with changes in mindfulness/self-compassion 
processes. Accordingly, the current study used the Mindful Attention and Awareness 
scale (MAAS; Brown and Ryan (2003)) to assess changes between the two time 
points, rather than just looking at the impact of training on the intrusive memory, 
depression measures etc. The MAAS is one of the most common measures of 
mindfulness (Solloway & Fisher, 2007) and was chosen for the current study as it 
assesses the experience of mindfulness in daily life (Brown & Ryan, 2003). However, 
there are some limitations to the scale. Firstly, the MAAS only focuses on the 
attentional component of mindfulness (Bergomi, Tschacher, & Kupper, 2013). Other 
measures, such as the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer, Smith, 
Hopkins, Krietemeyer, and Toney (2006)) are based on a wider definition of 
mindfulness, and include aspects of non-judgement, non-reactivity and observing. As 
noted by Woodruff et al. (2014), the definition of mindfulness is somewhat dependent 
on the measure of mindfulness used. This is problematic in respect to the large variety 
of self-report measures of mindfulness, which include the MAAS, the KIMS, the 
Freiberg Mindfulness Inventory and the FFMQ described above, as well as the 
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 
2008). Contrary to the multiple measures of mindfulness, to my knowledge there is 
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only one validated measure of self-compassion, the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS), 
which was therefore the measure used in this intervention study. Another limitation of 
the MAAS is that items are expressed in terms of what is not mindful, e.g. ‘I find 
myself doing things without paying attention’ and ‘I tend not to notice feelings of 
physical tension or discomfort until they really grab my attention’. This wording is 
slightly contradictory to the acceptance and non-judgemental aspect of mindfulness 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1994). In addition to the potential limitations of once specific scale, 
there are also more general issues pertaining to the use of self-report measures of 
mindfulness.  It is unclear whether we are able to accurately assess our level of 
mindfulness; it may not be something we are familiar with noticing and answering 
questions about (Baer, 2011; Grossman, 2011). While this is addressed to some extent 
through the use of statements written in ordinary language which do not require any 
prior knowledge of mindfulness to interpret (Baer, 2011), for example ‘I rush through 
activities without being attentive to them’ (Brown & Ryan, 2003), there still may a 
problem of validity. Furthermore, participants may be especially motivated to report 
changes on the questionnaires after putting substantial time and effort into a 
mindfulness intervention (Grossman, 2011). These factors may have impacted the 
ability to accurately measure mindfulness in the present intervention study.  
 
In addition to addressing these methodological limitations, recommendations for the 
future direction of the intervention study will now be presented. For example, it is 
important to establish the longevity of the reductions in intrusive-memory distress and 
BDI-II scores that were found in the current study. There is some initial evidence that 
reductions in psychopathology are sustainable, for both mindfulness (Kuyken et al., 
2008; Ma & Teasdale, 2004) and self-compassion (Neff & Germer, 2013) based 
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interventions. However, it is crucial to establish whether this is also the case for a 
short mixed intervention, as some of the other short interventions that have been 
tested did not include a follow-up period (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Smeets et al., 2014). 
As both mindfulness and self-compassion training involve quite substantial changes in 
the way individuals relate to emotional adversity, achieving sustainable changes may 
require a minimum number of sessions to promote long-term changes. Another issue 
for future research concerns the exact make-up of the intervention. In my thesis, I 
chose to use a two-component intervention for two reasons. Firstly, as discussed, 
while mindfulness and self-compassion share some similarities, it was proposed that 
both components would bring specific benefits to participants, as individuals have 
been shown to react both unmindfully (‘Because I’ve had this intrusive memory, what 
I’m doing will be ruined’) and in a non self-compassionate manner (‘Because I can’t 
control these memories, I am a weak person’) to their intrusions (Moulds et al., 2008). 
Therefore targeting both processes at once was expected to be more effective than 
addressing either one on their own. Moreover, Neff (2003a) proposes that 
mindfulness training is an important prerequisite of self-compassion training. 
Specifically, to be self-compassionate, individuals need to not overreact to or suppress 
negative thoughts, memories or feelings. These are skills that participants gain 
through mindfulness practice. Despite this underlying rationale, it is important to 
determine whether either of the two components is particularly successful at reducing 
intrusive-memory distress, or whether the combination of the two processes is the 
most effective. Furthermore, if indeed it is the combination that is the most beneficial, 
it would be important to establish the optimal configuration of sessions. For example, 
it is essential to establish whether equal numbers of sessions in mindfulness and self-
compassion are the most beneficial, rather than the current design which consisted of 
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two mindfulness sessions and only one self-compassion session. Another avenue for 
future research is to establish whether the improvements that were observed would 
also be found in a clinical sample. To my knowledge, there are no published 
investigations of a mixed mindfulness and self-compassion intervention in a clinical 
sample. Mindfulness and self-compassion both have been associated with reductions 
in psychopathology in clinical samples (Gilbert & Procter, 2006; Heeren & Philippot, 
2011; Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000) but as previously discussed, in the 
case of MBCT, the training was not effective across the whole sample (Ma & 
Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000). While more general mindfulness interventions 
have been shown to be effective in wider samples, such as community and student 
samples (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Danitz & Orsillo, 2014; Erogul et al., 2014; Shapiro 
et al., 1998), it remains to be determined whether a mixed intervention would only be 
effective for certain people, for example people with particularly low levels of 
mindfulness or self-compassion at baseline, or individuals with an extensive history of 
depression. Nonetheless, despite the limitations of this initial investigation, results are 
encouraging and the study is a first step towards addressing the current lack of 
treatment for intrusive memories in depression (Newby et al., 2014). This is an 
important contribution to the literature.  
 
Another goal of this thesis was to consider the overall manifestations of involuntary 
memory within the context of depression, when looking at the potential importance of 
individual differences in cognitive control. Recently, researchers have emphasized the 
importance of considering the research on involuntary memories more generally when 
looking at intrusive memories, instead of assuming intrusive memories are trauma-
specific or always problematic (Berntsen, 2011; Moulds & Krans, 2015). However, 
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this research is still in its infancy. It is important to bridge the gap between the two 
avenues of research because it has been demonstrated that dysphoric and depressed 
individuals experience both negative involuntary and positive involuntary memories, 
in both laboratory and diary studies (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Watson et al., 
2012). Therefore, only focusing on intrusive memories is overlooking other 
potentially important aspects of depressive cognition. As a consequence of this 
narrow focus, one important matter that had not gained a great deal of research 
attention is the relationship between the valence of involuntary memories and mental 
health problems. For example, it is unclear whether it is the case that low mood 
individuals experience more negative memories and/or fewer positive memories, or 
whether there is no association between the valence of involuntary memories and 
symptoms of depression. Consequently, chapter five sought to address this lack of 
research by looking at the relationship between the proportion of negative involuntary 
memories and the proportion of positive involuntary memories experienced in 
association with BDI-II scores. However, in this student and community sample, there 
were no significant correlations between memory valence (as rated by participants) 
and BDI-II scores. Participants with higher BDI-II scores did not record more 
negative, or fewer positive involuntary memories on the diary measure. Nonetheless, 
this finding may be a result of the non-clinical sample tested, as it must be noted that 
participants’ mean BDI-II score was relatively low (mean = 9.23, SD = 5.65). This 
might have resulted in insufficient variance to reveal significant correlations. It would 
therefore be helpful for future research to look at samples with higher levels of 
depressive symptomatology. Another possibility would be to compare the mean 
valence of the memories and the proportions of memories experienced by currently 
depressed, recovered depressed and never depressed individuals, as categorized 
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through the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV disorders (SCID-I; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, and Williams (2002)). This would indicate whether depressed 
individuals experience more negative and/or fewer positive, involuntary memories as 
compared to recovered depressed or never depressed individuals. As argued 
throughout the thesis, it is also possible that certain samples react to their memories 
differently, rather than it necessarily being the case that they experience different 
numbers of positive or negative memories in the first place. This is supported by work 
by Kvavilashvili and Schlagman (2011) who found that dysphoric participants rated 
their involuntary memories for negative events as more unpleasant than non-
dysphoric participants, although the events were not objectively more negative, as 
rated by the researchers. This suggests that negative cognitive biases played a role in 
the memory ratings for the dysphoric participants and demonstrates a parallel between 
voluntary and involuntary memory systems (Watson et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
their dysphoric participants did report fewer memories for positive events, as rated by 
the researcher. However, with a correlational analysis, this reduced experience of 
positive involuntary memories as a function of low mood was not replicated in the 
diary study presented in chapter five, which is a more naturalistic setting than a 
laboratory vigilance task. It is important to continue to investigate the relationship 
between depressive symptomatology and involuntary memory valence in a sample 
with higher numbers of dysphoric, as well as clinically depressed, participants. This is 
because, as previously argued in the thesis, the cognitive biases in depressed mood 
that have been shown to affect voluntary memory, including higher recall of negative 
material or difficulty recalling positive material (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), are 
well established. However, much less is known about the potential effect of these 
biases in terms of involuntary memories (Watson et al., 2012). For example, very 
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little work has investigated the impact of reactions to non-intrusive involuntary 
memories, for example reactions to positive involuntary memories. However these 
memories potentially have a negative impact on mood. For example, it has been 
shown that analytical responses to positive voluntarily recalled memories (e.g. 
thinking about the causes, meanings and consequences of the event) in low mood 
samples can result in decreases in mood (Werner-Seidler & Moulds, 2012; Werner-
Seidler, 2014). It remains unclear whether this may also be the case for involuntarily 
recalled positive memories. If, however, vulnerable individuals were shown to 
endorse maladaptive appraisals or ruminative reactions to positive involuntary 
memories (e.g. ‘why can’t things be this good now?’), this may be a good target for 
the treatment of mood disorders. This speaks to the importance of continuing to look 
at the overall experience of involuntary memories in low mood and depressed 
samples, rather than focusing only on ‘traditional’ intrusive memories. To my 
knowledge, the work presented in this thesis reflects one of the initial attempts to 
address this.  
 
In conclusion, the current programme of research makes important contributions to 
the existing literature on intrusive and involuntary memories. The research was 
motivated by existing research demonstrating that individual differences in cognitive 
control are associated with the experience of these intrusive memories (Verwoerd et 
al., 2009; Verwoerd et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2010), and represented the first 
application of the DMC, an important framework in the cognitive control literature, to 
this specific research question. Another important contribution to the literature was 
the use of an emotional task of cognitive control in the final study. Overall, there was 
some indication that individuals experiencing a high number of negative involuntary 
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memories are characterized by a deficit in proactive control. This was the case for 
diary measures of negative involuntary memories, on both the classic and emotional 
variant of the AX-CPT, and for the measure of intrusive-memory related distress on 
the emotional AX-CPT. These findings demonstrate that there is some link between 
cognitive control and the experience of memories concerning negative events that 
come to mind without being deliberately recalled. However, particularly in the final 
study, not all findings were clear-cut or in the predicted direction, therefore the link 
between cognitive control and intrusive memory experience needs to be further 
clarified. The work presented in the thesis reflects a step forward in this direction. In 
light of recent criticism of the lack of interaction between the involuntary and 
clinically-focused intrusive memory literatures (Moulds & Krans, 2015), the current 
thesis also extended the existing cognitive control work to investigate whether there 
was a link between the overall experience of involuntary memories, irrespective of the 
valence of the memory, and individual differences in cognitive control. In addition, as 
previously argued, individuals may react in a negative way to positive involuntary 
memories, such as has been demonstrated in reaction to positive voluntary memories 
(Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann, Siemer & Gotlib, 2007). However, there were 
no differences on the task between individuals who reported experiencing a high 
number of involuntary memories and individuals who reported low numbers of these 
memories. This null finding suggests that individuals experiencing high numbers of 
involuntary memory are not characterized by a deficit in cognitive control. Another 
novel contribution of the thesis was the demonstration that a brief mindfulness and 
self-compassion based intervention significantly reduced the distress associated with 
intrusive memories in a low mood sample. In addition, both the mindfulness/self-
compassion intervention and the relaxation control group reported reductions in 
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depressive symptomology, as measured by the BDI-II. The intervention was therefore 
successful and results suggest the potential for the development of intrusive-memory 
treatment. This is important because intrusive memories have been associated with the 
maintenance of depressive symptomatology longitudinally (Newby & Moulds, 2011b) 
and therefore are an important target for treatment.  In sum, the present thesis has 
demonstrated the importance of proactive control related-deficits on intrusive or 
negative involuntary memory experience, and the importance of specifically 
encouraging participants to react more mindfully and more self-compassionately to 
their intrusive memories to reduce both distress and symptoms of depression.   
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Appendix A 
 
Example Diary Questions 
 
Diary questions: (to be completed for each intrusive memory experienced) 
 
What were you doing when the memory came to mind?  
Were you thinking anything at the time?  
How was your mood?  
Very good  0 1 2 3 4 5  Very bad 
Describe the memory in detail: 
 
Is the memory characterized by a certain emotional content?  
Hardly negative  1 2 3 4 5  Extremely negative  
 
Did the memory influence your mood?  
My mood became better, worse, uninfluenced (please circle) 
 
Diary questions (to be completed for each involuntary memory experienced) 
 
What were you doing when the memory came to mind?  
Were you thinking anything at the time?  
How was your mood?  
Very good  0 1 2 3 4 5  Very bad 
Describe the memory in detail: 
 
Is the memory characterized by a certain emotional content?  
 Very negative  0 1 2 3 4 5  Very positive  
 
Did the memory influence your mood?  
 My mood became better, worse, uninfluenced (please circle) 
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Appendix B 
 Compliance Questionnaire 
Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible.   
 
For all questions: 1=I completely agree, 5=I completely disagree 
 
 
Question 1: I wrote down every negative involuntary memory I experienced over the 7 days  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Question 2:  There were times I experienced a negative involuntary memory but I couldn’t 
put it into words 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
If so, how many times do you estimate this was the 
case…………………………………………. 
 
Question 3: There were many times I experienced a negative involuntary memory but it was 
impractical to record details of the memory  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
If so, how many times do you estimate this was the 
case………………………………………………. 
 
Question 4: Overall, the number of memories recorded in my diary reflects very well the 
number of negative involuntary memories I experienced over the week  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 





